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The BEGINNINGS *of* TO-MORROW

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY
OF THE GREAT SOCIETY

BY

HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER, PH.D.

Formerly Professor of Sociology, Ohio State University



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TO HER
WITH WHOM I HAVE TRAVELED
THROUGH MANY YEARS AND MANY LANDS,
WITH GROWING JOY AND UNDERSTANDING

Preface

THE rôle of prophet is an ancient and often discredited profession. In modern times, however, the basis of prognostication is changing from intuitions and hopes to reasoned conclusions drawn from greatly increased knowledge of the possibilities and certainties inhering in both historical facts and natural laws. When we call this "a cock-eyed world" we imply that surgery and spectacles might make it straight.

All sciences, both physical and social, are of primary importance because they promise some control over the future. Physics and mathematics have made it possible to anticipate the strains of a bridge; psychology and sociology give warnings and suggestions for social procedure. In this book I have been trying to look ahead into the largest human relationships from the point of view of a sociologist.

The sociologist is not an advocate; whether things are good or bad, they are equally grist for his mill. As a human being, when he foresees disturbing conditions, he may admonish men to change their attitudes if they would escape disaster. But as a scientist he must describe human processes as they are, not as many might wish them to be. He tries to discover universals in what seem to be unrelated and exclusive phenomena. When religious fanaticism and atheism flourish side by side, he seeks to find a common explanation. He assumes that whatever happens is dependent on some prior condition, so he looks for that condition. If cultures vary widely he does not claim that it is because people are different, but because something in their histories makes them what they are.

Sociology is the most complex of all sciences because it

involves some aspects of all the others; though it is one of the youngest of the social sciences it has an assurance born of the insistence of self-conscious modern society that it be given some indication as to where and how it is going. Sociological methods are still tentative and inadequate, but the technique is improving and the data accumulating. The sociological approach may be intensive or extensive. Accurate statistics in a small area prepare the way for wider application and broader interpretation; a study of a single family throws light on both general family and cultural life.

This book is essentially of the telescopic variety, aiming to plot areas for the later use of the microscope, but never forgetting that a specimen under the microscope is, after all, only a specimen. The method and purpose are two-fold: first, to present enough historical and contemporary data to bring into focus the apparently unrelated but actually universal social forces now active in the whole world; and, second, to suggest directions in which new sociological laws may be formulated. The changes that are taking place in society are so rapid and so extensive that we shall be lost in the storm unless we can take reckonings, even though, at best, they be only approximate. We may want to stay Nordic, nationalistic, capitalistic, and Christian, but, if we cannot, it is well to get some inkling of why, how, what, and when. In the sciences, even in as exact a one as mathematics, progress is made by following the imagination. We build on hunches drawn from what we have learned about other things, lay down a hypothesis and then verify, modify, or reject it.

It is hoped that what follows will offer some stimulus to further and more exact study of the cultures that are virile in the world, and that new and sounder concepts will be developed. For the student there is unlimited opportunity for further exploration; for the general reader some light may be thrown on contemporary bewildering events,

and some interest aroused in watching the course ahead. For those who find the first chapters a little dull I recommend skipping to later ones.

The range that I have covered is broad and much of the treatment necessarily impressionistic. I can only hope that I fall into the class of observers described by Ramsay MacDonald when he said: "A shrewd observer, who will make many mistakes in describing details, will understand the general tendency of the sum total of Indian life more accurately than one who has lived so long in the country that he has ceased to see it except as a mass of moving detail." I have tried to get close to the edge of the craters in the eruptive social conditions of each of the peoples whom I describe, and so far as possible, to identify myself with their cultural point of view, with a sympathy arising from my acceptance of the common nature of all human beings.

No one can escape the insistent rush of news from the awakening East, nor the discouraged notes of dilemma and disorganization from the West. It is, of course, impossible for one book to outline the whole story, for all the libraries of the world can tell only part of it.

The bibliography at the end is selective rather than exhaustive, and is arranged to apply approximately to the sequence of the chapters. Special attention is called to the two books of Dr. Hans Kohn on the Near and on the Hither East, as they are mines of information. When Dr. Kohn and I first met a few years ago in Jerusalem, we read each other's books and were at first surprised that two persons of such wide separation in background and experience should have drawn identical conclusions. The explanation is simple. Fact and theory have been leading in the direction of our common position. Ogburn in *Social Change* has shown by a long list that simultaneous inventions and ideas coming from men widely separated are the product of the accumulated contributions of the times and not of the special genius of the men who produce them.

That such ideas, in this case, are now accumulating is indicated by the dates in the bibliography, a large proportion of which fall within the last five years.

The Great Society is already upon us. Many of our overwhelming problems are but the birth pains of a new order. There are few who doubt its coming, and everyone is eager to push back the veil to see more clearly what that order is to be. I have indicated in the following pages some of the forces and qualities that are now beginning to give form to it. It is a pleasant or unpleasant prospect according to one's point of view, but, since it is inevitable, we may as well prepare ourselves to accept it.

It is impossible to give the names of the many men and women who have been helpful to me. They live all the way around the globe. The inhabitants of Asia are friendly people and many of them have befriended me. Of specific persons, first place must be given to my wife whose constant encouragement has been accompanied by such unrelenting criticism that anything future readers may say will be gentle by comparison; her insistence that sentences should convey meaning has made for clarity where otherwise darkness would have prevailed. My daughter, Gustova, helped with the typing and used the Library of Congress in connection with the bibliography. I owe particular gratitude to my former colleague, Professor Carl Norman of the Ohio State University, who read my first draft and gave me valuable suggestions. Most of the chapters have been read by several people; special mention must be made of Professor J. S. Burgess of Pomona College, who is responsible for my intimate contacts in China through Yenching University, and who gave me valuable suggestions for the chapter on China though he does not accept all of my conclusions. This chapter was also read by Grover Clark, of whom mention is made in the text, and by my former students, C. Y. Yen and L. C. Wen. Another former student, Jayaprakash Narayan, not only prepared

me for many things in India, but was an invaluable cicerone during my stay there. Haridas Muzumdar was designated by Mr. Gandhi to look after us during our stay at the ashram and also accompanied us to Bombay, and has critically read my material on India, as have also S. L. Joshi, Professor of Comparative Religion at Dartmouth College, and Mr. Richard Gregg of Boston, an active worker for India and a close friend of Mr. Gandhi. I also owe more than can be measured to numerous lecture audiences on whom I have tried out my ideas, and to my last graduate class at Ohio State University, which for a year engaged in happy controversy with me over the whole range of the material of the book.

OBERLIN, OHIO

November 3, 1932

Introduction

BY JEROME DAVIS

WHETHER we recognize it or not we are rushing into a new era. The old order is almost as antiquated and useless as is the stagecoach or the sailing schooner. This is true not only of the economic order, about which we have heard so much, but also of the political and ethical realms as well. The radio, the airplane, and the moving picture have shattered the isolation of every nation. In point of time the entire world is smaller to-day than were our thirteen original colonies at the foundation of this republic. A significant event transpiring in the most remote corner of the world is almost immediately the topic of conversation everywhere.

We are actually experiencing a cross-fertilization of cultures, and every nation has become interdependent with every other. The development of new copper mines in South Africa causes riots and unemployment in Montana. The increase of wheat production or a new oil development in Russia means ruin for thousands of American farmers or oil producers. Depression in Europe means depression throughout the world. A new political theory or practice is immediately flashed around the world and may cause reverberations everywhere.

Asia is slowly emerging as one of the great political, social, and economic areas of the world. What is happening there will vitally affect almost every phase of American life, yet we are almost totally ignorant of that vast country. In the next decade we shall have to understand the problems of Asia if we are to live intelligently in the Great Society.

This volume will help us to realize and to comprehend the beginnings of an emergent new civilization — the dawn of to-morrow's world. Here we can secure that introduction to the sociology of internationalism which will be an essential mark of the education of the future.

Dr. Miller has surveyed his field wisely and well. He has not attempted to champion any particular race or culture. If he tears to pieces some of our own rationalizations it is only because he presents the latest scientific data. If college students are to understand the era in which they are living they must become familiar with just such facts about this changing world. Every citizen who is not completely anaesthetized by local provincialisms will find that this volume opens new vistas of understanding.

YALE UNIVERSITY

Contents

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	3
II. REVOLUTION	24
III. CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM	45
IV. RACE	62
V. WESTERN CIVILIZATION	76
VI. ASIA—THE EAST	97
VII. THE CHALLENGE OF RUSSIA	103
VIII. THE ASIATIC ANTIPODE—JAPAN	135
IX. THE CASE OF KOREA	149
X. STATIC AND DYNAMIC CHINA	163
XI. AROUND THE CORNER OF ASIA	196
XII. THE SEARCHING OF THE SPIRIT— INDIA	210
XIII. GANDHI AND THE INDIAN REVO- LUTION	227
XIV. THE CRADLE OF RELIGION	245
XV. THE NEAR EAST—ARABS, JEWS, AND TURKS	255
XVI. CONCLUSION	278
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	289
INDEX	307

THE BEGINNINGS OF TO-MORROW

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The first several hundred thousand years of man's social evolution are shrouded in darkness, but we know that the evolution must have been so slow that a thousand years could have brought but little change. When the stages of savagery and of barbarism came, the speed of progress constantly increased and, relative to what had preceded, became rapid and finally culminated in the beginning of civilization between ten and six thousand years ago. Even then the first steps were halting and uneven, with brilliant spurts in Egypt, Babylon, and India.

The discovery of writing made the era of civilization possible, because it not only made possible the preservation of records, but also enlarged the area of administration through the written transmission of orders and laws. Until almost a century ago, however, the obstacle of space remained unchanged; now the face of the earth has shrunk to the size of a province and time for communication has become instantaneous. More history is now being made in a day than formerly was made in many centuries, but unfortunately the acceleration gives no time for the habits of a generation to catch up with conditions.

Although the words *civilize* and *civilization* originally pertained to the *cives* or citizens of a state, they have acquired a constantly broadening connotation until now they actually imply the highest moral and cultural values. Nevertheless, the ethical, legal, economic, and religious systems under which people live still fall within the limits of a state or nation, and are essentially provincial. The result is that

we have many national cultures and civilizations rather than a *civilization*.

It has never been possible for adjoining peoples to escape altogether from sharing one another's ideas and achievements, although it is possible for them to retain cultural identity. In other words, European civilization is a unit, though composed of peoples sharply contrasted in subsidiary attitudes and institutions. Oriental civilizations stand off distinctly from Occidental, and within themselves, as in China and India, have little in common except what has come by independent evolution. Even between these two there has been occasional contact, as for instance the effect of Indian Buddhism on China.

We also speak of higher and lower civilizations and have come to grade the higher by the degree of utilization of the powers of nature, which has resulted in communication, travel and leisure, education and government. Epoch-making as this development has been, it has perhaps been less fundamental than we have supposed. Within the decade in which we are living, thanks to the War, economics, communication, and travel, isolations have disappeared both within the West and between the West and the East.

An era is more comprehensive and elemental than an epoch. It involves changes in attitudes and directions. We may properly speak of the machine epoch but of the Christian era. The cataclysmic changes that are now taking place both within and between civilizations will so change the course of human affairs that the word civilization, derived from the states of the Roman world, must give way to an era dominated by the larger significance of *cosmopolitanism*; this means the substitution of the Cosmos (the world) for the state. The task now set before human society is to discover how it can make the transition from the age-old codes of values to the new and inescapable necessity of revaluation and readjustment, with

a minimum of destructive conflict both personal and cultural.

We may now look forward somewhat into the future through our knowledge of history and social laws and see ourselves and our changing institutions much as spectators look from the gallery upon the spectacle below. In previous transitions from one era to another the pace was too slow to be observed and philosophers and prophets like Confucius and Plato were too deficient in the data of history and knowledge of the forces in the social process to distinguish the actual from the ideal. While now we have more data and some training, the whirl is so rapid and the characters so numerous that we shall miss many details, but still can get an inkling of the general movement of the drama in which we are both actors and spectators. We can see the breakdown of isolations and the sudden interplay upon one another of hitherto distinctive areas of culture, with disorganizations and reintegrations taking place in quick succession. We see ourselves clinging to old institutions and ideas though admitting them to be empty. We have the paradox of narrow religious, ethical, economic, and political attitudes and broad realistic and philosophical outlooks at the same time. Science, both natural and social, and practical necessities are pushing us into new positions as our old ones become untenable. The daily growing interest in foreign events comes from the knowledge that their consequences concern us and that we cannot escape from them.

We have assumed, almost up to the present moment, that the West — Europe and America — were to set the pace for culture to the end of time and that the white race was the chosen race. We now begin to have a defeatist attitude toward ourselves, and the facts suggest to us that the white race, with barely over one-fourth of the total population of the world, may not, after all, be destined to maintain its preëminence. Each culture has a peculiar,

but not exclusive, contribution to make, and for some time there will be both conflict and assimilation as each continues to specialize in its own field.

The World War was a momentous event, but it was the occasion rather than the cause of the vastly more important developments of the next decade, many of which would have occurred had there been no war, but with less overwhelming swiftness. For example, all the forces making for the Russian Revolution were already active and could not have been held long in leash. The awakening of the vast population of China had already begun, and the revolt in India was gathering force. The scientific and technical developments in Europe and America which will be most instrumental in the change were in full swing; it is impossible to say whether the War helped or hindered their progress. The War, however, marks the effective awakening of the people of the East, which was begun when the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905. This victory not only showed the East that it could use Western weapons, but also stimulated nationalism.

In spite of Kipling, East and West have met. The recent prestige of the West in the eyes of Asia for a time gave rise to an impetus towards imitation and the acceptance of Western standards that misled many into thinking that the West would assimilate the East. The awakening of the East through the rising tide of nationalism has coincided with the waning of both Western power and confidence in its own institutions. This reversal has led the peoples of Asia to reëmphasize their own values, which, in fact, they have never yielded except most superficially. It has been easier for them to return to their own because Western philosophy dealt with practical rather than profound things and, in time of crisis, could not point a way of salvation, while their own philosophies have served them in many crises. It is a great mistake to try to estimate assimilation from what can be seen, for such assimilation may be

most superficial, leaving the depths of Eastern life unmodified.

At the same time that chauvinists have been glorifying the high achievement and probable ultimateness of Western development, there have been many Jeremiahs who have proclaimed its demise. Spengler's *Decline of the West* was accepted rather than scorned. Our archeologists have discovered many cultures that have risen, declined, and even disappeared. They came, however, at times of isolation. Now we have to discover whether, in these times of universal interstimulation, a culture can entirely disappear even though its relative position may change. If there is to be any "compensation" as the West goes down it must be from the rise of the East; such a rise seems to be impending.

The social sciences have formulated some laws of the social process, but they are all derived from observation of the young, rapidly changing, and relatively small groups of the West. Now we are at the same stage with regard to these laws that natural science has been when new discoveries, like the electron theory, threw old formulas into the discard.

Asia has slightly more than half of the population of the world, divided into enormous and distinctive culture areas, some of which were older than any part of the West now is before Greece came over the horizon. The social laws of assimilation, conflict, change, mores, social control, and of a multitude of social institutions, running from the family to the state, may be vastly modified by an intensive study of these settled cultures of vast populations of great age. The interpenetration of the persistent forces of the philosophies and habits of hundreds of millions of peoples extending over a period of thousands of years, is a social phenomenon that we have hitherto not had opportunities to study.

All in all the social process in an awakened Asia has be-

come an irrepressible force in human affairs: its laws are largely unknown, and their effect may be overwhelming. The speed with which the changes have come is almost incredible. Less than thirty years ago, all of Asia was governed either by a resident or an alien absolutism; now absolutism has either all gone, or is giving place to the popular demand for democratic institutions. All of this change is at the same time the product of Western ideas and stimulation and a repudiation of Western interference and control.

Our possibilities of observation at the present time suggest that, in addition to the changes in sociological laws, there may be also a merging of ethical theory with them. Every culture develops moral codes; so long as the group is in isolation, these may be satisfactory, but with the breakdown of isolation they may become invalid. At any rate the problem of morality is made infinitely complicated by the situation we now face. Formerly we were concerned only with the individual and his group; now there is a social process going on which transcends both. It may for convenience be called the Cosmic Process. Just as the aim of both individual and group development may be considered as Goods, so the consequences of the cosmic process may be called the Cosmic Good. Its laws transcend the area in which people have lived, except in terms of religion, but we may hope to discover something of their nature now that our knowledge of history is enlarged and our range of vision is broadened. The aim of morality is always high, but the constraints of ignorance and perspective and the coercive influence of existing social systems have constantly dulled the sight. Now that the range has been enlarged by new conditions, the evolution of ethics must bound forward to keep up with the new relationships. At the same time there are some paradoxes that seem to be inherent in the problem of individual adjustment to the larger and future processes.

Hitherto we have confined the moral problem to the individual and his immediate group, with only such over-reaching as might be inspired by idealism or religion. The conflict between the individual and his group has resulted in establishing the abstract right of freedom of conscience while at the same time every type of coercive pressure is being used to make the individual conform his moral purpose to that of the group. If the conscience has a religious association we may permit conscientious objectors to refuse to go to war if they are citizens of the country, but we refuse to admit them to citizenship when they claim this same right of conscience. Individual morality has been defined in much detail in terms of relationship to the group, and much of it has been crystallized in law. Personal egotism is a vice, but group egotism has been raised to the highest virtue by calling it loyalty and patriotism; the self-interests of groups have become the measure of moral endeavor while the self-interest of individuals is immoral. This magnification of the ultimateness of group aims has reached its climax at the very moment when the interrelations of groups raise the question whether group immorality is not the same as that of the individual. Law makes invalid contracts made between individuals under compulsion but recognizes treaties made under duress between countries. Antipathies and exploitations between groups have not been considered reprehensible. The paradox is that the growth of these antagonisms has often resulted in unexpected developments that raise the question whether the Cosmic Good may not require immoral agencies for its advancement.

Many things go on in the social process that by every present definition now used must be called immoral. Let us take anti-Semitism as an example. From the point of view of neither the Jew nor the non-Jew can it be morally justified by any ethical standards; from the point of view of the Jew it has meant rank injustice. It has, however, been a stimulus of incalculable importance in

driving the Jews to achievements of social value much out of proportion to their numbers and ability; thus from the point of view of society as a whole it is an injustice that has brought a Good. The exploitation of China by the Western powers and the losing of the war with Japan in 1895 seemed to be necessary stimuli to awaken China, and the dominance of the English in India was the instrument for the arousing of the Indians to a struggle for self-respect. Multitudes of similar illustrations can be given. While the question may be raised whether these happenings should be called a Good, we must nevertheless accept them as part of the cosmic process and by that standard consider them as falling in line with *inevitable* development or Cosmic Good.

What we actually find is that while ethical systems assume to base their principles on universals they have generally left the Cosmos out of the reckoning. Outside the culture groups within which moral values have been established there is a social evolution which determines the trend of human events and, under its laws, inevitable results come which no one has planned or desired. It may be called the Cosmic Good because it is in contrast to the Good sought by the individual and the group, standing in a position to laugh at their struggles because it knows it is bound to win in the end.

The amalgamation of races may be considered as an example of the Cosmic Good. Biologically it has always taken place wherever races have been in contact, but, except in rare instances, it has always been strongly opposed by each of the races concerned. The ethical codes have generally forbidden it, but it has occurred just the same and will continue to occur more rapidly than ever, now that all races are coming into increased contact. The measure of its value cannot be estimated by contemporaries, but its effect on all the concepts of race and the problems involved will be revolutionary.

In sociology we have divided groups into "primary" and "secondary." The primary group, sometimes called the face-to-face group, is intimate, sharing its advantages and problems mutually. It is the place where morals are nurtured. In modern society the expansion of the personal or primary into impersonal or secondary groups has necessitated symbolic relations, such as political parties and corporations. These are called secondary because our relation to them is not immediate. We may define a *tertiary* group to cover the conditions that are now facing us. The secondary groups have developed within cultures; the tertiary groups are intercultural or cosmopolitan. In the cosmopolitan development which we are now inevitably entering, moral tragedies will be multitudinous and social disorganization and demoralization will be widespread, but we shall be on the way to a new orientation if we can transfer our thinking to a tertiary level.

In this book we are dealing with the relation of the peoples and cultures of Asia to those of the rest of the world. For the great majority of the world's population, it will be a long time before the organization of these relations can be conscious and directed. This supergroup relationship, nevertheless, enters the new sociological level.

Already many writers have begun to turn our attention to the significance of the East for the West and to the wide range of problems that are presented to both the Orient and the Occident. Two of these, Kohn and Clark,¹ have both written in *World Unity* (1931-1932) in some detail on principles which are fully accepted in this book. Dr. Kohn has written under the title "Orient and Occident"; Mr. Clark on "Why East and West Are Different."

According to Kohn it was only at the beginning of this

¹ Dr. Hans Kohn, of Jerusalem, author of *The History of Nationalism in the East* and several other books dealing with the Orient, a man of unusual equipment, and Grover Clark, for some years editor of the *Peking Leader*, and a keen observer of much experience.

century that there was any consciousness of a common Oriental destiny; this was crystallized by the World War. He says: "The moral opposition of the Occident is weakening before the claims of the Orient — claims which the Orient is setting up at once as a pupil of the West, and in an appropriation of Western political and social ideas. The Orient obtained its weapons against the Occident not only from the latter's technical arsenal but from its spiritual arsenal as well. The two worlds, so foreign to each other, are beginning to approach each other on a field fertilized with ideas which have ripened in Europe in the last two or three centuries."¹ One of the agencies for carrying Westernism into the Orient is Russia, which has an influence "over wide areas." The result is that "mankind is slowly merging into a unit." A first stage in this process is the establishment of both racial and national self-respect. As Kohn says, the people of the Orient, like those of Europe, prefer bad self-government to good alien government, and though the transfer from alien to self-government may be disorderly it is no different from the experience of Europe. In both India and China the presence of the English has stimulated race consciousness and animosity.

The problem of fitting the Western patterns onto the Oriental ones is difficult because there has been no time to go through the historical stages, but nevertheless it is being undertaken. When we discuss, in later chapters, the peculiar cultures of some of the Oriental peoples, we shall see more clearly what the difficulties are. The inadequacy of Western institutions to meet their own problems has created a tendency in the Orient to retain its own institutions; but both the model and the drive are set by the West.

The difference between the West and the East, as developed by Clark, explains some of the Oriental and the Occidental forms and gives a *natural* explanation of social

¹ *World Unity*, New York, Oct., 1931, p. 18.

values that have hitherto been considered *rational*. The individualism and initiative of the West we shall discuss in these terms in Chapter IV. The conformity and conservatism of the Orient which Clark first explained to the author when they were together on the Famine Commission in the Province of Shansi, in China, have been developed at length by him in a series of articles in *World Unity*.

According to Clark the difference between Eastern and Western cultures grew out of the fact that the East lived by agriculture and the West by hunting. Although the West has now become settled, the holdover of its patterns remains, and its institutions and values have been built into forms of thought. Agriculture means that it is possible for a much more congested population to exist than under a system of hunting. It also means that the importance of the individual becomes less. The result of this is that, while human life will be less valued, the responsibility for those individuals who belong to the family or community will be accepted, leaving those outside to shift for themselves. In order to live happily in such a community the individual must conform. If he should be a non-conformist he would be put out and would not be taken into another group. Whatever limitations the individual suffers in his own group he is at least assured of existence. "The individual was a social menace."

This view is corroborated by W. A. Anderson,¹ who found that while there is considerable migration from village to village, the migrants are always set apart as guests and have no status in the village or privilege of local worship or participation in local affairs. In the activities of the missionaries, converts came largely from "guests" who turned to the Christian church as a means of finding some social life which no other local group could offer them. In

¹ "Some Major Elements in the Social Pattern of Rural China and Rural America." Publication of the American Sociological Society. Vol. XXV, No. 4, Nov., 1931, p. 47.

India, it is the outcaste group that gets into the Christian fold.

This necessity of acquiescence to the group requirements, as Clark says, makes men in the East "strive to change their environments to fit their desires." This fact explains much that not long ago was attributed to instinct or racial differences. It also makes clear that ethical values in East and West are less rational and more accidental and artificial than we have considered them. It also underlies religious developments.

Buddhism, which for a time covered India and China, was essentially individualistic in origin. The individual had to secure his own salvation. But it soon lost its hold in India; in China it was transformed into "Mahayana Buddhism" which taught that individual effort was nothing and faith all, in the attainment of Nirvana. One could not reach the Goal, salvation was impossible, through one's own efforts alone; not individual striving but belief in the efficacy of Buddha's aid, to be won by the performance of stated rights, was essential to "securing release from the Wheel of Life." The Christian church, based on the interpretations of Paul, made belief and conformity essential for salvation, but at the same time evolved in Western patterns to a point where individual salvation was made possible only through works.

Again, in the East, in both economic and political life, invention and experiment threatened the established security. It was safer to continue with the old than to risk even a promising innovation, for always there was no marginal economic surplus, and there was plenty of labor, hence no need of labor-saving devices. However, when something had been demonstrated as successful elsewhere, it could easily be adopted by the whole group. For instance, when the China International Famine Commission demonstrated on small patches of ground the superiority of selected seeds, the neighboring peasants would hardly

let them ripen before gathering them. This accounts for the wholesale appropriation of a wide range of Western techniques, greatly accelerated by the very forms of social life that would never have been able to discover them for themselves.

Politically, democratic institutions are impossible without individualism. In India and China, though there has been within castes and families even a communal democracy, in national relations absolutism has generally prevailed. When absolutism breaks down there is no democratic leadership. This accounts for recurrent periods of chaos, in the larger unit, but continuity in the conforming small units that are relatively unaffected. The solidarity of the Chinese family system and rural life has frequently been described. India is even more agricultural than China, having more than three hundred million of its three hundred and fifty million people on the land, living in villages whose number is given as between five and seven hundred thousand; actually the rural population has been increasing in recent decades faster than the urban. While the family system in India with its normal variations in type is as strong and large in its collateral inclusions as in China, there is the additional fact that every one belongs to a religious communion, and about two hundred million are in the caste system. This will be discussed in a later chapter.

According to Wilson,¹ "Caste is a conservative shelter to which, being poor, the individual Indian can retreat that he may be fed and clothed. It follows that in the normal Indian village there are no beggars, no pauperism and no need of institutions for the blind or deaf. All these are cared for by their kindred and everyone is fed."

It follows from such a system in India, even more than in China where guilds have wide prevalence with productive and commercial objectives, that the commonly accepted

¹ Warren H. Wilson, "The Family and Village in India." Publication of the American Sociological Society. Vol. XXV, No. 4, 1931, p. 54.

theory of the usual economic drives has little significance to the individual. Wilson points out that even with the great poverty credited to India it is difficult to get laborers for factories, and the higher the pay the shorter time they will work, because real life is back in the home village. Wilson concludes that not economic determinism, but sociological organization, is the explanation of life in India.

It is so difficult for Westerners to understand the primary organizations of India that to them Gandhi's spinning wheel, designed to rehabilitate these hundreds of thousands of villages that have been disorganized by the introduction of European goods, seems absurd, but Gandhi understands the social organization of India, and outsiders who criticize him do not.

"The village unit is a subsistent unit into which the people can retreat when want or scarcity is felt, and within which the social bonds, drawn ever tighter, bind up obligations and secure against want each member of the village community. . . . Now in America or in Europe, where the actions of men are economically determined, both by the effects of machinery and by the patterns of behavior common to us all, the man who is out of a job has a motive to desert his wife and children; he is inclined to turn his back on his relatives; and many unemployed join the bread line or seek individual help. But in India the man who is discharged in a factory in Bombay goes back to his village and lives on his nearest of kin; he works in the fields, and he and his family sleep under the shelter of the parental roof and eat of their dish around the family fire."¹

In spite of the age-long experience in the suppression of individual initiative by social coercion, Orientals none the less show, when they are released from the bonds that have held them, just as much capacity for individual action as Westerners; such results of their individualism as can permeate into the masses will be transmitted by those who

¹ Wilson, *Ibid.*

understand the organization of life, not by those on the outside who are convinced that their methods are obviously better.

What we are facing then, is the prospect of a new society in which moral codes, philosophy of life, and habits developed under widely different conditions in isolated evolutions are suddenly coming together to form a cosmopolitan unit. It is not strange that a crisis like the World War and the world depression should be both a cause and an accompaniment of what is no less than a catastrophic change.

Just as the individual pursues interests growing out of the inherent aspects of his nature in the face of the complications of the world, some individuals specializing in one field and others in other fields, so a whole people may specialize. The choice of the object of attention may be accidental, or it may be forced by political, geographical, or economic circumstances, but once started, its interest and power proceed by the momentum of habit and experience. The prime object of this book is to show that these specialized accomplishments are now coming to a synthesis in the world and may round out society as a broadly developed man is rounded out by a balance in his understanding of himself and the world. This principle has been well put, again by Clark.¹

“Man lives in a three-fold world — social, physical, and psychological. He thus stands in a three-fold relation to his fellow men, to material things, and to that body of experiences and ideas out of which come men’s conception of the gods.

“Because of the conditions under which they have lived, each of the three main divisions of civilized man has been concerned primarily with one of these worlds, one of these relations, and each has gone farther than either of the others in solving the problems arising in its particular field.

¹ *World Unity*, New York, April, 1931, p. 29.

“Now steam and electricity have cut away the barriers which for many generations have separated these great branches of the human race; the three streams of civilization are merging. Each can make its own vital contribution to the new civilization of the world as a whole that must inevitably develop. Whether that civilization will develop peacefully, whether these contributions will be made and accepted with willing appreciation, will depend on whether men are wise enough to understand, and to act on the understanding, that each can learn from the other and that what benefits all is most beneficial to each.”

In spite of the individualistic character of the West, supposed to produce leaders, it is an interesting phenomenon that not a single preëminent leader has appeared in the West in these trying times while in Asia they have been numerous. The explanation may be found in the fact that in the West a leader must convince individuals while in the East he dominates masses. The sudden emergence of the East has thus been a mass movement under leaders whose power has never before been equaled. The momentum of these conservative masses just released from absolutism, taking on democratic forms that have been first achieved in the West, under leadership that has the advantage of the dynamics of habits developed under the system of acquiescence to authority, is accelerating the new era in human affairs.

The one personality in the West, Karl Marx, whose influence has been most outstanding and who has been stubbornly resisted by his own people, has already had much and promises to have increasing importance in the East. He formulated an ideal and a technique for social reorganization which has spread to regions where it is vitalized far beyond any expectation that Marx himself could have had.

There is no possibility of understanding the recent developments in Asia without taking into account the remark-

able personalities that have been the leaders and the symbols of the present movements. The three best known are Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, and Gandhi, but to these must be added Kemal of Turkey and Zaglul of Egypt; though the latter belongs to Africa rather than Asia, his influence in the Arab world puts him in the Oriental sphere of development.

All five of these men were living at the beginning of the decade 1920-1930; Gandhi and Kemal through the whole of it. The first three have had an immediate influence over more people than any other men that ever lived. As was suggested above, they led peoples who had been disciplined by political absolutism and mass conformity; but in addition, they were leaders of revolt, a revolt that was in every case against the same European economic exploitation and political control. In the West where individualism requires that a leader persuade each person separately, it is impossible that such powerful leadership could exist; now that leadership has appeared in the East its power there is irrepressible.

Typical as these leaders are of their own cultures, all of them were stimulated in their ideals from the West, and the influence which they have started bids fair to extend far beyond their own borders. Since in this book Russia is included within the East, Lenin belongs with the others. He had a modern education and based his program on Marx; but since he was dealing with an agricultural people accustomed to absolutism he was able in prerevolutionary times to establish a discipline that assured success, but that probably could not have been applied nor continued in practice anywhere else in Europe.

"In pre-revolutionary polemics with his Menshevik and other opponents Lenin always insisted that a revolutionary socialistic party, in order to function effectively, must be distinguished by two qualities: absolute subordination of the will of the individual members to the central organs of

the Party, and willingness of each individual member to make any sacrifice up to life itself, for the advancement of the cause. . . . The Communist Party owed its victory in the civil war more to these instincts for discipline and unity . . . than to almost any other single factor."¹ This discipline was at the time and has been since easy and effective because of the "instincts" or habits that supplemented Lenin's direct program.

Sun Yat-sen came as a young boy to Honolulu where he studied in American schools, and later studied medicine at an English mission college in Hongkong. He also spent a good deal of time in Japan. He was much more steeped in Western points of view than in Chinese philosophy. He was a non-conforming individualist who nevertheless secured following enough to overthrow the decadent monarchy and to lead the reconstructive revolution for a modern China. He has served as the torch which lighted the first steps of the awakened China. His philosophy has to a degree supplanted that of Confucius in popular appeal but it is probable that the Confucian force which lies so deep will come back.

Gandhi had to a large extent repudiated the religious teaching of his family and caste before, as a student in London, he became inspired by the Sermon on the Mount in which he found a parallel to his recollections of the Bhagavad Gita. He also read Thoreau's essay on "Civil Disobedience," and Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God Is within You*. These last two furnished the inspiration for his life's program. It is an interesting illustration of world-wide interrelation of ideas that Tolstoy's first chapter, which furnishes the thesis of his book, deals with the American Quakers and with a platform written for a conference of Quakers in Boston in 1838 by William Lloyd Garrison and the fifty years of preaching and writing of Aldin Ballou, a

¹ William Henry Chamberlain, *Soviet Russia*, pp. 61-62. Little, Brown, 1931.

Universalist clergyman in Massachusetts. But Gandhi re-interpreted all his Western inspirations into old Indian forms and made himself equal to the task of becoming the most powerful leader of the greatest number of people in the history of man.

While the East has been arousing itself, the West, shocked and bruised by the Great War and disconcerted by the influx of socialistic ideas, has discovered that its advancement in economic and mechanical power is unable to assure peace or abolish poverty. At the same time there have been in the West revolutions that have overthrown established political systems, and undermined both ecclesiastical and economic orders. Nationalism, which began about a century ago, has swept the world until all imperialism seems doomed. Closely related to nationalism is the growing resentment of the colored races to white control. Revolution is merely one of the means of social evolution, more obvious and more rapid than myriads of subtler forces, but, none the less, when seen in perspective, a part of the whole process.

The discussion which follows will deal mainly with four geographical culture areas across which are running worldwide revolutionary and nationalistic tendencies.

The West is Europe and America and part of their dependencies. It has been responsible for the rapid acceleration of modern life through its initiative, science, political organization, and economic development, and had attained such a degree of self-confidence that it thought it could dominate the world forever. That it had inherent weaknesses has only recently appeared. Its political system has failed to keep the peace both externally and internally. The democracy which promised so much has been sharply questioned, and such reactions as Fascism, introducing no new fundamental principles, have sometimes seemed the only way out. The economic power which gave the world a period of material progress has not abolished poverty nor

made men altogether happy. None the less it still has vast vitality, though its domination of the world seems just coming to an end.

The Russian Revolution was inevitable because of an awakening to the unbearable political and economic burdens on the people, but the fact that it had a communistic program has made its influence felt to the uttermost parts of the earth. The resistance to it in the West suggests that it has a potency that cannot altogether be escaped. The force of numbers and resources is sufficient to constitute a threat, but of much more importance is the challenge which the theory itself presents to peoples dissatisfied with things as they are.

China is a world in itself, self-sufficient and self-satisfied for ages before the West was born; with a population of one-fourth of the human race, it has decided to wake up and appropriate all that it wishes from the West and then stand on its own feet. Its very numbers make it potent and perhaps portentous, and its cultural age and unity make it irresistible.

India, with the next largest aggregation of population and in history contemporary with China, has through ages devoted itself almost exclusively to religion and left practical matters to take care of themselves, sometimes drifting into chaos, sometimes falling under a conqueror. Now it is turning its religious experience into a power that can defy the West, and has thereby become a part of the modern world. Thanks to the preaching of Christianity, there is enough understanding of religion in the West to make the Indian movement comprehensible and its repercussion is felt over the same area as that touched by Russian Communism.

Some day soon there will be a force in the Islamic world, but there is as yet no sign of any constructive character in the modernism which is developing in it, except the impetus given by Turkey. It will be greatly influenced by the play

of these other forces that are active all about it and to some extent through it.

Nationalism, which has risen to high tide everywhere since the War, in China and India was almost simultaneous in the yellow and the brown races. The smaller portions of the races, such as the Japanese and the peoples bordering on India, share in this racial-nationalistic awakening, as do the members of the other races and nations throughout the world.

Since the subsidiary facts of nationalism and race consciousness run through all the Asiatic awakening, and since the process of revolution has not only been used by the various peoples involved but is also one of the most important forms of the social process, it will clarify the later chapters of this book to turn aside for a brief consideration of these subjects: revolution, nationalism, and race.

Chapter II

REVOLUTION

Large areas of the world have been conditioned to glorify war and to despise revolution. The beastliness, futility, and irrationality of war have been gilded over by poetry, music, song, and story. The heroic virtues of war have been used to teach character to children and even zeal for religion. The flag, the government, and the army have been inextricably associated in men's minds. The leaders of war have been made the great figures of history, and their victories are given the credit for the superior culture which every people claims. With Freudian forgetfulness the ghastly suffering and losses of war are ignored. Too recently to have had as yet any influence on the culture patterns, widespread agitation for the abolition of war has begun. Barely fifty years ago the uncompromising Tolstoy in caustic language described the uniform of the Russian officer as "the clothes of a clown with baubles on his breast." Since Tolstoy's time, while the religious and moral arguments that he used have continued, the movement against war has become more realistic. The increased destructiveness of war through new inventions, and the vastly more involved relationships between people who might go to war, not only created the League of Nations, but also have given a new impetus to thinking. Still, to the arguments against war, the common retort is that it is human nature to fight.

Revolution is pictured as a sordid specter, dark and ominous, the antithesis of the ordered discipline that civilization seeks and that is so conspicuously exemplified by the automatic drill of soldiers. Its vices are to be hated and its

leaders are to be condemned by public opinion as traitors. The memories of the horrid sequences of revolution linger, and its fruits may be long in coming while the first outcome of war in victory is conspicuous. The losers of war never sing its praises. The winners of a revolution absorb the losers and come into their glory perhaps only in later generations.

In the past when society was relatively static revolution had no place; but in the modern dynamic, rapidly changing world, revolution may be so much in accord with human nature that it will be a continuous instrument of change. The power of habits makes an inflexibility which seems to require a convulsive shock to change them. We may discover that the natural history of revolution in its psychological laws is much more in accord with human nature than war, and that the character developed by its participants has an independence and a courage vastly superior to anything that can be made by war. Its leaders may stand out as the really great characters of history. We have only to think of Patrick Henry, George Washington, Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, Gandhi, Masaryk, and Paderewski.

Revolution means the passing from one system of control to another. The control may be the sovereignty of one government over another, the monopoly of capital, the dominance of an ecclesiastical institution, the mores of a culture, or the crystallization of castes. This passing may be with a minimum of, or entirely without violence or it may be full of violence. When we know enough about the conditions which bring revolutions and the laws of their process we may be able to secure all their results without violence. In fact many of the most momentous revolutions have had little. The overthrow of the Feudal System, the Protestant Reformation, the passage from supernaturalism to science, and the enfranchisement of women are examples of this sort, but we generally do not call them revolutions because they have lacked the accompaniments of terror and

disorder which we associate with the great political revolutions. When we live under a genuinely democratic organization all revolutions may be without violence, but in our present stage we fear such consequences as accompanied the French and Russian revolutions. We should constantly remember, however, that these revolutions were against absolutisms that claimed divine support and can therefore never be classed with revolutions under democratic governments. But even so the losses were vastly less than in any major war. Perhaps the real unavowed reason for the dread of revolution is that, whatever its nature may be, the status quo will be overthrown and our habits and vested interests disorganized. The risk of losing life in war or in resisting a revolution is not so disagreeable as the necessity of changing our habits.

The drive that makes revolutions is the desire for freedom, but strange as it may seem we do not know our lack of freedom until our attention has been called to it. Slaves and women have accepted their status, as have the subjects of absolute sovereigns and the victims of economic exploitation, until from somewhere there has come the suggestion that a larger freedom is possible. For this reason no revolution is spontaneous and immediate. It takes a long time, in general about three generations after the idea takes root, before a revolution is started. Revolutions must become mass movements before they are precipitated.

"A revolution may finally become a belief, but it often commences under the action of perfectly rational motives: the suppression of crying abuses, of a detested despotic government or an unpopular sovereign &c.

"Although the origin of a revolution may be perfectly rational we must not forget that the reasons invoked in preparing for it do not influence the crowd until they have been transformed into sentiments. Rational logic can paint the abuses to be destroyed, but to move the multitude its hopes must be awakened.

"The great revolutions have usually commenced at the top, not from the bottom; but once the people is unchained it is to the people that revolution owes its might."¹

In spite of its importance in the social process very little has yet been written about revolution. In the *Encyclopedia Britannica* it does not have a special heading while the technique and laws of war have over eleven pages with fifty-two cross references. Since revolutions bring catastrophic changes in the direction of human society, and since all of them grow in the main out of the same natural history and follow the same general course, it is time that the laws and processes that govern them should be intensively studied. Sorokin in his *Sociology of Revolution* has developed fully the course and consequences of revolution, but has given little attention to the development of the causes. Other writers who have dealt with the question have been either casual or horrified. Revolutions should be faced as objectively as the physician, prepared by his knowledge of the normal physiological laws, faces a complicated disease.

It is the purpose of this chapter merely to stress the importance of further intensive and scientific study because not only is revolution an instrument in the awakening of Asia,² but it is also a dominant factor in the changes that are impending or taking place everywhere.

"I think it is clear that within recent years an uneasy suspicion has come into being that the principle of authority has been dangerously impaired, and that the social system if it is to cohere must be reorganized. . . . In the experience of the English-speaking race once in every three generations a social convulsion has occurred. . . . Groups or interests like capital and monopoly assume sovereignty. This has been a transfer from the qualities of the sovereign, but . . . if capital insists upon continuing to exercise sovereign

¹ Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution*, pp. 24, 29. Unwin, 1913.

² See *The Revolt in Asia*, by Josef Hall.

powers, without accepting responsibility for a trust, the revolt against the existing order must probably continue.”¹

Although a revolution may be predominantly political, there are usually economic factors involved that may be of the utmost importance in the end even though for the time being subordinated to the political.

The significant revolutions of the eighteenth century were the American and the French revolutions which together inaugurated a democratic epoch in history. Because of the significance in Europe and the principles involved, the French Revolution is the more important. In the nineteenth century there were the unsuccessful Revolution of 1848 in Central Europe, and the emancipation of Greece and the Balkan States from the sovereignty of the Turks. In October, 1910, the monarchy in Portugal was overthrown, and the following October that in China. Now that our recent history is so well established, we can calmly observe the most important result that came in the train of the World War. It is a matter of relative indifference which side won, but the revolutions that came at once and are likely to continue for some time are of stupendous importance. The first flush of the revolutions was entirely political with an economic aspect, but as soon as the political question is settled it will be preëminently economic. The Russian Revolution, which came first, was so comprehensive in its scope and wide in extent that it has almost overshadowed the others.

We find, however, that the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish empires have disappeared, lastly the Spanish kingdom. On the other side of the shield, throughout Central Europe we find set up completely new states which came as the result of subsidiary revolutions in their own right: Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Jugoslavia, and Greece. At the same time

¹ Brooks Adams, *Theory of Social Revolutions*, pp. 6 ff. Macmillan, 1913.

there has been continuous revolutionary activity in the Philippines, in China, and sporadic outbreaks, but constant active effort, in Korea. Indo-China is girding herself against the French, and the Indians are carrying on the greatest revolution of all time. The Arabs of the Near East in Asia and Egypt are accumulating a force that soon will be irrepressible.

The explanation of these simultaneous revolutions over such wide areas must be found in the interstimulation which modern times have made possible. The potential agitators in each country are supported in their activities by what is going on elsewhere. The introduction of democratic suggestions by missionaries, political and economic exploiters from democratic countries, native students educated in England and in America where they have become familiar not only with contemporary political ideas, but with the history of the struggle for freedom in those countries, are agencies by which the revolutionary movements spread.

The reason that it takes so long to arouse feeling against injustice is that customs and mores are rationalized into convictions that are with the greatest difficulty discredited. In every case of revolt it will be found that the beginnings were laid about seventy-five years earlier. None of those that have not yet succeeded can be suppressed if they have captured the masses with what Le Bon calls "belief."

Traditionally it has been claimed that no revolution can succeed until it has the army on its side, but the new technique of boycott introduced by the Chinese and the Indians, together with the non-violent civil disobedience of the Indians are weapons that are likely to prove stronger than armies.

All revolutions start at first with a single objective — some peculiar despotism or injustice that is in the focus of attention. Since they undermine dominant mores and create a social crisis, all mores are disorganized so that

the extent of necessary reorganization of life may be very large. The preëminent importance of the Russian Revolution comes from its subsidiary results as well as from its primary objectives, which were equally political and economic. All the relations of social life are affected. The removal of old controls has resulted in freeing religion, morals, and education in ways that would have constituted a major revolution had they come singly. It is for this reason that historians will probably date the coming era from the Russian Revolution rather than from the World War, except as the latter was an incident in the revolutionary period.

All the other contemporary revolutions are likely to have similar results. That of Turkey not only established a republic but threw a bombshell into Islamic ideas which will in the end modernize one of the world's great religions. The overthrow of the Chinese monarchy will finally result in fundamental changes in Chinese social life. Old stereotypes become so firmly established by age that nothing short of a crisis can dislodge them. The agrarian reforms and caste emancipation in India would have been delayed indefinitely without the revolt against British domination. Now they will be of the utmost importance in the future organization of India.

It is necessary that peoples become first politically emancipated in order that there can be the free passage of ideas from one to another; now that this is becoming approximately complete nothing can stop a rapid spread of all the new ideas that are attacking the old ones. It has been suggested¹ that the older an idea or custom is and the more people accept it, the more likely it is to be wrong, because the rationalizations in its support are more highly developed. The crises through which we are now passing are shaking old ideas at their foundations, and, until new controls have grown up, it is inevitable that there should

¹ James Harvey Robinson, in *The Mind in the Making*.

be a period of social disorganization. The saving grace in the situation is that we have now the elements of social laws and some notion of an objective. "Social Planning" is a principle that is impressing the world with its importance. It could have made little progress so long as the frozen habits of the prerevolutionary period prevailed, or until we had even our present imperfect understanding of social science.

While these political turnovers have been nurtured and accomplished in the East, the West has also been preparing for fundamental changes. Their shadow appeared long enough ago to forecast an eventual culmination. More than forty years ago Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical letter of 1891 not only interpreted the signs of the times, but indicated that they were not new. He said:

"It is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change which has long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of the conflict are unmistakable; the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals and the poverty of the masses; the increasing self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes, all are occupied with it — and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention."

In spite of the convulsions in society that have occupied the forty years since that writing, we are only now in the midst of the period that Leo XIII foresaw; though his words may sound like truisms to-day, they describe world contemporary conditions.

Thirty-two years after Leo XIII, Woodrow Wilson expressed a similar interpretation of the course of events:

"In these doubtful and anxious days, when all the world is at unrest, and, look which way you will, the road ahead seems darkened by shadows which portend dangers of many kinds, it is only common prudence that we should look about us and attempt to assess the causes of distress and the most likely means of removing them.

"There must be some real ground for the universal unrest and perturbation. It is not to be found in superficial politics or in mere economics. It lies deep at the sources of the spiritual life of our times. It leads to revolution: and perhaps if we take the case of the Russian Revolution, the outstanding event of its kind in our age, we may find a good deal of instruction for our judgment of present critical situations and circumstances."

And concluding, he says: "The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually." ¹

Both of these eminent men have suggested that the one way to stave off revolution is by anticipating its objective before it enforces its demands. It may be possible that the Cosmic Process cannot always work that way though it may ultimately be made to do so. In the democratic West the slogans of individual political freedom have kept alive a conviction of freedom which has closed men's eyes to the fact that capital has to a large degree usurped the sovereignty that once belonged to the state, and the blinded masses have not yet reached a point of "belief" in regard to the possibility of change.

In the East, the struggle for freedom from political absolutism came at the very moment when the West was murmuring but feebly against economic absolutism, but now the two movements are rushing along together, and the East may arrive first at the goal of emancipation. In

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug., 1923.

the West socialism has been dealt with antagonistically because it attacked a going system, but in the East there was no such system, so socialistic ideas in some form have made a headway not yet fully comprehended.

The epidemic of revolutions in South America, while it may have slight elements of the forces that are going on in Europe and Asia, is chiefly political and personal rather than deeply social.

In the next chapter we shall consider the organization of national consciousness which runs, as it were, at right angles to the forces that make for revolution. When nationalistic affairs are relatively settled, we shall have problems in which the revolutionary method will more and more take the place of war.

The class consciousness out of which revolution develops is not simple and static but is complicated and is being rapidly modified by factors that have come in the modern period. Although peoples have lived in nations and classes for indefinite centuries, the consciousness of nation and class is clear-cut only in the last century, and dynamic only in the last fifty years.

The nation may be described as a vertical group, including within its membership people of every class or horizontal level. It is an enlarged family or community which, whatever the disparity of its members in social position, has a sense of solidarity from top to bottom. The recent emphasis on race and the possibility of interracial conflict have begun to make a corresponding vertical racial grouping. Both may use geographical boundaries to set their limits.

Classes are horizontal in their organization and recognize common interests across frontiers. The older peoples have crystallized class by heredity, but modern class consciousness, particularly under democratic ideals which repudiate birth into status, has arisen from resentment against domination and exploitation either by persons or economic conditions.

In the superstitious ages, which are not yet fully past, those in power were either given or claimed divine attributes and no one imagined revolt possible. The caste system of India has been maintained by religious sanctions, and the class system of Europe has continued by social pressure. Modern psychology has undermined classification on the basis of divine approval, furnishing in the present period an influence comparable to the reasoning, a century and a half ago, of Locke, Hobbes, and others who exploded the ground on which the divine right of kings stood. Even though there should be a new classification on the basis of intelligence tests the members of the new classes would have their positions determined without reference to any old social categories. Recent geographical discoveries, inventions, and capitalistic enterprise have given power to many who had previously been debarred from it, and dispossessed many who had had position by birth or preferment. These newcomers to power tend to make the same claims of permanent superiority as did their predecessors. They are the conservatives who struggle by rationalization or by force to maintain the status to which they have so recently arrived. They are less sure of themselves than were those whom they have displaced for they themselves have demonstrated the instability of social position and know that they may in turn be overthrown.

The horizontal group is primarily economic and membership in it has survival rather than sentimental value, although symbols of class on the higher levels may attain much importance. They may be only residential sections, grammatical usage, or membership in clubs.

This geometrical designation of classes as horizontal has become an accepted form of speech. We have high, low, and middle classes; the criterion of definition may be birth, wealth, or personal power, but more and more it has become economic status. It is easy to place the

capitalist on the top and the laborer on the lower level while the professional class stands nearer the top than the bottom. There are actually many inner gradations from the socially dependent through the unskilled to the skilled worker, the technician, executive, director, and great capitalist. Factory production and large scale merchandising are blotting out the distinctions on the lower levels, and greatly increasing their numerical importance. The term proletarian is applied to them all. The lines of class interest between nations are becoming increasingly strong on every level and the influence that passes across national boundaries is welding classes into a solidarity that corresponds to the vertical influence of patriotism.

Classes accept a status until a leader or a symbol arouses them. Organized religion is prevailing on the side of the status quo, although most religions start through revolution. When the divine right of kings was questioned, all divine rights lost their strength; but with the coming of nationalism, an effort has been made to throw the strength of the religious support to the sovereignty of the state, as in old Russia and Austria. Vertical groups ignore the horizontal tendency and struggle to establish themselves as supreme by appeal to history, biological purity, and whatnot, elevating loyalty to the highest virtue, thereby giving it a religious appeal.

Horizontal interests are practical and deal with the very continuance of life; having less of the ideal in them, at first they find it difficult to focus attention, as their symbols are less sentimental. Although conditions and relations are changing very rapidly, the theory of Marxian socialism has in recent times been the basis for the development of class consciousness and the stimulus to most of our recent revolutions. In feudal times class consciousness was very strong but the possibility of revolt was unimaginable.

When there is a conflict between vertical groups we call

it war. When it is between class groups it is revolution, though it often happens that the dominating group is a nation which in its relation to another nation is a class. This is the situation in the relation of England to India, and Japan to Korea.¹

The vertical organization is more irrational than the horizontal, because, within the vertical group, there are individuals and classes that are more closely related to those in other vertical groups than to classes within their own vertical group. Paderewski the artist belongs to the musical world and has only a sentimental and historical relation to the Polish peasant. Roland Hayes the Negro singer ranks with the best without regard to color, but for the time being shares the disabilities of the class position of the Negroes. Einstein the scientist is understood by more non-Jews than Jews, but would presumably be excluded from some anti-Semitic hotels. A steel magnate or an international banker is more at home with others of his sort in a foreign country than with his laborers or clerks in his own country. Polish and Russian peasants and even Negro tenants have more in common with each other than with the intellectuals of their own neighborhoods, though they are not yet aware of it. The awakening of this idea is a rich field for communistic propaganda.

Much more progress has been made in the effort to prevent war than to prevent revolution, because the vertical group is more aware of itself, since history and politics have been concerned almost exclusively with vertical groups and are more interested in the interdependence of vertical groups than in the solution of interclass problems.

What has happened in addition to the familiarity that people are getting with other people who live across frontiers is a tangible capitalistic interpenetration. Patriotism is personal and sentimental because focused on a definite

¹ See Herbert A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chaps. II, III. Lippincott, 1924.

area and a specific history, while capital is impersonal and fluid. It has gone around the world without reference to the political loyalties of its owners, and has devised techniques, like international banking and commerce, of great efficiency. When the Rothschild family was getting its power in 1800 there was neither a universal postal system in Europe, nor a banking system that enabled a traveler to go about without taking his cash with him. Now one may go almost anywhere in the world, and with a simple document procure money without variation in value, and may purchase either articles made in his own country or their imitated equivalent wherever he finds himself. A world-wide economic depression would have been impossible if the economic organization of the world had not already become relatively integrated.

The owners of the capital which has brought about this change are not numerous but they exercise a power over the life of multitudes that is just beginning to be noticed. The transmission of capital from generation to generation means that the management of the capital passes from the control of those who created it to specialized agencies. A most interesting aspect of this is the increasing ownership by women. Not only do rich men leave their fortunes to their wives, but the vast amount of life insurance falls to the benefit of women. Someone has estimated that in a comparatively short time an actual majority of all capital will be owned by women who have no responsibility in its creation or management.

This impersonal character of capital has made possible the very rapid development of large concentrations in concerns doing world-wide business, like the oil and automobile companies and the great banks. It has made possible the substitution of machinery for human labor and has made the theory of individualism empty in the face of a system under which those subjected to machine conditions have found themselves herded. It has also made

invalid the claims of labor, formulated when the part played by the laborer was enormously large, that by virtue of his part in the product he had the right to control it and to receive all the profits.

Next below the large capitalist are the important merchants and manufacturers, with the professional men on a similar level. The former identify their interests with those of the larger capitalists and are often the most stubbornly conservative element in society. In spite of their comparative economic freedom they are, as a matter of fact, suffering from excessive competition with one another, and with chain stores and consolidated methods of manufacturing which leave them little independence or hope.

The professional class—doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, and trained commercial men whose incomes depend on fees or salaries—have interests and access to advantages on the upper level, and a freedom which money alone cannot give. In general they have tended to have attitudes supporting the capitalist because they are in part dependent upon him, and in part because they enjoy much of his kind of life.

All of them except the doctors are very closely involved in the economic system, and its changes are bringing new problems to them. Capital in the form of stocks and bonds has been lost to personal control, and is in the hands of directors whose share in ownership is so slight that they are often irresponsible and sometimes criminal in their management. The technical production which constitutes the only real value is subsidized to the artificial manipulation of finance by those who may know nothing of the actual details of the basic industry. Bankers play with railroads, power plants, and factories as though they were merely pawns in the game for profit rather than agencies for creating goods for consumption. This divorce between commercial manipulation and technical production has

increased rapidly. The actual fundamental work is carried on by professionally trained men who receive salaries. They are not only business executives and engineers, but scientists and lawyers. Without them all big business would be helpless; at any moment it would be possible for them to take over any of these enterprises without hindrance from the owners of the capital or loss to the main purpose of the industry. A leading metropolitan newspaper was left in trust to two women with a bank as the trustee. The editors are thus two removes from the owners. Owners are represented in general by shares of stock in which they are interested only from the side of dividends. Whether there are many or few stockholders is a matter of no concern to the specific purpose of a railroad or a factory, for these are run by experts whose job is production, while the financial side is interested only in profits.

The revolutionary possibility arises from the fact that these experts who are the vital element in the enterprises are merely employees who may be discharged at any time. The greater the industry the larger the proportion of these necessary salaried men. So long as their salaries have been high and their tenure fairly secure they have been satisfied and conservative. When the profit-seeking manipulators become reckless and corrupt, the dignity of the actual managers who are technically and professionally trained is seriously undermined and the consequent resentment is a normal basis for the beginning of revolt.

Until very recently it has seemed as though the United States were fortified against an imminent revolution even though many conditions favorable to its culmination have been present. Its democratic system theoretically made possible any fundamental change without disturbance, but for many years the power of "the invisible government" has been known to be the dominating force in the visible government. Its large and contented middle class has

thriven on the existing system, and the still unexploited natural resources have made for conservatism. Exposures of corruption in the Federal and local governments have been received with indifference because, in spite of special privileges, the majority were successful. Nevertheless, for many years there have been voices crying in the wilderness whose cries have furnished a basis for new thinking. The masses have not yet taken much part in this thinking because it has not yet become a "belief." The creeping in of nation-wide organizations, such as the chain store, and distributing agencies of all sorts has begun to undermine the ground on which the middle class has built up its influence and its attitudes, thus releasing a new and powerful group for potential revolt.

As this is being written, events are moving rapidly in America. The pedestal on which great business men had succeeded in putting themselves has dropped from under them. Defense mechanism is being set up which appeals to bigotry and prejudice as well as to higher emotions. Patriotism is being set off against the struggle for justice by calling movements for more justice radical and un-American. The sacredness of the Constitution has been magnified and its defenders have waved the flag to divert attention from realities. The bitter spread of hardship pushes on and weakens the power of the past. Russia stands a constant challenge to the ultimate value of American political and economic organization. In ever-widening circles the question of inevitable change is being persistently raised. It is more and more evident that neither the unique individualistic habits nor the great natural resources of America can save her from a course not charted in her traditions nor approved by those who were but lately leaders.

There is a growing discontent with the fact that the public schools may not be exposed to ideas less conservative than those accepted by the ruling class. The result is

that those who have come out of the schools are peculiarly acquiescent under the curtailment of freedom and opportunity through this control of outworn teachings.

We see from the above discussion that there is developing in America and, to a less extent, perhaps, in all other commercial-industrial countries, certain new conditions for the organization of class power different from anything that has hitherto prevailed anywhere. The technical men are equally important and valuable under any system, as is evidenced by the fact that the Soviets have called in a great many American engineers to build and direct their plants. The problems of modern industry are altogether too complicated to be developed by the unskilled proletarian class which until this time has felt that it had adequate cause for revolution and was quite capable of handling the affairs which it proposed to take over. The Soviet Union has not taken in any American business men, probably because it felt that they would be too indoctrinated with the capitalistic technique; but it will be compelled soon to adopt the purely technical methods necessary to make large business enterprises possible and will then find trained men valuable.

A proletarian revolution was possible in Russia because the economic and industrial organization was simple, and there were technicians available in other parts of the world to enable them to undertake a material development. Such a proletarian revolution would not be possible in America and would be only relatively possible in most of Europe. When tried in Italy, it opened the way for Fascism because of the complete collapse of a complicated though not extensive modern system. In Germany it could not last long because the more intelligent people would find it too irksome, and in England and America it would be only momentary. The professional classes will probably for some time continue to turn towards the upper classes, but in order to be able to function successfully in

a new order they will have to ally themselves ultimately with the skilled and unskilled workmen.

All these revolutionary changes might happen without any particular disturbance, just as the passing from the feudal system seems to have taken place by an acceptance of new conditions. However, a long industrial crisis or a series of crises close together may arouse such intense feeling in the proletarian class that it will precipitate revolution regardless of the consequences. It is also possible for a class to become infected by a revolution in another country, both because of the intricately involved economic relations, and because of the free transmission of theories which seem to apply to the local situation. The influence of Russia, for instance, both in its political and economic revolution and in its technique of reorganization, is of incalculable weight. It is involved in all that is happening both in the East and in the West.

The people of the East who have been inspired by the West and have taken its political models while repudiating its political control, are now taking its latest economic ideas and are using them not so much in revolt against parallel economic systems among themselves as against alien exploitation. The very ineptitude with which they face their political problems makes them more amenable to radical economic proposals. As a matter of fact all of Asia, each people in its own way, is foreshortening the course of history by appropriating the experience that has been vicariously lived through by the Western peoples. This being the case we must anticipate confusion, but we may feel sure that the time required for orderly reorganization will not be comparable in length to that originally required by Europe to secure similar results by evolutionary development. What seems like hopeless confusion is only the rapid movement of many forces at the same time.

China "is staggering under the burden of five contemporary revolutions at once — an economic and industrial

revolution, a political upheaval, an intellectual renaissance, a social transformation and a moral and religious reformation." ¹

Imperialism has undoubtedly had its day and its sun is near to setting. Its supporters have ceased to justify it on the selfish grounds that first drove them into it, but instead urge its continuance on the high grounds of moral responsibility for their subject peoples. The universal moral rationalization of cultures that are controlling others is that such control is necessary for the protection of people against disorder among themselves. When the revolt is on, disorder and inattention to internal problems are so great as to give added strength to this argument. There are two answers to this: first, that both the attention and the emotions are so focused on the one effort at freedom that no surplus of interest can be devoted to internal affairs; the second is merely a matter of pedagogy. Neither an individual nor a people can learn self-government and discipline without responsibility.

None the less it is undeniable, even among the people who are most resentful, that the ruling powers have made great contributions both technically and psychologically. In the matter of education alone Asia has increased her power immeasurably. On the other hand the psychological influence has come both from a knowledge of the history of the struggle for freedom by the dominant power itself, and from the resentment against such power. If there is any expectation of gratitude to the beneficent power it is doomed to disappointment, for now that the people are awakening, they feel that alien control is an infringement of dignity which cannot be compensated for by benevolent intentions.

What we have attempted to do in this chapter is to call attention to the increasing importance of revolution in the

¹ Sherwood Eddy, *The Challenge of the East*, p. xiii. Farrar and Rinehart, 1931.

social process; that it follows very definite laws which are at present little known; that its use, common in the West, has been appropriated by the East where the techniques of boycott and non-violence are giving it a new power; and that with the passing of absolutism and imperialism, it is becoming more and more economic in its application. We shall consider the parallel development of nationalism and race consciousness in the next two chapters, two forms of social grouping that promise to be more temporary than the solving of problems by revolution.

Chapter III

CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM

While revolution in some form has long been a factor in human affairs, nationalism is entirely modern. Before the modern period, say up to a hundred years ago, people lived in groups, sometimes called nations. They made war more or less spontaneously for a variety of reasons and those who were conquered submitted and often were assimilated, or, when they were able, fought back, but there was no feeling of what is called nationalism.

When the future historian reviews the period through which we are now passing he will find two tendencies absorbing the attention of the masses of the people — the spread of capitalism and imperialism with accompanying revolutions against their power, and the universal spread of nationalism. These two movements are antagonistic, interrelated, and mutually stimulating. Both are forces aiming at social reorganization and both will run their courses in their present form and disappear.

There is a tangible reality in economics which will always prevail, because it is so intimately tied up with existence, but nationalism is more accidental and dependent on sentiments that are complicated by tradition and history. Although nations with their loyalties and self-esteem have long existed, the cult of nationalism with its psychopathic qualities and driving power has covered the face of the earth in two generations, and has probably now reached its climax. The basis of nationalism in all cases, in spite of additional elements, is revolt against political and cultural imperialism.

There is no concrete and permanent definition of a nation. It usually has some geographical relations, but may exist without them; it may inhere in a consciousness of blood relationship, but aliens may be adopted into it; it may turn about tradition and history, but myth may be just as effective; it may claim high moral justification and purpose, but an analysis of its history may show that it came into existence by ruthless injustice.

The artificial rationalization about each nation drives one to the conclusion that the real reason for it is the psychological yearning of the individual to belong to a group that will give him social dignity; the nation was created in part to satisfy this yearning. In other words, the intrinsic qualities of the nation are indefinable, but the subjective satisfactions that it gives have made it seem paramount to the minds of those who can see no alternative equal to it. As was indicated in the previous chapter, the nation is a vertical grouping in which the practical value of class interests is ignored, because the individual thinks he can find his greatest self-realization in his nation. Formerly he found it in religion; now he is transferring much of his religious emotion to nationalism.

While the external conditions under which nationalism is appearing differ very widely, there are many characteristics common to all cases. Nationalism appeared first where national freedom had been curtailed, but it is now taking the same form among peoples where national sovereignty is well established. Among the subject peoples of Europe it was especially strong just before the War, for which it was the occasion. The killing of the Crown Prince of Austria was done by Serbian nationalists. Since the War, nationalism has developed in dominant countries like the United States, England, and Italy where it played little part before. In them it grows out of fear, hatred, and egotism.

It was inevitable that an instrument containing so much

power as nationalism has developed, but with such vague characteristics, should lend itself to exploitation and delusion at the hands of self-interest. This self-interest has been both political and economic, but its main drive has been economic. The plea of patriotism has raised tariffs, increased armament, and censored foreign ideas.

The widespread and inherent strength of nationalism has attracted the attention of many students who have written about both its psychological rise and its expression in particular cases. It was given a new force when President Wilson proclaimed "Self-Determination of Nations" as an objective of the World War. The present widespread interest in internationalism is closely interrelated with nationalism, and must await the working out of national fulfillment.

Like other new things in the East, nationalism came to it from the West. It came both as a system of political organization and as a moral sentiment. To England must be given most of the credit — or blame — for introducing it into India and China; the United States, France, and some others, all using the same model, followed closely. This Western nationalism in its early days was marked by efficiency and self-confidence, not by sentimentality. As Tagore has put it, the nation is a machine seeking success rather than goodness. He says: "A Nation in the sense of the political and economic union of the people, is the aspect which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose. Society as such has no ulterior purpose. It is an end in itself. . . . But when, with the help of science and the perfection of organization, its power begins to grow and brings in harvests of wealth, it crosses the boundaries with amazing rapidity." ¹

It is purely accidental whether an individual falls into one national group or another. It may be a matter of

¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, pp. 19, 20. The Macmillan Company, 1917.

birth in a geographical location, or adoption into a family, or naturalization in a state, or education in patriotic tradition. It often happens that a father belongs to one nation and his son to another, and yet both will give their lives for their national causes. Generally one belongs to a nation because he thinks he does, his thinking having been deliberately conditioned; he may sometimes be coerced into membership if he lives within the political boundaries. This happens when boundaries are revised.

Nationalism flourishes best under repression, but develops thereby psychopathic characteristics. Some years ago the author gave the name "Oppression psychosis" to these characteristics.¹ It is a disease which must run its course; one of the agencies for its cure will be the disappearance of imperialism, for now that nationalism has started on its course it will not wane until national freedom has everywhere been attained. It is still in its first stages in the eastern countries that have recently become nationalistic, but we may be sure that its symptoms will be like those that have become so conspicuous in cases of long duration.

When it has crossed the boundaries, by a strange combination of conditions, consciousness of the nation is used to advance the interests of those who gain most from international advantages. This is possible because of the quasi-mythical character of the nation. "The nation is a very useful and vital institution to many business enterprises which depend for their prosperity upon protective tariffs or foreign spheres of commercial preference, or which supply the nation with arms with which to compete with other nations. These enterprises cordially believe in nationalism. Nationalism is also advocated by what may be called extranational commercialism — that is, enterprises which lie outside of national bounds. Ventures of this kind find

¹ See Miller, H. A., *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. IV.

the nation very useful and are therefore among the foremost preachers of nationalism." ¹

When these practical interests define the nation, its delimitations are fairly obvious, but really it has never been possible to make an objective definition of a nation. That it is based on blood, race, religion, or culture is not sufficiently exact to satisfy all the characteristics of a nation. There is always a metaphysical element in the consciousness of each national. Many capricious circumstances enter into the question when one claims his nation. There may be myths about blood and exaggeration about culture, but nationality has become a dominant note in education everywhere. It grew out of thinking rather than out of experience. "The putting forth of nationalistic doctrines was one of the mental exercises of the eighteenth century. Primarily it was the work of intellectuals and the expression of current intellectual interests." ²

It is also true that as interests expanded beyond the farm and local community, there arose the human demand to belong to some group; the nation with a common culture and common political experience was the normal place to find satisfaction, and the inevitable field for the scope of history and loyal sentiment. Now, though there has been a still further expansion of interests involved in science, history, religion, and commerce, it will not be easy to make the masses internationally minded. In fact it may never be possible because of the limited localism in which most people will always live. The problem then becomes one of a new modus of organization so that nationalism will have a positive constructive rather than a negative destructive value. That there is promise of this is indicated by the policy adopted by the Soviet Union which will

¹ Edward Krehbiel, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1915*, p. 220.

² Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, p. 232. Richard Smith, 1931.

be described later in this chapter, and in the constitutional provisions of some of the new states of Central Europe, which put nationality rights in a position similar to those of religious sects.

The Western note of nationalism in all its aspects including its metaphysical arguments has been appropriated by the East as a basis of its revolt against the impositions of alien nations. The active nationalism of the present, as contrasted with the imperialistic nationalism which came first, was bred by the very oppression of imperialism. It has not had the commercial and political advantages which led to the growth of the first, but it has a great momentum from the emotional solidarity coming from resentment. This is the type which now has Asia in its grip.

We shall now consider in brief detail some of the particular examples of nationalistic expression, both as actual present-day social phenomena and as illustrations of the parallel psychological expressions. Since tangible objectives of national reality cannot be found, its identifications are arranged around symbols. Religion stands first, either resulting in fanatical adherence or equally fanatical rejection. Then come language, which is more immediately obvious, and finally history, myth, and geography, and in some cases race. These find expression both as inferiority and superiority complexes, though in most cases nationalism is the outgrowth of the inferiority complex.

Since the national feeling in Japan is set off in its isolated development from all the rest we shall begin with it, and discuss it further in the chapter on Japan. The Japanese nation has for ages considered itself as a family relationship. During the whole historic period of Japan extending over two thousand years there has been a single ruling dynasty, and from the beginning there has been an emphasis on the Emperor's paternal character, with the result that his preëminence has given the appearance of a blood relationship in the nation. Even Japanese Commu-

nists find no inconsistency in keeping the Emperor and completely overthrowing the social and economic system. It was this sense of solidarity that kept Japan isolated and self-sufficient for centuries and made it possible for her to resist the political encroachments of the West, and at the same time appropriate as much of the Western as she pleased. The religion of Shintoism has little other significance than as a religion of nationalism. It is true that the aggressions of the West stimulated fear and hatred on the part of the Japanese, but all the mythical elements of nationalism already existed there before they were dreamed of anywhere else.

China, which is the oldest nation in the world, was almost the last to develop nationalism. The reason for this is that, unlike Japan, the social control of the people has come from the personal family myth rather than the national family myth. In other words, in China the unit of social interest has been the family rather than the nation. This difference is illustrated by the following incidents. A Japanese who was campaigning in an election heard of his son's death. He said that his wife could manage the funeral, but that he must stick to his responsibility to the state. In China, a general, holding an important office in the central government, recently insisted on resigning because his father had died and he had to retire to take charge of the funeral.

Now that nationalism has taken root in China it has become a most absorbing idea among all the people, and is rapidly taking on the psychopathic qualities. Since the Chinese have little religion in the sense that it is found in most of the rest of the world, an increasing hostility to alien religions has taken its place as a symbol of the national movement. The dialects which have been diverse are giving way to a common language, and books are being written in order to avoid use of those in foreign languages. The consciousness of a long history is looked upon as a

sure anchor in the conflict with Western culture. Much of the old is being thrown off in the effort at modernization, but the consciousness of China is itself becoming a religion.

With the possible exception of Korea, the next oldest national group after China are the Jews. It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast. Probably as many Chinese as all the Jews in the world have died of famine in the last few years. The Jews have never had much territory and what they have had was held by frequent wars; now for fifteen hundred years they have had no territory whatever. The Jews, however, throw more light on the technique of nationalism than any other group, for only by means of it have they been able to retain their identity. They have had a tradition and a literature which have been kept constantly to the forefront. Both the tradition and the literature were identified with religion. If, at the time of the Dispersion, they had gone to China where they would have met no religious antagonism, they would probably have been lost through amalgamation ages ago. They have had no possibility of setting up an ecclesiastical center, like Rome, so they have had to put their emphasis on ritual, and have preserved their unity, though widely separated, by constant reference to the sources of their inspiration. The punctilious ritual and the authority written in the Hebrew language became the symbol of Jewish identity.

The forces of repression under which the Jews lived in Europe developed an aggressiveness and adaptability which have been called Jewish characteristics. These characteristics are the same as those which tend to develop, with variations, in every suppressed national group. They create a vicious circle by increasing their divergence from the people among whom they live and so increasing opposition to them. The fact that Jewish orthodoxy is an instrument in the maintenance of Jewish solidarity rather

than a value in itself is proved by the loss of general interest in it as soon as the Jews under the national urge came into possession of land in Palestine. In Palestine one finds religion, as it appeared under the conditions of anti-Semitism in Europe, only in those in whom it already had become an ingrained habit.

Since national freedom in the geographic sense has not yet been attained and may never be possible, and since anti-Semitism is still widespread, the symbols of nationalism are widely cultivated. Educated Jews learn modern philosophy and psychology and reject orthodoxy, but they increase their interest in the Hebrew language, form cultural organizations, and use as much influence as possible to keep alive the ancient traditions. The Jews show that there is no necessary relation between nationalism and territory, though, for the time being, they aspire to be like the other nations and look upon Palestine as their land.

Next to the Jews, the Irish have thus far kept up the longest struggle for liberty. For six hundred years and more the English tried to reduce the Irish to a willingness to become a part of England. If they had never undertaken to do this the Irish would have been as loyal as the Scotch. When England began this attempt both the English and the Irish were Roman Catholics, with the Irish taking perhaps the more liberal attitude towards religion. England happened to accept the Protestant Reformation before Ireland had a chance, with the result that Ireland in opposition became ardently Roman Catholic. The zeal with which the English Protestants tried to force Protestantism on the Irish was unremitting. The outcome was that the Roman Catholic Church became the chief symbol of the Irish revolt. Every method of English statesmanship, except the right one, was used on Ireland and only strengthened the opposition. All the emotional states aroused by the conflict were carried to America by the

immigrants and continued to the third and fourth generations. The Roman Catholic Church in America, where there are over eighteen million adherents, is largely dominated by the Irish. The Irish nationalists in America, being without a country of their own, had a situation much like that of the Jews, who have been nurturing national feeling in alien lands. The political desires that it was impossible to satisfy in Ireland found an outlet in America where the number of Irish officeholders is far out of proportion to the total number of Irish. This interest in politics is characteristic of people who have been denied political freedom, and takes the form of numerous party divisions. Where political responsibility is denied, political theories are academic, so that when opportunity comes each theory has adherents who contend for its success. The great number of parties in the new European states is an indication of this tendency. Recently there were some ten Irish candidates standing for election for the mayor's office of Boston. It has been said that wherever you have two Jews you have three opinions. The Poles, also, whose nationalism is very strong, have a universal reputation for dissension.

When the Irish Free State was finally established, one of its first steps was to revive the old language. Very few knew it and the insistence upon learning a new and local language was illogical and inconvenient but it took away the disgrace of having to speak in the language of the oppressor. This adherence to a language is one of the psychopathic signs of nationalism, for always it involves inconvenience and the limiting of the range of communication. One may rightly say that it is foolish to repudiate a language and a literature that one already knows; the reply is simply that nationalism works that way.

The Jews, the Irish, and a dozen other national groups who have sent many immigrants to America show that the freedom and economic prosperity which they found

here did not take away a sense of responsibility for the oppressed relatives in the motherland. All of them have contributed largely to the national causes.

Czechoslovakia shows many parallels to Ireland. In 1415 John Huss, a priest who had striven for Czech ideals, was burned at the stake by a Roman Catholic Council. Immediately he became a symbol of Czech nationalism and was followed by a Protestant movement that preceded that of Martin Luther by a hundred years. After the Thirty Years' War, which began in 1618, the Catholic forces, which had been completely victorious, compelled the people to become Catholics again, and for a hundred and sixty years no religious freedom was permitted. In America, about 1850, the Czech Freethinking movement began and Czech Freethinkers became the active agents of the national movement. Austria, the ruling power, was Catholic. Much progress had been made in teaching the Czechs to use the German language, but an increasing resistance to it developed, so that, at the outbreak of the World War, German-speaking people received curt treatment in Prague.

Each of the Central European states formed after the War offers variations in the process of nationalism, but psychologically all are the same. The Poles who had been dominated by Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia, like the Irish took Catholicism as their symbol; the Lithuanians who had been culturally dominated by the Poles developed a disproportionate number of Freethinkers.

On the other side of the world is Korea, the last state to fall under the once common practice of imperialism. Only twenty-five years ago Japan began to get her tentacles on Korea and a few years later annexed it in defiance of treaty and the wish of the people. The Korean national movement began in the days when China had exacted tribute, but it was vague and inarticulate. In the nineties when Russia, China, and Japan were competing with a

degenerate Korean government for control, Korean nationalism was born; it reached a climax on March 1, 1919, in a nation-wide uprising. This was ruthlessly put down, though many reforms soon followed. In Korea, Buddhism had been under the ban for many years so that there was no accepted religion there when the first Christian missionaries arrived less than fifty years ago. There is no country where missionary enterprise has won so many converts in so short a time as Korea; thus Christianity became the nucleus of the nationalistic activity. The Japanese are trying to force the Koreans to learn Japanese, so there is a strong reaction against that language.

When a national movement has once started neither repression nor freedom makes much difference, though repression means more violent reaction. In the Philippines where the United States has given a great deal of freedom for agitation, the independence movement has the same characteristics as in Korea. In Indo-China, which is a French colony, the people are largely primitive and the French method of military control prevails. The French have recently prohibited the importation of American bailed newspapers which were used for wrapping purposes, on the ground that the papers might contain "dangerous thoughts." Agitation, however, is very active there. The Dutch rule Java with benevolence and absolutism, but revolution is not far distant.

India belongs in a class by itself. In no other country where nationalism has appeared has there been so much division among the people themselves. Not only are there the differences of religions and language but there is also the crystallized caste system. English is the only common medium of understanding for the whole of India, but since the opposition to England has been gaining headway, abhorrence of the English language has resulted in the rapid adoption of Hindi. No other force could have had the effect of breaking down caste that nationalism has had.

Gandhi, who is the personification of the religious spirit of India, repudiated separation of religious sects, so all the religions of India are found among his followers. The sharpest division among the Indians is that between Hindu and Moslem; this has been a great stumblingblock to the success of the movement, but there are signs of a breakdown even in this antagonism. The Indian students who have been educated in England are leaders of the movement against England.

This last fact, which is illustrated in all national movements, suggests one of the most interesting characteristics of nationalism. The social process seems to go on in a paradoxical fashion. It needs injustice to start the struggle for justice, and gains freedom only after being denied it. This is one of the most obvious examples of the Cosmic Good. It would have been difficult to secure the necessary reorganization of society which had to come to India without the English as the object of common enmity.

The repercussions of the Indian movement are of incalculable importance. The interest in Gandhi in the Moslem countries of the Near East supersedes interest in the establishment of Moslem independence and, while there is opposition to him among the Moslems of India, there seems to be almost universal disapproval among the Arab Moslems of this Indian Moslem attitude. This means that nationalism is emerging as a more important group idea than religion, which hitherto has dominated all Islam. Among the Arabs, the non-Moslems, although greatly outnumbered by the Moslems, are making common cause with them, and a unity is appearing which is altogether new. The presence of the English and the French must be given credit for this.

In the meantime nationalism has already become absurd. The sentiment in behalf of world organization and the sinuous spread of commerce make nationalism in the present form utterly irrational and impractical as an ultimate

cult. One thing, however, the world should quickly learn, namely, that a national group cannot be crushed out by force, lack of land, or loss of language. One of the unfortunate heritages of nationalism is the hangover of complexes which last long after the condition out of which they grew has passed away. They may be superiority complexes, as in the case of Italy and the United States, and thereby develop other problems which will be troublesome for a time and then disappear as the whole nationalistic idea dies out.

There has been only one political power with the exception of Switzerland that has had a program under which a variety of national groups may live together as equals under one system: the much abused Union of Soviet Republics. If everything else should be forgotten about the Russian Revolution, the fact that this particular program was undertaken is a contribution to social experimentations of incomparable value.

The old Russian Empire was a great sinner in its effort to mold all its subjects into the image of the Great Russians. The Union of Soviet Republics is composed of more than thirty national units differing in languages and cultures. Someone at the beginning of the new régime had the worldly wisdom to suggest that it would be possible to have one economic system and let people have any culture they wished. In the central bureau of education there is a committee that prepares textbooks in all the languages of the Union and makes it easy for the users of the languages to learn to read them. The result has been that this most heterogeneous state has an amazing unity. The whole world will finally have to be organized in some such way; then the thing that is happening in the Soviet Union will happen everywhere, namely: when there is no attack on the things which a nationality holds precious, there will no longer be fear and people will be willing to learn any language or appropriate any culture.

If anyone may venture to prophesy from such signs as the times afford, he may suggest that the interdependence of the world of ideas, scientific, economic, and spiritual, presages a new type of organization that is so inevitable that, three hundred years hence, our present nationalism will be as difficult to understand and will seem as far away and archaic as now seems the feudal system of three hundred years ago. Before this prophecy is fulfilled, however, the foreshortened history of Asiatic nationalism will have run its course, and out of the assurance of cultures of long experience we shall get the drive towards what Tagore has defined as the "no nation."

The present glorification of nationalism by Fascist movements gives us nothing new. It is a defense mechanism to resist the inevitable rapid sweep toward internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Mussolini, Hitler, and Hearst, with their anti-internationalism, are symptoms that pose as cures. The military men and minds are on the defensive because their functions will be lost unless they maintain nationalistic attitudes. The international tendency on the other hand is being organized for both practical and moral reasons: practical, because already the economic and cultural involvements make isolation impossible, and because the barriers that nationalistic jealousies with their armies, tariffs, and egotisms have created are at the very moment being broken down or climbed over; moral, because universal values are becoming daily more apparent. Science and religion are urging equality of men, sympathy and understanding are spreading rapidly, ideas about inherent differences in race are being exploded. Not of slight importance too is the universal human desire for adventures outside of the sterile cultures in which people live.

Difficult as the psychological aspects of the nationalist problem are, they are greatly complicated by the inherited theory of sovereignty. Sovereignty is derived from the claim of absolute monarchs and has been appropriated by

constitutional monarchies and democracies. To secure it is the object of endeavor of every national movement. Political theory concerning sovereignty is now undergoing fundamental changes, but it is the archaic type that arouses peoples to jealous fury. In the days of self-sufficient and isolated kingdoms, states could be autonomous and sovereign — had to be, in fact. Now every state is so involved with others economically, intellectually, and morally that political concepts and practices of a prior condition are as obsolete as Roman triremes and the divine right of kings.

International law is necessary to define and protect world-wide commercial activity, and only selfish interests insist on sovereign right to raise tariffs and maintain monopolies. Intellectually there are no frontiers since ideas belong to the whole world and not even a superpatriot would deny himself the advantage of knowledge derived from alien sources. Religion and art disseminate themselves with little regard for the boundaries set by sovereign states. Constant migrations have resulted in blood relationships that furnish biological bonds between nations that reduce to absurdity claims of inherent superiority and sovereign exclusiveness. Less tangible but even more powerful are the enlarged moral concepts that can coerce powerful nations against their wills when they become reckless in their adherence to legal treaties.

The formation of the League of Nations was a tacit admission that the old order of sovereignty had passed, though smooth words were used to calm the feelings of those not yet ready to admit it; the vestigial remains of sovereignty have clogged the working of this instrument which is pointing in the direction we are bound to travel. More important than the formal organization, because its success depends upon them, are the movements for cultivating international sentiment and understanding that will educate a generation that can look beyond its own borders.

They have appeared in churches, schools, and civic societies without number in many countries. They attack the military institution as the bulwark of sentimental nationalism and irrational claims of sovereignty. Nations are being held back from embracing positive programs which they know to be necessary because of fear that other nations may take advantage of bars that may be let down. The fact, however, that the whole basis of the old theories has been undermined gives the promise that before long all that will be left of the old nation and nationalism is the residuum that is necessary for local administration and psychological satisfaction.

In the meantime those peoples who have not yet enjoyed the full measure of sovereignty or have lost it will run the gamut of its attainment, possession, and decline. In the succeeding chapters we shall rarely be out of touch with the potent drive of nationalistic forces.

Chapter IV

RACE

Vastly more has been written about racial theories than about either revolution or nationalism, though as a concrete problem it is more recent than either of them. In its modern form, race has become a problem arising from the point of view of the Caucasian with regard to other races and almost entirely of the Anglo-Saxon division of the Caucasian race. It originated in the imperialistic relation of the English to the yellow, brown, and black peoples who came under their empire, and became most intense in America where the black race had the status of slavery.

With the emergence of Asia into the field as a serious contender for recognition, the race question has entered into an entirely new phase. Fortunately science had already anticipated the need by devoting so much attention to the analysis of race that it will be comparatively easy to make the necessary adjustments as soon as prejudice has been reduced.

The more we study the question of race the more difficult it becomes to define a race. Any man on the street may know what it is, but a scientist has to fumble for the answer. There are certain characteristics of features, hair, and color, so uniform among people that are called a race that a novice can pick them out, but after he has picked them, what has he?

A rough estimate of the race groups according to color gives us about 550 million whites, 500 million yellows, between 350 and 450 million browns, 200 million blacks, and

75 million reds. They can be grouped only by sight. If everyone were blind a large part of our race problem would disappear. We should find, however, that in general there are different cultures roughly corresponding to race color lines.

As long as the proportions of the races in a given area were to the advantage of the white, or where the possession of all the instruments of power made it easy for a few to rule the many, the colored races occupied a status which worked fairly well as long as it was accepted. When the colored races resent their status they find themselves faced by prejudice which is the important factor in the racial problem.

Partly because of their long experience in governing subject peoples and partly because they have cultivated their own self-respect so diligently, the English mannerism adds to the appearance of conscious superiority that may not be intended but that reacts on the Englishman by making him feel superior, and on the colored races by making them feel resentful and bitter. As George Young says in his book *Constantinople*: "Our British aloofness is no doubt a help in governing Eastern subject races; but only so long as they remain subject."

In America, this same Anglo-Saxon quality of aloofness, perhaps somewhat softened but applied with even more consciousness of superiority and backed by the sanctions of religion, dealt with the Negro successfully as long as he "stayed in his place." The two great laboratories for the study of race have been the United States and Asia. The very sharpness of race separation in America adds greatly to its value for observation. Africa with her numbers and her resources also is revolting against white imperialism and economic and cultural exploitation. Her cultural history is not comparable to that of China and India, but her present tribal organization indicates a long social history.

The Cosmic Process has plenty of time. Only the con-

temporary generation is impatient, but the scientist tries to look over the contemporary toward the universal and the ultimate. The power of awakened colored races is recognized as so formidable that it cannot be disposed of by any casual method. All of Asia is colored and discussion about race has penetrated there, arousing feelings of resentment which have greatly accelerated both the revolutionary and the nationalistic movements. It quickens the desire to prove that claims of race superiority are not true, and makes the scanning of the foibles of the white race more keen.

The race problem then reduces itself to three factors: prejudice, the cultural position of the races, and the inherent nature of race. In the last we have a purely scientific matter which, much perverted, is used as the basis for all the rationalization in connection with the other two. It will be discussed later in the chapter. The cultural differences are genuine social problems and must be faced by purely social, not biological, attitudes. Prejudice is an entirely conditioned type of reaction. It may be dissolved either by psychoanalysis, which will give an explanation of its historical development, or by the slow process of experience.

If we turn to the great popularizer of the theory of evolution, Herbert Spencer, we shall be told that cultures are on a scale of complexity which are called higher and lower. In his naïve acceptance of the principle of the universal application of evolution, Spencer thought that the higher culture represents a greater degree of biological evolution than the lower. It was this theory which began the intensive scientific speculation about race differentiation during the last fifty years.

Starting from Spencer, anthropologists began to study all sorts of primitive cultures. They found very wide variations both between and within races and concluded that the biological explanation plays so small a part in these

variations that it did not need to be reckoned with scientifically; its popular vogue, however, demands a good deal of refuting.

Although race problems are primarily cultural, race arguments are predominantly based on biological premises. It was assumed on the evolutionary hypothesis that the biological differences were organic and all-pervasive. Every investigation, however, has proved the contrary. Now only the superficial obvious fact of color remains as a racial measure. A prominent surgeon with violent prejudice against the Negro asserted that the only place where a Negro is the same as a white man is on the dissecting table. It is true that all efforts to find structural variations by which to define races except the single one of color have shown that under the skin there is nothing distinctive.

When the biological argument began to lose force the psychological demonstration was attempted. A few years ago it was thought that intelligence testing would demonstrate the grades of race differences unequivocally. The army intelligence tests were used freely in America in the propaganda for the exclusion law. Now no reputable psychologist claims that those tests had any value except for the selection, at the time, of men qualified for officers' training courses. They certainly could not determine racial capacity. It was found, for example, that the Negroes born in the North had higher grades than whites born in the South, though the whites in the South stood higher than Negroes in the South.¹

¹ It happens that the present writer in 1904 was the first person to make an extensive application of the method of mental testing of races. Money was raised for the research by William James, and the method was worked out with R. M. Yerkes, who later developed the army intelligence tests. The first tests were given to many hundreds of whites, Negroes, and Indians, and, although it was expected to find that even such crude tests would immediately show race grouping, they showed nothing of the sort. Since then, the technique has made great progress, and has been applied to millions of persons of all races. The conclusion seems to be that they are as negative as were the original ones. There

Modern psychology has moved on, however, to a point where we are now able to explain many things that were hitherto completely baffling. The two new theories, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, deal with complexes and behavior patterns. The spread of popular use of these two theories is amazing. Everybody talks about complexes and often correctly. There are sex complexes, inferiority complexes, and group complexes, which are made to bear loads that strain them, but which indicate the beginning of a different kind of thinking. Complexes go far towards explaining attitudes of and towards race, and behavior patterns explain race characteristics.

Behavior patterns, or culture patterns as they are called by the sociologist, are difficult to understand. Twenty-five years ago instinct, inherited and invariable, was made to account for most of our characteristics and explained the differences between individuals, nations, and races. A good deal of faith in instincts still continues, but behaviorist psychology has shown that with the barest minimum left to instincts, or inherited dispositions, all our characteristics are habits, most of them formed in the very earliest period of life. This undermines the pseudo-scientific argument of the "manifest destiny" of race, not excepting the white race which has been the most blatant in claiming it.

A culture pattern means the set of habits which a culture group imposes on those who are born and reared within it. There are race culture groups, that is, large areas in which people of the same color are subject to the same social environment. They develop a technique of life, traditions, and social organization that has every appearance of

are biological and psychological differences between individuals, but when a sufficiently large group is taken, variations, except superficial ones, cannot be detected. One cannot deny that there may eventually be found racial differences in both fields, but they are so unimportant that they cannot explain cultural differences.

"characteristics." This makes the race problem just as real as it would have been on any other basis, but puts its solution on an entirely different one.

About twenty-five years ago the Nordic theory began to gain disciples. According to this, the supreme racial stock of the world is that division of the Caucasian race that lives in Northern Europe. Its characteristics and limits have never been clearly defined, but the Germans, English, and Scandinavians fell within the definition. The qualities were measured by accomplishment that by the Germans was called "*kultur*," and by the British "*imperial responsibility*" or "*the white man's burden*." As has been suggested, there was vagueness in the idea, but when it got started it was rationalized to the limit. Nietzsche's superman was easily taken to be a Nordic German. The best argument for Nordic superiority is the way in which the Nordic group spread over the face of the earth until it controlled nine-tenths of the globe, either politically or economically, and could well turn about and say, as did little Jack Horner after extracting the plum from the pie, "*What great men are we!*" It was the same sense of inherent superiority that justified the Germans in their assurance that God was unquestionably on their side, thus putting the other Nordics for the time being without the pale. Chamberlin, an Englishman adopted in Germany, furnished them with their arguments, though it was the French royalist, Gobineau, for years unnoticed, who had first formulated the arguments.

At the time of the War and immediately afterwards, the theory began to gain great vogue in the United States. Madison Grant and Osborne, who are real scientists in their own fields, and some of the people interested in eugenics, like Lothrop Stoddard, took the matter up with vigor. An eminent geographer, Ellsworth Huntington, who had gone off on the Nordic tangent, said in one of his books, after claiming Nordic origin for several well-known Latins,

that Columbus was a Nordic, as we can tell from the pictures and busts of him "whether authentic or not."

Stoddard's *Rising Tide of Color* has had a tremendous vogue, because it stimulated pride, hatred, and fear at the same time. The falling birth rate of the Nordics was measured against the high birth rate of the colored races. The fact fell easily into the thinking that had been aroused by the German Kaiser when he coined the term "yellow peril." The Germans have stopped their Nordic aggression, but the British and Americans still have their imperialism. British imperialism in its early days was accidental and merely imperialism, but the Nordic theory gives to those who now need moral justification a pious ground on which to stand.

In America the theory has had a great variety of opportunity for activity. All our recent legislation on the matter of immigration has been buoyed up by it. Within the white race were all our European immigrants. We disliked many of them because they were Roman Catholics, because they were Jews, and still others because they were unwashed. While we have never had anti-Semitism as intensely as it is found, off and on, in Europe, yet we have always had a touch of it. Since the number of Jews was rapidly increasing, the best way to stop them from coming was to convince the country that they were not Nordics and therefore of inferior stock. Then there were the Italians and Slavs of Southeastern Europe. It did not do to say in so many words that they were inferior, but the Ku Klux Klan succeeded in organizing bigotry against religion and race so that there was no stopping anti-immigration legislation. The present "national origins" law became operative; it fixed the number of immigrants according to racial stock and is designed to make the great proportion of immigrants of Nordic stock. If there had been no Nordic theory, probably the discriminatory Asiatic exclusion law could not have been passed.

Of course the people who were classed as inferior have resented it. Since our leading anthropologists have been Jews, their objection to the Nordic theory has been attributed to self-interest. Some Japanese scientists who also have contributed to the discussion have met the same accusation. In the last ten years many of our best Nordic scientists have completely punctured the theory. It is accepted in scientific circles as a myth, but still has a great deal of force coming from the momentum of existing political organization with its aggressive exploiting power.

On the other side of the picture is the sullen reaction of those who are excluded from social, economic, and political privileges. This reaction created the movement which is driving the colored races into each other's arms. For the present the Chinese and Japanese have the bitterest hostility towards each other. If there were no race theories, their relations would be worked out on the basis of political and economic issues. It is possible, however, that the attitude of the white race towards the yellow will gradually drive the Chinese and Japanese together. There have already been a number of overtures between Japan and India. The number is likely to increase. There are signs that show that the Negro may also be drawn into the entente. A few years ago the Chinese students were unable to get much favorable news in American papers, so they sent a record of the racial situation in China to the students in Negro colleges. This was the first organized effort to bring the Negro into a consciousness with other races towards the white man. It is said that for a number of years in India there was a paper that published with large headlines the news of Negro lynchings in the United States.

India has had an intra-race problem of vast magnitude. There was a dark native race in India when the historic invasions began. The succession of invaders settled in the midst of those who were already there, and had the

relation of conquerors and conquered, with differences in culture; the Indians have occupied themselves for several thousands of years with the problems which these facts created. The caste system was presumably based on distinctions of race and was later forged into religious sanctions in which it was entirely forgotten that race was the original basis. In spite of the strict prohibitions to go outside of caste, no longer can the caste be said to mark racial divisions; in recent years it has been attacked by many reform movements as having no rational justification.

“But from the earliest beginnings of history India has had her own problem constantly before her — it is the race problem. . . . This problem of race unity which we have been trying to solve for so many years has likewise to be faced by you in America. Many people of this country ask me what is happening as to the caste distinctions in India. But when the question is asked me, it is usually done with a superior air. And I feel tempted to put the same question to our American critics with a slight modification. ‘What have you done with the Red Indian, and the Negro?’ For you have not got over your attitude of caste toward them. You have used violent methods to keep aloof from other races, but until you have solved the question here in America you have no right to question India.

“In spite of our great difficulty, however, India has done something. She has tried to make an adjustment of races, to acknowledge the real differences between them where these exist, and to seek for some basis for unity. This basis has come through our saints, like Nanak, Kabir, Chaitnaya, and others,¹ preaching one God to all races of India.”²

Just as every individual, because he knows himself better than anyone else, is predisposed to be egotistical, so every

¹ Who include Tagore himself and Gandhi.

² Tagore, *Nationalism in India*, pp. 118-119.

racial group, having lived by itself and built up its distinctive culture, thinks itself superior. It easily transfers this immediate reaction by rationalization to an explanation on the basis of race. When the Chinese first came into contact with the white race, they despised it and have never ceased to do so. It is impossible to tell how much of the recent anti-foreign attitude in China is based on race feeling, but there is no question but that race feeling is a decided factor. If this strengthening of race consciousness continues, there is no escape from increased conflict.

The theories of racial variations fall into harmony with popular prejudice; scientific theories that lead in the opposite direction towards racial similarity spread much less rapidly; yet our greatest hope for the avoidance of conflict depends on the newer theories of race similarity which are held by practically every reputable scientist to-day. They will leave all the problems of culture variation where they were before, but will exert a new influence. As long as exploitation is possible, the dominant groups will hold the so-called inferior race in a class status; but when economic interests reach a basis of comparative equality, a degree of mutual respect is bound to follow. In California, on the one hand, there are bitter feelings towards Orientals and, on the other, an interest and a faith in the increase of trade with them.

England and the United States are the most involved in the problem of race. England has South Africa, Egypt, India, and her penetration of China, in which race questions are intimately involved. The United States has fifteen million Negroes and a half million Indians — more or less — within her borders; Porto Rico and the Philippines on the outside, with Hawaii on the margin. The success of Western civilization and the assurance of Christian superiority and responsibility have conditioned the English and the Americans to habits of haughtiness that presage difficult involvements for the future. These habits in the

relations of the Anglo-Saxons to the other races are a constant stimulus to resistance and resentment. While economic exploitation is the chief reason for dominating weaker cultures, the reaction of the exploited to the personal manner of the exploiter will play a large part in the overthrow of the dominant group. Every intelligent Englishman knows that his days in Egypt, India, and China are numbered; Americans are less aware of their shaky tenure of race domination, because they are less aware of their own empire. The most successful experiment in the world in race relations is being made in Hawaii. Its value is that it shows that races can live together harmoniously. Unfortunately the racial groups there reflect the racial attitudes of their countries of origin. The Chinese and Japanese are inevitably influenced by the race experience suffered by their people in Asia. The flock of tourists who are going to Honolulu are more likely to upset the balance by their prejudices than to learn anything from the results that are happily being shown there. The presence of the military greatly aggravates the situation.

Neither education nor religion seems to have any influence on race attitudes except as the education bears directly on the analysis of the race problem. There is quite as much prejudice among the educated as among the uneducated; if the educated happen to have the pseudo-scientific point of view, they are able to rationalize even more successfully than those who have merely a naïve reaction to people who are different. The Christian religion preaches tolerance and equality, but along with it goes in practice a consciousness of superiority and an inextricable alliance between Christianity and the imperialistic peoples.

The religion in which there is no race consciousness is Mohammedanism, because in it all races are united as brothers under Allah. In this there is great promise. For this reason the Turkish Revolution may be comparable

in its ultimate influence to the Russian Revolution. Turkey, which for centuries was the titular head of the Mohammedan world, has undertaken to become modern. If she succeeds, as there is every reason to believe she will, in spite of the hostility of the rest of the Mohammedans because of the abolition of the caliphate, she will be imitated by them. One eminent Egyptian said to the writer that it would not be ten years before Egypt would follow Turkey in progressivism. The geographical location of the Mohammedans at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and Africa gives them a strategical position in world affairs. All Moslems are brothers and within their fold are whites, blacks, browns, and yellows. Their missionary methods give them a great advantage over Christians. Since they are on a similar cultural level with the people among whom they go and since they have no racial fastidiousness, they identify themselves with their converts and marry with them. There will therefore probably be a rapid spread of the Islamic influence.

Many people feel that travel decreases race prejudice, but actually it seems to accentuate it. Nine-tenths of the hundreds of thousands of tourists who go to Europe every summer come home with a greater feeling of superiority, because abroad they found a scarcity of bathrooms and other American conveniences. Those who go to China are confirmed in their conviction of the superiority of the West over the East. Bad and meager as these results are, foreign travel is still the first step towards getting acquainted and towards learning the fact that human beings are all essentially alike.

The second step after travel will be the scientific explanation of the differences in cultures; we must have faith that this will gradually permeate popular thinking.

The next stage will be the organization of the dominated races with power enough to insist on conditions of racial self-respect. This is the dangerous stage, for it may lead to

violent conflict and to the taking of the same irrational attitudes of race superiority on the part of those that are now down but will climb up, as have been held by those who have been up.

The final and distant stage will be a biological merging of all the peoples of the earth. There is no biological reason why we should not return to one race type since we originated from one; so long as differences in status and differences of culture prevail, this biological merging cannot take place easily. At present, wherever races are in close contact, there are intermarriages on the highest and lowest social levels, the one where social conventions can be defied, the other where they do not exist; but in the great middle class prejudice still holds a forbidding power.

Dr. C. L. Wu in his doctor's dissertation on "Attitudes in the United States towards Negroes, Jews, and Orientals" found that wherever the numbers of each of these groups were large there was exactly the same kind of prejudice towards them, though many of the Jews are indistinguishable from other Caucasians, and many Negroes may pass as white. All of them suffer from ostracism and all of them use similar methods to meet it. Politically all of them make problems. Mention has been made of the relation of the Jews to the exclusion law. In local elections every effort is made to handicap them. All the world knows of the political attitude of California towards Orientals. The effect of the Negro on the politics of the United States is out of all proportion to his numbers. He is the cause of the "solid South," which, though slightly cracked in the election of President Hoover, will unquestionably return to its solidarity and continue to render the South unimportant in national politics.

We may sum up the argument of this chapter as follows: the first concept of racial variation as biological was discarded; then it became psychological and proved to be equally unable to establish a criterion for the measurement

of race. Then came the new psychology and a new type of explanation by culture patterns. The Nordic theory is a form of rationalization to justify the holding of power already obtained by ruthless methods and now needs a pious defense. England and the United States, having the most power over alien peoples, have correspondingly the most interest outside of the dominated groups themselves in the solution of the race problem. A successful solution means the complete elimination of racial consciousness and an attack on the social and political problems arising from cultural differences. The religion that offers the most promise of help is Mohammedanism but its influence is limited to its adherents. Christianity has consistently preached an ideal which has not been practiced. If Christianity can check itself before a cataclysm comes by practicing the precepts that it has so long preached, race will become as innocuous as the color of eyes or the shape of noses. Just what part Communism will play cannot be clearly seen, though at present Communist theory takes a most advanced position in the matter of race.

With this brief preliminary discussion of the factors which are involved in the relations of the East to the West, we are now ready to enter into our main thesis.

Chapter V

WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Man has lived as man on the earth from one to several million years, but all the evidence seems to show that only in the six to ten thousand years just past did he develop either agriculture or political organization, or any religious or philosophical notions about the universe. It is not strange, then, that in this brief experimental period only a small portion of the possibilities of man both as an individual and as a society should have been demonstrated. Now that the empirical method is being applied to the study of society, instead of concluding that any particular form yet achieved is ultimate and desirable we must admit that we are just at the beginning, with vastly more to learn and do than the total of what we now know and have done.

The conspicuous part that Europe and America have played in recent years has led to the militant conviction that Western civilization and Christianity are the culmination of the Good. At the present moment, when this idea is being challenged, many people stand bewildered. The achievements of Western civilization are brilliant and glorious. To them are to be credited the whole great present changing character of human society. That it has made Westerners overconfident in themselves and their products is not at all strange. They had even assumed that all history was being fulfilled in their institutions.

Now that many of these institutions are falling about their heads as they come bounding back from the East, there is, let us hope, idealism enough in these same West-

erners to give them the leadership in the effort to bring about international understanding and harmony and to start on a new course. Although nationalism, race consciousness, and the method of revolution are of Western origin, so are internationalism, humanitarianism, and sportsmanship. Western diplomats and business men have been selfish, but their missionaries have had high purposes, and have both carried Westernism far and brought back information of the East to the waiting West.

Western civilization is a unit composed of many parts that differ in details but are alike in outlook. Leadership of the whole has been now with one part and now with another. Europe was the cradle where nations have grown to maturity and lost their position by senility. We have the record of Greece, Rome, France, England, Germany, and others, each preëminent in some contribution to the progress of civilization. The Cosmic Process, however, has always been indifferent to the self-esteem of peoples, so that the rise and fall of nations is the picture of history.

Europe has occupied the center of the stage for a long time; but now those who were recently great have lost or are losing their power and grandeur, probably never to regain them. The German Empire has been shorn both of territory and of prestige. Even supposing a powerful monarch should come back and that the intelligence and industry of the Germans should again give them preëminence in Europe, it is inconceivable that the awe in which Germany was once held should ever return. No one would be rash enough to expect a return of Austria-Hungary. What has happened to France and to England is not yet so obvious. Great Britain has been called "an Empire Emeritus," and the facts justify the name. For some years she will retain the form of an empty shell without substance. The Englishman has already assumed a defeatist attitude that parallels the falling off of both possessions and commerce. The Dominions give obeisance but

govern themselves; whenever they desire they will break the tie that has bound them to the Empire.

It may well be claimed that the present organization of states is unimportant, and that the technique and resources of the old states will again assert themselves under modified forms. There is no doubt that in some degree this will hold true, but in the meantime the rest of the world will have been undergoing modification also. The United States for instance at the present moment has entered into much of the heritage of Europe.

The United States and the rest of the Americas have a virility that has gone out of Europe, but they also share in the ills that have spread their blight on the whole of the West. The new position of the United States is regretfully admitted by Europeans. Dean Inge said: "When I was in Berlin, two years before the War, I said to my host: 'Europe will lead the world about fifty years more, after which the supremacy will pass to the United States. But if Europe goes to war, the Americans will take the scepter and the trident at once, and neither you nor we will ever recover them.' My prediction has become true and consequently America is now by far the most interesting country in the world. The Americans are our masters."¹

The United States with her traditions and her individualism is the inheritor of the line of Christendom screened through the social structure of medieval and modern Europe. The geographical limits set by the Pacific Ocean and the social vigor of the Oriental have compelled the Western flow of migration to come to a halt. We have been so obsessed by the notion that the direction of civilization is westward that it has somehow seemed to be inherent in the nature of the universe. This illusion arose out of pioneering possibilities. L

The crux of the matter is that Western civilization has for the moment realized itself. It is not the limits of

¹ *Lay Thoughts of a Dean*, p. 134. Putnam, 1926.

geography alone that have brought it to a standstill, but the limits of its own nature. Its contributions will not be lost, but its values are no longer exclusive and are beginning to share in the common values of all human experience, most of which has been outside the area called the West. A change of relationship does not mean extermination, and a difference in culture does not mean that any is valueless; but psychologically, a generation or an epoch may be surfeited by one culture and turn to another, just as we turn from one popular song to another.

Western civilization from Roman times has stood pre-eminently for power and efficiency. Most of its citizens accept these as inherent conditions of life. Nevertheless there are always tendencies, sometimes in individuals and sometimes in whole groups, to resist the dominant forces in culture. Art and idealism may be active where they are not formulated but die under too much organization. This means that in a world organized more and more as a unit, there are bound to be changing areas of emphasis, as the formulation proceeds.

It is not necessary to treat the West at length because we know it by being a part of it, and whole libraries have already been written about it. Many books and articles have also been written about its departing glories. Romain Rolland, a French writer of unusual depth and breadth of view, says:¹

"The lesson of history is tragic. Political history is immoral, it has never ceased to be immoral throughout the centuries during which states have existed. Under the mask of civilization, for brutal national ideals, the policies of the great Powers practice fraud and violence, theft and the extermination (or the degradation) of so-called inferior peoples. The device of glory and wealth which mounts to the skies has been built up during centuries on a basis of crime.

¹ "The Iron Net," the *Survey*, August 1, 1926.

"But at a fated hour, which may sound a little sooner or a little later, but which always sounds at last, moral retribution arrives, implacable. Morals which have not come into their own during the long course of historical evolution claim their due at the end of the road, inexorably. And the punishment is pitiless as was the crime. It seems as blind as antique Destiny. The will of the best of men can no longer do aught to avert it. The oppressors have so closely entwined their fate with that of the oppressed that it is no longer possible for them to disengage it without destruction.

"The so-called Christian civilization of Europe and America bears on its shoulders centuries of misdeeds. At the present moment, when its conscience is disquieted, it would clear itself if it could but cannot. It is caught in the iron net which the fathers prepared.

"My conclusion bluntly put, is this: The European world, white civilization as a whole, is heading toward catastrophe. . . ."

The "catastrophe" will be comparable on a larger scale to the transitions from Ilium to Athens, from Greece to Rome, from Italy to the Holy Roman Empire, or from Europe to America. Since transition has hitherto taken place from east to west a reversal of direction from west to east seems to be more cataclysmic and the collapse of greater portent.

There has been so much self-analysis in the West that it is not necessary here to do more than call attention to some of its characteristics that have been significant for the East. The breakdown of Western self-assurance began with reflections on the issues and accomplishments of the Great War. This was followed by the bubble of temporary prosperity and a period of depression unlike any that had preceded it because many of the factors in it, on account of its vast extent, were no longer confined to the West. In less than a generation economic interdependence had

become a world-wide phenomenon. Political and economic disturbances in one country threw the machinery of others out of gear. The whole commercial structure had been built so rapidly and so artificially that it could not stand against a storm. ✓

It is only in the Eastern countries that civilization has had even an important part of six thousand years in which to develop, while Western civilization has been in adolescence only three or four hundred years at best and its maturity has barely begun. It was only half a century B.C. that the Germans were first known. They were then merely aggressive tribes; the same was true of all the peoples of Europe who were the forerunners of Western civilization. The many centuries of the Dark and Middle Ages were necessary for the influence of Rome, not ideal either civilly or religiously, to bring some control and unity among these tribesmen. The Renaissance of five hundred years ago and the epoch of invention of power and science beginning a hundred years ago cover the full period, out of a million years, in which the West has made its unique contributions to the world. It is not strange that there are great gaps and uneven developments.

In the crowded and older East only a stereotyped and conforming culture could survive, and a premium was set on the suppression of individual initiative and variation. The momentums and habits of the past held the cultures to a permanent type. In the area of Western civilization, in contrast to this old, crowded conformity, there was a sparse population which, until recently, made its living by hunting and conquest. Just behind it was barbarism, which had developed few social controls and was a system in which the individualist and the adventurer were as valuable to their group as the conformist in the East was to his. Thus originated as a social ideal the aggressiveness that has been the keynote both of Western activity and of Western philosophy. Strangely enough, it was this very

condition of savagery and barbarism, with its emphasis on aggressive individualism, that furnished the condition necessary for the humanitarianism and idealism so different from anything found in the East. In China, outside the communistic family, suffering made little appeal, because lives were too numerous to be valued. In India, under similar crowded conditions, with a climate that brought early death, attention was directed largely to spiritual possibilities after death. In the East, with more people than necessary, slavery rarely had importance, while in the West even the life of the slave was significant. In a sense in the West, savage tribes sprang full-fledged into civilization. We now know enough about the persistence of attitudes not to expect them to have been wholly modified in the brief time that has elapsed, especially since these qualities of barbarism were of peculiar value in the specific course of development that the West embarked upon.

The old countries developed philosophy and religion, but the West began with superstitions and then adopted bodily, as a substitute for what might have grown out of its own experience, the Eastern religion of Christianity. In time Christianity actually became a compensating substitute for a life that grew more and more out of harmony with its teachings. With the accumulation of wealth and power there was a corresponding zeal in the maintenance of Christian forms and at the same time rationalization to satisfy the conscience. Christianity taught the denial of force and the repudiation of material wealth, but the drive of the too recent savage habits has given both of these a significance they possess nowhere else in the world. Nevertheless Christian and Western have become synonyms. The idealism in the Christian doctrine has combined with Western aggressiveness and justified carrying Western culture to the uttermost parts of the world. Commerce might have gone without it but

it would have gone in a different mood. What the missionaries have primarily carried has not been theology but Western culture and they have often been unable to distinguish between them, calling both Christianity. Energetic exploration and exploitation in harmony with the individualistic tendency to pursue an object to its end regardless of consequences became the real religion.

In Europe the Roman Catholic Church with its political associations was responsible for the breakdown of tribal organization and the birth of states on the Roman model. It also introduced the Latin language as the medium of communication, though Latin was an artificial language because it was already dead. Much of it became absorbed into the meager local languages which were alive and Latin ceased to be vital, but tradition has held it in the educational program for an astonishing period of time after its demise.

In the modern world there has been a deliberate effort to make French and then German the world's medium of communication, as Latin was the European, but, without deliberate intention, English has come to occupy a place similar to that of medieval Latin. It extends into the large reaches of the world. In China and India, however, the native languages were already highly developed in contrast to those primitive unwritten ones of Europe. They had become so crystallized that there had grown up wide variation between the literary and the common language. English as contrasted with Latin is living and has a directness not found in the Eastern languages and its form is bound to have an influence, even though its vocabulary may not be appropriated as was the case with Latin. Commerce, travel, and the students of the various countries who have gone to England and America, as well as the imperialistic activities of Great Britain, account for the spread of English, until it has become the *lingua franca* of the world, the accepted language of commerce, and a

required subject in the schools of multitudes of countries. It is probable, however, that it has reached its highest vogue and will from now on decline, since the growth of national feeling everywhere is emphasizing the symbolism of the native languages. It has been of great advantage to the spread of English that it is the language of both England and of the United States and therefore could not be associated with the imperialism of any one country.

Much more pervasive even than language and commerce has been the spread from the West of scientific method and practical technique. This has become the real drive of Western civilization. To a very large degree it has been appropriable by the rest of the world without any particular change in its general philosophies of life. A scientific law, a machine, or a financial process has no nationality.

Since a universal process or idea need not be credited to any nation but can be taken by all, the situation presents to the West a dilemma, because the West, as such, is not essential to the working of its own formulas. It is a dilemma which therefore may amount to the bankruptcy of Western control over the very things it has created. All that Asia wants to make her the competitor of the West, she can take without fundamentally changing her own philosophy. The West has no philosophy except that of materialistic individualism, and, as we shall see later, this is at the present moment perhaps its greatest liability, though formerly its greatest asset. The West has no religion growing out of its own experience. Some time it may get one when it has suffered as the other peoples have suffered from limitations such as they have had. Defeatism has become characteristic of Europe since the War, and is now emerging in the United States. It may be followed by humility which has been entirely lacking in the West, but which underlies every religion. The real meaning of religion must be something different from that generally

given to it. It is a psychological phenomenon rather than a theological one. Faith is built up to meet the problem that comes from the necessity of bridging the chasm between the finiteness of space, time, and quality in which we live and the concepts of infinite space, time, and perfection in quality. It must struggle to find harmony between the finite and the infinite. The West has been so preoccupied with its control over tangible things that it has been misled into thinking that things were ultimate.

Cultures like individuals are egocentric. That is, each is so familiar with itself and ignorant of others that it builds up a consciousness of superiority. Until the birth of the West, conquest was of interest only in the advantages it gave, and if peoples became absorbed in the process it was an incident, not a program. The West is the only culture that was so self-conscious about itself that its habit of deliberately spreading itself became one of its chief characteristics. This militancy is intimately tied up with Christian practice, and has given a rationalized justification for all forms of exploitation. It has put clothes on the naked in the name of morality and at the same time gloried in the fact that it created markets for new goods. It has also carried its political forces, scientific achievements, and educational standards to the ends of the earth.

The political forms have been basically democratic with their resulting parliamentary systems. There is undoubtedly an historical explanation of this prevailing type of organization to be found in the early conditions of life. Clark has put it as follows:¹

"The hunters realized well enough that an army or a hunting band, while in the field, could not be run by a committee. Prompt and unquestioning obedience to the chosen leader was essential. But, for them, the obedience was voluntary, and to a leader who was demonstrably superior. The authority remained absolute, too, only

¹ Grover Clark, *World Unity*, Jan., 1932, p. 252.

during the crisis; except for such times, individual freedom was the rule. Policies were decided by discussion; no man could impose his arbitrary whims on another.

"The situation was inevitable, because, among the hunting peoples, the balance of power was with the individual. Not even the group itself could compel continuing and involuntary obedience by those recognized as members; and any leader who tried to impose arbitrarily on his fellows soon found himself without followers.

"Democratic ideas and institutions therefore naturally enough developed in the regions where the descendants of the North European hunters started to create modern Western civilization. Feudalism saw a partial establishment of autocratic practices; but the autocracy was toward conquered serfs; among the aristocracy basically democratic ways prevailed. In due course the hunter-bred individualistic democratic urge overthrew the structure of autocracy; and as these North European peoples spread, democracy spread too."

Democratic development has clearly been a characteristic development in the West. Its institutions have been looked upon favorably by the East, even though it may prove that they must be radically modified to fit the conditions of the East. This same radical modification is also needed in the West, for the very products of the individualistic system are bringing its own destruction. The machines which initiative and science have created brought an age of such complexity that organization and control became as necessary as among an overcrowded agricultural people. The drive of individualism will undoubtedly continue for a long time, but it must find new channels for expression, as the old ones are being closed. Thus science and institutions that have been appropriable by the East with its social structure will by the degree of success in using them serve as an example to the West of adaptations that it must itself make.

Every people has had an educational method by which it prepared the children to live according to the forms of the culture. Its efficiency in the East has not justified the frequent assumptions that its education has been lacking. The educational ideas of Europe and America which grew out of the democratic demand that education be open to everyone, up to the highest levels, has resulted in the rapid development of universities. These have carried the accepted ideas of science and its methods into every university in every part of the world, and, as has already been said, the impersonality of science is not offensive to race or national attitudes. It has been laying the ground for a common human society by setting forth the universals of experimental truth as distinguished from the evolved values of isolated cultures. In other words, education has been one of the most fundamental forces leading toward world organization, though for the present it is often dominated by particularistic interests.

Western education has been experimental and pragmatic. It is now leading the West to try to find out what is going on elsewhere. It is sending fact-finding expeditions to Russia and China; it fills the newspapers with the happenings in India and Japan. It still has its own stereotypes and myths, but this new method that it has established contains the germs of its own salvation, by leading it to discover what others are doing before it is too late, and at the same time by raising questions about the validity of all old values.

Education is impersonal in its content, while religion is personal, and the West, as has been indicated above, gave a religious turn to its practical and personal affairs and with the passion of idealism set itself to the task of developing its unexploited natural resources and in the fields of commerce, finance, and individual merit wrought miracles. Capitalism grew out of the thrift that was so much emphasized by John Calvin. These developments

all ran contrary to the elemental social teachings of Jesus, but were rationalized into the dominant interpretations of Christianity. It furnished a justification for imperialism, built armies and banks, and was convinced that it was all done for the glory of God.

The combination of individualism, which grew out of the sparse population, and the valuation of the personality as emphasized by Christianity was largely responsible for the emancipation of women. There was read into Christianity the principle of monogamy which was not inherent in it and which has been of enormous value in the changing position of women throughout the world. In other words, there were released by this combination of barbarism and an Eastern religion idealistic forces, inherent in the population and in the capacities of mankind, that had been inhibited by the highly organized and stereotyped old cultures, and that had not yet been awakened among the more primitive peoples. The idea of carrying a blazing torch to light the rest of the world bred a sense of superiority in the West which finally became so offensive that it has now brought the reaction of resentment that is the basis for the opposition the West is now meeting.

Throughout the West, without any leadership except the interstimulations of individuals and ideas, progress has gone on by leaps and bounds. Now a country in Europe, and now America, has had the leadership; each built on what the other developed. There has never been a prophet among them though there have been many men who have given new impetus or changed directions. In other countries, and generally throughout history, until the modern Western period, the idea of change has never been popular. What change has occurred has been the result of social evolution rather than a program or an end in itself such as the scientific period has brought or the spread of colonization necessitated. There has never been a leader in the West whose dominance has been at all

comparable to the three men of the East who came in the last decade. Such Napoleons as have raised themselves above the level of the rest have exercised local and temporary influence, often by force or economic accident rather than by ideas. Since the West has actually been preëminently an experimental laboratory, unhampered by either philosophy or habits, it would have been greatly handicapped by dominant personalities or coercive ideas. Its discoveries have thus been unparalleled and have made the period which is called Modern.

What has been developed, however, has been technology with culture trailing along. The difference between technique and culture is that a technique can be appropriated and mastered in a single generation, while a culture is the product of centuries and seemingly endless. Skill in driving an automobile has no relation to cultural background. One may see aeroplanes and hear radios in many countries in Asia and find them to be in no conflict with allegiance to Confucius, Buddha, or Mohammed. The followers of all of these prophets may study the same science and yet socially react in the accustomed ways. Post, telephone, telegraph, and newspaper are equally useful whatever the ideas communicated.

Social science, as distinguished from social philosophy, is a product of the West, and its laws have been formulated largely from the observation of human reactions where the time element makes them only relatively comparable with those of the much older cultures. The power of folkways or mores in Europe and China is so different that perhaps we need different names for them, and we shall certainly need to recast much that we have thought to be definitely established laws, when we know more of ancient cultures. In the history with which we have been familiar, important continuity goes back at most only a very few centuries. Palestine, Greece, and Rome which have had much influence on us are none the less alien. It

is difficult for us to understand the weight of thousands of years. This was vividly brought home to the author when he was attending a "Moon Festival" celebration in Peking in 1929. This is a holiday that is universally celebrated in China. One of the university instructors read a poem about the celebration, written 2200 B. C., describing the Festival as it was being celebrated in 1929. When Buddha determined to begin his preaching, 500 B. C., he went to Benares because that was the religious center of India. It still remains so.

Some habits may be broken by a crisis while others are not affected. The contact with the modern world was a crisis for Japan. Though she adopted much, there is still more in Japanese traditions that has not been modified than that has been modified. Buddhism was adopted in China and held sway for many centuries; it is now moribund, leaving China as little influenced as though it had been a summer shower. India has been swept again and again by conquest, but the priest and the "holy man" have retained their ancient dominance.

In Europe, unanchored by age-old habits, it has been easy to have revolutionary changes, and they have been all-pervasive and complete. This elasticity and freedom for development have given the West a confidence and power that account for its unquestioning grasp after everything new.

Forms of government and systems of education have constantly changed. Since there was no thoroughly established body of habits, accidental local conditions resulted in the building up of many states, which by imitation have had similar forms of government; hostilities between them have been constant and have resulted in suicidal wars. In other words there has been one civilization but many cultures. China, with a population comparable to the whole West, has one civilization and one culture. India, with its great divisive elements, has remained inte-

grated because underneath all the bases of conflict there has been the momentum of common heritage and habits.

The Western exploitation of natural resources has brought to the service of man powers that were undreamed of but a few decades ago and were impossible by any other method than that of aggressive individualism. The power of slaves has been multiplied many times by the power of machines, and, in a curious way, has brought about a condition of surplus population not unlike that of the crowded areas of the East. In the East, however, there are more people than can be fed; in the West, there are more people than are needed to produce the necessary food. Now the West is facing the question which the East has answered long ago, namely: whether things are the end of life. The East, not having them, but having life itself, has devoted itself to values pertaining to life.

Western technique in commerce and production has been accompanied by developments in democratic government. These governments have moved so fast and new problems have been so vast that for the moment they seem to be failing. The League of Nations has come as a desperate attempt to save from the approaching chaos not only the West, but the whole world which was being brought under the influence of Western conditions.

The supporters of anarchy claim that if individuals are left to themselves their natures are such that they will live harmoniously together without any coercive controls. In the modern world the programs are so complicated that such elemental individualism is impossible. The result is that we have organized not only production and commerce, but states as well, for the common purpose of economic development, and are actually getting organized anarchy. We find this illustrated, for example, in the chaos that comes from competing railroads, in individualistic mass production, with its consequent overproduction bringing recurrent depressions, and in high-pressure selling organi-

zations; at the same time we have bread lines. In fact the whole capitalistic system gives a perfect illustration of social anarchy. States with their competing war machines and patriotic insularities furnish an equally good illustration.

The individualism of the Western civilization seems to have reached an impasse. It has set the whole world in a new course by its enterprise and inventions. The political systems which have taken many of the monarchical traditions into their democratic development seem to be on the verge of dissolution. The practical working of democracy is too much tied up with both holdover notions of religion, economic status, and ignorance to solve its present problems. It may be that social patterns can be devised that will make it succeed, but they certainly have not succeeded yet. Political instability is the outstanding fact in the West and over as much of the East as has adopted the same sort of political institutions. We have hitherto spoken with disdain about the "backward peoples" and condemned their disorder, but it may be that these same "backward peoples" with their very different types of social organization will have to save the West, if it is to be saved, from collapse.

The difficulties in which the West finds itself have received a good deal of discussion; it is only necessary to mention them in order that we may have points of attachment for making clearer the relationships which are bound to be established with the East.

The individualistic capitalism of small states which may be called economic nationalism is not stabilized by deep-seated traditions and religion. There are vast resources being exploited by scientific technique backed by a *laissez faire* economic theory, which, for a century during the period of greatest expansion, has given logical assurance of soundness. This theory permitted production to run riot, while problems of distribution received a minimum of attention.

States that have been economically interdependent have maintained the principle of sovereignty, and business policy has been actuated by no motive except that of profits. The result has been national antagonisms based on sentiments that have ignored the larger economic unity, striving only to establish such supremacy as is possible within narrow national limits. Capital has achieved constantly increasing centralization, its owners have assumed a superiority comparable to that attributed to kings under the theory of divine right. The momentum of the system has made it difficult to hear the occasional Jeremiah, who has proclaimed the doom of capitalism unless it should give more attention to the very people who have made the wealth possible, by both their labor and their buying power.

Finally there has emerged as the result of the severe economic depression an awareness that something is wrong, but the onward rush of self-destruction is difficult to stop. The multiplication of machines has made the need of laborers less and less; and the distance between the possessions and power of the capitalists and those of the masses has grown greater. We have had the anomaly of bread lines in many cities in the shadows of skyscrapers, and of storehouses of food bursting because there have been no purchasers.

We are also on the eve of the same kind of modification in agriculture that came in industry when the factory system was introduced. The application of machine methods is revolutionizing farming as it revolutionized industrial production.

We are now face to face with the imperative need of substituting collective planning for the individualistic anarchy which has brought such chaos. This will be very difficult because even if it were done in each country individually the problems are not solved unless each country has a program in harmony with the others. The world-

wide character of the last depression has demonstrated for the first time the economic interrelation of the world. In other words, the possibility of maintaining national sovereignty in practice is completely denied by the realism of interdependence.

Necessary and inevitable as a new system is, whether under a capitalistic or a socialistic scheme, it is fraught with very grave dangers. It is a very real question whether we have yet had experience enough to be able safely to entrust the existence of hundreds of millions of people to an artificial system. Our engineers are able to set up nation-wide distribution of electric power; but when this power breaks down, our statesmen are not equally equipped to save the people made helpless by dependence on it. For instance, when a great industry with hundreds of thousands of employees shuts down, these employees have no alternative resources.

There is another aspect of the individualistic system that must not be overlooked — the matter of population. In the West where the dominant idea has been for men to get ahead by depending on themselves, and the measure of their success has been in the possession of things, there has been a constant competition between these things and children, with the result that there has been a rapid fall in the birth rate, though the population has not yet fallen proportionally because of the parallel fall in the death rate. As the population grows older the death rate is bound to increase again. Capitalism thus gives an automatic check to population increase. It is otherwise under a socialistic system where babies cannot compete with "conspicuous spending." We find this illustrated by the increased birth rate in the Soviet Union. It will eventually be as necessary to have population planning as economic planning. For both, we have as yet only amateurish beginnings of scientific knowledge.

Until very recently the relation of the West to the East

has been a one-way traffic. It has carried the West into the East and brought back only economic and imperialistic advantage. There is, however, already an incipient awareness of the fact that the East has potentiality and elements of culture; very soon, in fact already, there is coming, in this time of Western desperation, a variety of influences that may have decided results. From Russia there are stimulations that will lead to economic reorganization, especially on the basis of collective planning. From both China and India we are beginning to gain respect for the accumulations of cultural age. India, as the original home of religion, will aid in the reinterpretation of religion in the West. China, because of her numbers and her ethical system, must be reckoned with in ways that are not yet clear.

Although we are unquestionably moving towards cosmopolitanism and Communism, we have been so disconcerted by the developments in Russia that we have not been able to analyze alternative forces that are found in other cultures than the Russian which will modify developments even there.

As will be shown in a later chapter, the success of the application of Communism in Russia is derived from the fact that already there was a cultural preparation for it. In the West, there is the necessity but no predisposing folkways. We have developed organization and efficiency from the top, not from the bottom. The attitudes and habits that must be changed are monumental, while in Russia they were insignificant and incidental. The result is bound to be fundamental modifications of the Russian methods to meet the demands of individualistic habits of other countries. Just as in China the family system will resist the state control of the individual, so in Europe and America the dominance, not of economic freedom, but of individual initiative, will introduce factors of great importance in world reorganization.

We may say definitely that the day of the exclusive

leadership of the world by the West is coming to a close and that the rise of Asia is appearing above the horizon.

There is, however, less justification for the expectation offered by Spengler, and concurred in by many others, that the West will be reduced to the level of barbarism. The rise and fall of civilizations and cultures that have been so objectively illustrated by the excavation of ancient cities built by succeeding peoples one above the other, suggest the historical continuance of hills and valleys in all cultures. These, however, were cultures in isolation, whose strength, in each case, was contained within itself. The archeological parallelism cannot be repeated, because it is inconceivable that the accumulations of knowledge can now be entirely lost, or that communication can be absolutely broken for a sufficient time to permit forgetting.

On the other hand there can well be a psychological slump comparable to the archeological disappearance of cities, but the interstimulations of peoples can hardly allow the wiping out of whole cultures by force or disintegration.

We may predict in conclusion that the self-assured leadership of the white West is approaching its end, and though there may be some rebuffs for its arrogance, its area, population, and virility will enable its real values to survive.

The facility and eagerness with which some Western groups are seeking to promote international organization come from a genuine idealism and an understanding of the inevitableness of a new world order. A period of greater or less chaos will come but its pains will be only those of the birth of cosmopolitanism from its parents, isolation and civilization.

Chapter VI

ASIA — THE EAST

As the sun of the West declines that of the East rises. The East is preëminently Asia. The power of Asia lies in its size, its population numbers, and its ages of cultural continuity. A glance at the map of Europe and Asia shows the relative insignificance of Europe, if Russia is included in Asia where it belongs culturally. It will be so treated in the next chapter.

Russia belongs in a class by itself in geographical area, covering as it does one-sixth of the land surface and one twenty-third of the total surface of the globe. Its size can be illustrated by a comparison of distances. From Leningrad to Vladivostok is almost exactly the same distance as from Leningrad to New York City, and a line from the extreme limits of Siberia to Leningrad equals one from Leningrad to San Francisco. The peninsula of India differs little in size from Europe outside of Russia.

The total population of the world is estimated as being from 1,800,000,000 to 1,900,000,000, of which only some 800,000,000 live outside of Asia. Including Russia in Asia, as we do in this book, another 100,000,000 must be subtracted from the 800,000,000, leaving over sixty per cent of humankind in Asia. Of these, 160,000,000 are in the Soviet Union. Just over 350,000,000 are in India, which alone almost equals the 375,000,000 in Europe outside Russia. The estimates of the population of China run from 350,000,000 to 500,000,000, to which the Mongolian population of Japan and Korea must be added. Taking this proportion as a base for natural increase, with the Western

rate of increase declining, it is inevitable that the disparity of numbers between Asia and the rest of the world will rapidly increase. This disparity is not new, but the situation was very different when Asia was set off in isolation. Now that all the avenues of contact and interstimulation are open to Asia, the very pressure of her numbers will be felt to the uttermost part of the earth. Two roads are open to the West: one, to fight a losing battle of resistance, as suggested by Lothrop Stoddard,¹ and the other to accept the inevitable and make adjustment to it.

The artificial sense of superiority which races and cultures have set up for themselves must go the way of all myths, and reliance must be placed in the continuity of *culture* rather than in the biological strain that possesses it. There are two illusions that need to be exploded: first, that a biological identity can be maintained; second, that it makes any difference to our descendants who or what we are.

The satisfaction which some people take in their family trees, or rather in a conspicuous ancestor of several centuries past, becomes ridiculous when they realize that the proportion of heritage diminishes by geometrical ratio. We have two parents, four grandparents, and eight great-grandparents; then the ratio goes 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096 for twelve generations back. Allowing three generations to a century, this means four centuries. If we double that to twenty-four generations or eight hundred years we have over sixteen million ancestors. In everyone's hereditary line, there is always the merging and remerging of many lines and also the coming in of alien strains. It is obvious that anyone claiming superiority because, for example, of descent from Charlemagne, has such an infinitesimal element that it is ridiculous. He probably has vastly more blood from every race in the world.

¹ *The Rising Tide of Color.*

We may be justified in having concern over the heritage of blood and culture of our immediate children; but just as we know and care nothing about our sixteen great-great-grandparents we should accept the fact with equanimity that our descendants at the same distance will neither know nor care about us. Our solicitude, however, should lead us towards an interest in building a future for them to enter into that is not so much the continuity of our personal lines as an advance towards a better culture. In other words we shall accelerate progress if we can learn to view developments impersonally rather than personally.

There is only one way that this can be brought about, namely, by progress in social science. We are probably at the beginning of such a progressive development in this field that, long before the end of the century, it will be comparable to the advance made in natural science in the last seventy years. We have reached a point where the present momentum of physical sciences will furnish all we need in that field. The world crisis made clear the fact that production had gone ahead of distribution. The problems of distribution, however, are not solvable by the methods of engineers, but by those of social scientists, because there are complicated psychological factors to reckon with. So far social science has gone through a period not unlike that which the study of electricity went through from the time of Franklin to the beginning of Edison. The necessities of solving the social problems are more pressing, however, than any which came from demands for electrical applications. The result, when the world once turns its attention seriously to this fact, and it is beginning to do so, will be equally epoch-making.

The forces inherent in Asia have been lying dormant and unnoticed while Western civilization has occupied the stage; but now they are beginning to assert themselves. The power in each culture area will vary from all others, but human society must assimilate all the elements that

are now being presented to it whether it wishes to or not; the era into which we are now entering will be largely occupied with this task.

The forces that have started the resurgence of Asia are revolution, nationalism, and race, all thrown into the hopper together, but not uniformly mixed. The process began with revolution. In each case the West has furnished the occasion and the instruments of revolutions, but the reasons were laid deep in local history.

Since the larger part of Russia, or the Soviet Union, is in Asia and its traditions are more Eastern than Western, it is not in contravention of the facts to class Russia with Asia. In Russia, the War made the Revolution immediately effective, and the Western theory of Marx furnished a ready-made program; but we must remember that the Russian Revolution had been in preparation for a century and would have resulted soon without the War. It would have followed much the same course without Marx because of the Communistic customs familiar to Russian institutions.

The revolution in Japan was the first modern one in Asia, but since it occurred without violence, we do not remember it as a revolution; it had, however, the same kind of results that come from violent revolution. The breakdown of the power of the Shoguns and the complete reorganization of political and economic life was brought about peacefully after the forcible ending of the policy of exclusion by Commodore Perry. Japan saved herself by reverting to national solidarity, while adopting without reservation techniques of the West. Her national consciousness has been increased by racial sensitiveness, which has been greatly stimulated by legal discrimination on the basis of race by the Western countries.

Japan took and ruled Korea according to the methods of Western imperialism; American missionaries and the spirit of the times gave the Koreans the modern democratic ideas that have been the basis of her nationalistic revolt.

China has had a longer history than any other culture that has existed; she did not become aware of her shortcomings until Western exploitation was understood and resented by Chinese who had received Western education. Now nationalism is the religion of China. There is less race consciousness than in Japan, but it is potential as a reason for resentment.

In the Philippines, Indo-China, and Java we have still another race which has been despised and exploited by the Spanish, the Americans, the French, and the Dutch. Nothing less than independence will now satisfy them. Siam belongs in a class by itself, though its awakening and independence have parallelisms to Japan.

India, with age-old problems, has been whipped into national and racial consciousness by English domination and education and now is releasing the power within her enormous population nurtured in intense religious experiences.

Then there is Islam, dominated by the Arabs, with Turkey awakened and going her own way. Islam is more backward than the rest of Asia but she had a day of glory when Europe was in the Dark Ages. She has now begun a renaissance by revolt against the powers of the West. Modernism is beginning to sweep over the followers of the Prophet.

A very few years ago Japan was looked upon as the spokesman of the East, because of the threat which was carried by Japan's possession of the weapons of the West, and of the feeling that, at the same time, she was the expression of the mysterious undercurrent of the East. Now China looms as a power so vastly greater than Japan that it seems to be generally accepted that whatever part Japan plays in world affairs, it will be temporary and relatively insignificant. The minor movements, however, coöperate in the whole Asiatic awakening, so we need to know something of the forces that actuate them.

It is not only the awakening of Asia with her variant and dynamic ideas that throws down the challenge, but the fact that these ideas will be carried by more than half of the population of the earth. Asia is freely appropriating whatever she thinks is valuable from the West, making it over into her own image and then coming back to enact a new drama. This means that the center of the stage for the next era will be largely occupied by the East.

Chapter VII

THE CHALLENGE OF RUSSIA

"Abandon hope all ye who enter here" were the words that the author seemed to see written over the frontier when he first entered Russia before the War. For more than a century the world had been conditioned to look upon Russia as mysterious and fearsome. To see a book advertised as *verboden in Russland* immediately suggested that it was valid elsewhere. To be hostile to Russian ways of doing things had become so normal that an "about face" by Russia did not change prerevolutionary attitudes. Curiosity was aroused but fear and suspicion were not diminished. The result has been that it is impossible for the world to evaluate the program of the Soviets without the emotion carried over from the past. Russia had held to an absolutism that had generally been abandoned but was still fresh in memory. Suddenly she actually adopted a program that had as yet only been dreamed of by others. Governments and people transferred the resistance that had been established against being pulled backward by too close association with Russia to the new possibility of being pulled forward. This resistance was intensified by the fact that murmurings of discontent had already begun among those who magnified their own political and economic status by contrasting them with old Russia. There came, however, a new thrill in discussing, reading about, and visiting Russia partly because of the mystery associated with Russia and partly because the ideas which the Soviets were putting into practice were already stirring in the thoughts of people everywhere.

As we shall see below, the Russians had long had a social pattern of communal life on which they had specialized which had the elements that conformed to these new ideas of social reorganization. These ideas had been inhibited by the emphasis on the particularistic developments of other cultures, but they had inherent qualities that were easily recognized when put into practice. This is the basis of the real interest in the Soviet experiment. We find a counterpart to this in the interest in the specialized developments of ethics in China and of religion in India. The attention that was attracted to Gandhi arose because men everywhere have felt the inadequacies in the development of their own religions which had left such a wide chasm between ideals and practice, and therefore were predisposed to look with hope to any proof that harmony could be demonstrated. In the same way, as the imperfections of capitalism and of the present forms of government have become more apparent, Russia has offered an understandable example of a reaching out toward improvement. There is no possibility that the religious forms of India or the specific form of bolshevik Russia will be adopted by the rest of the world beyond what it can easily grasp. It is, nevertheless, inevitable that the peculiar expertness of Russia, arising from her preparation for this undertaking, will furnish a stimulus comparable to the religious stimulus from India.

During the last century there was in Russia literary and other artistic production of the highest merit. Tolstoy was preëminent both for his literary art and his profound morality and may be called the greatest moral force of the last century. Many of the writers who rank high spent long periods in exile, either abroad or in Siberia because of their writings which were often confiscated and burned.

Russia was known to be Christian, but belonged to the little known Greek Orthodox branch of the church. The masses adhered to the church because it satisfied their

primitive superstitions, which were primarily pagan, with its ritualistic magnificence. Because the people were so satisfied with the church it was possible for the absolutist government to exploit the power of the church for political ends, especially since it was practically devoid of educational and moral function. Very few tourists visited Russia before the War, for it was far away and presumably difficult and dangerous.

It has seemed strange and paradoxical that the Marxian theory, which was definitely formulated to apply to capitalistic-industrial conditions, was first appropriated by a non-capitalistic peasant people. It was prophesied that for this reason the program must fail. Rather than strange and paradoxical, Russia was the normal place to begin and illustrates what will be emphasized throughout the remainder of this book: that whatever is taken from Western developments is grafted on to existing habits and attitudes, so that the new things become merely instruments of a culture that already was characteristic.

This is indicated by the following extract from an article by the present writer which was published in the *New York Times*, Sunday, May 23, 1915, almost two and a half years before the Bolshevik Revolution of November 8, 1917. It was entitled "A Prophecy of Slav Domination." It should be remembered that this was nearly a year before America entered the War. The prophecy outlined in it is not yet complete, but there is now evident a degree of fulfillment that makes it worth while to remind ourselves that the power of Russian Communism is not in the theory of Marx but in the older practice of Russia. Marxism has modified the program and furnished its logic but its application was possible because of what it found in Russia.

"Whether the Allies or the Germans win in the present War, it will be only a brief time before the Slavic people, led by Russia, will exert the dominating economic, social, and political influence in Europe, and perhaps in the whole

world. However sincerely the Germans may feel that they are defending civilization against barbarism, their victory could only delay and would probably hasten the ultimate triumph of the superior forces inhering in the Slavic people.

"There are in Europe approximately 130,000,000 Slavs to 70,000,000 Germans. The rate of increase of population in Russia, where most of the Slavs are found, is 2.01 per cent annum against 1.40 per cent in Germany. This advantage in population and rate of increase in favor of Russia is in itself an insuperable force.

"Furthermore, the natural resources of Russia exceed those of all the rest of Europe put together, and are almost wholly undeveloped. These physical factors, coupled with the even more significant rapid development of Slavic consciousness and the spread of modern ideas in Russia, make the advent of a dominant Slavic influence absolutely assured.

"In some respects the civilization of most of the Slavic peoples lags behind the rest of Europe; in other respects it is simply different. It is well to recognize that we have no assurance that any particular civilization values are the ultimately correct ones. We Americans have had criticism enough to convince us that everyone does not agree with us, and to suggest that other people may also have some good to contribute to the world. Stephen Graham says: " 'Russia is evolving as the greatest artistic, philosophical, and mystical nation in the world, and Moscow may be said to be the literary capital of Europe.'

"It is among the masses, however, that we are to find the real contribution that Russia is making. It was formerly thought that the ideals and practices were derived by imitation from a superior culture, but now we are discovering that traditions and customs are transmitted horizontally between people of the same class rather than vertically between classes. The despotism of Russia is no

more the expression of the real Russian people than Tammany Hall is an expression of American democracy, and the influence of both institutions on national character has been insignificant. Despotisms come and go but the habits of a people endure.

"The Russians, in a unique manner, have preserved to a time that much needs them forms of social organization and traditions of simple living together that have been almost lost elsewhere in the development of modern life. There is every reason to believe that the Slav will be swept along by the flood tide of modern development before he has had time to lose his characteristic habits and attitudes.

"When the autocracy is overthrown there will undoubtedly be a period of comparative chaos, for it is not likely that the Russian characteristics will easily adapt themselves to the demands of efficiency in the administration of government. But the question may well be asked whether efficiency is in itself a desideratum.

"What the Russian common citizen will bring to the new era of civilization are a familiarity with democratic practice and a habit of mutual aid and coöperation which were universal among the various peoples of Europe a few centuries ago and which had disappeared almost everywhere else.

"One may get a shock to his self-esteem as he finds that his title of Herr Professor or Herr Journalist, which is never omitted in Germany, is dropped when he gets to Russia. In the language of the country he becomes "Mr." Men in high places such as heads of universities are addressed by their colleagues by their first name. Even in the relation of nobleman to peasant there is something of the relation of older and younger brother, however harsh the older one may be.

"These characteristics seem at first unimportant, but are really significant of a national habit of mind that has grown out of Slavic institutions, the most fundamental

of which is without doubt the communal village or Mir, in which most of the population has lived for centuries.

"In the Russian Mir land is owned in common and is regularly reallocated by the villagers themselves among the householders according to their working capacity and needs. The Mir elects its own executive and may engage in all kinds of work of public utility. When the man representing the household is away, the woman represents its interests in the village discussions and occasionally a woman is elected executive.

"The villages are united into larger administrative units called Zemstvos. For some centuries these units have carried on a degree of self-government such as has been unobtainable in the most enlightened countries. These features, which an extremely despotic government has not been able to suppress, have recently been incorporated into its political organization.

"We have, then, a very curious condition of unusual oppression and unusual freedom existing side by side. Instead of declining under modern economic conditions we find that the system has grown stronger. The effort to introduce individualistic economic methods has been unavailing. Communal ownership has come spontaneously into existence in the marvelously rich regions of Southern Russia, which were colonized within a century under individual ownership. The same thing has happened repeatedly among the recent immigrants to Siberia.

"The training in community management is not confined to agriculture, but extends to all sorts of new conditions such as modern industry brings. It appears particularly in the Artel, which is a coöperative productive organization applied to almost all kinds of enterprises throughout Russia, and is a form of coöperation efficient to a degree only dreamed of elsewhere. According to Kropotkin: 'At the present time we find the Artel everywhere — among each group of ten to fifty peasants who come from the same

village and work at a factory, in all the building trades, among fishermen and hunters, among convicts on their way to and in Siberia, among railway porters, Exchange messengers, Custom House laborers, everywhere in village industries, which give occupation to 7,000,000 men — from top to bottom of the working world, permanent and temporary, for production and consumption, and under all possible aspects.'

"Tiffany's finest enamel silverware is made mostly by peasants' Artels in Moscow. In one small factory, from which many of the men were away getting in the village harvests, the rest were making beautiful inlaid objects worth a hundred dollars apiece. Yet these workmen proprietors were so untouched by the civilization for which they were producing that they ate their dinner from a common dish with wooden spoons.

"This experience in self-government throws light on many social phenomena not easily explained otherwise. The labor movement developed in Western Europe. In Russia the labor propaganda so familiar in other countries is not allowed, and meetings may not be held for organization and discussion, but in some simple way we find labor actually organized and strikes both common and well managed. It is estimated that at the outbreak of the War there were 120,000 men on strike in Petrograd alone.

"With this power of spontaneous organization labor cannot be indefinitely exploited. The workingmen are mostly illiterate. When they learn to read and are allowed the tremendous auxiliary of free communication we shall have a social force almost unique in its power.

"The church has developed in the same way despite efforts to ally it with autocracy. The Orthodox Church is magnificent in equipment and ritual, yet it offers a marked contrast to the aristocratic system of the Roman Catholic Church. The Russian most devoutly takes off his hat when passing a church or holy picture, but he keeps

it on when passing a priest. In the church priest and people mingle freely, and the high and low worship standing and kneeling side by side.

"In Russia the best evidence of the recognition of women is found in their prominence as revolutionists. There they have been quite as prominent as men and have been clearly recognized as equals. The assured superiority felt by men in England, as witnessed by the suffrage difficulties, has no counterpart in Russia. The average American has certainly heard the names of twice as many Russian women as German.

"At present the larger part of the Slavic world is permeated with ignorance and dominated by bureaucracy, but education is only a generation deep. In regard to these peoples of the future we have reason for both hope and gratitude rather than fear, since there have been preserved and nurtured in what we call barbarism traits of peculiar value for the solution of the complex impending social, political, and economic problems. Unquestionably society will have some temporary difficulties with the disintegrating and almost anarchistic tendencies of the Slavs, but these cannot be as great as those arising from militarism.

"We may find in the structure which is to be built in the coming century the fulfillment of the prophecy: 'The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner.'"

This potentiality was recognized immediately after the Revolution, and seems to be fulfilling this outline with amazing accuracy, but fear of its identical application elsewhere may be allayed by the knowledge that what was normal for Russia may be abnormal elsewhere.

The communal habit was much older than the Czarist system and has persisted, but the absolutist experience was also an important factor in the present program, for it prepared the people for subservience to authority. The

remarkable practical success in the applications of Communism is due to the disciplined obedience of both leaders and people. With the single exception of Japan, it is inconceivable that such centralized authority could have been accepted so soon by any other people in the world. The grand scale on which the Soviets have spread themselves over their whole area would have been an impossible miracle except for previous training both in the elements of the program and in acquiescence to authoritative control.

As soon as the Revolution had succeeded in transferring the power from the three per cent who had held it to the ninety-seven per cent to whom it had been denied, the vast mass that had long practiced communal life reverted inevitably and naturally to a Communistic expression of power. To visualize and symbolize it they took Marx as the basis of doctrine and put his picture in the place of the holy icons. As soon as the doctrine began to work under the leadership of Lenin, the picture of Marx was displaced for that of Lenin, and, though the writings of Marx remained as scripture, the process went on, to a large degree, according to tradition. Lenin and Trotsky began their reconstruction as naturally on Communistic lines as a Westerner, like Hoover, would have begun on capitalistic lines.

We must not, of course, underestimate the importance of Marx. His teachings had been thoroughly assimilated by the Bolsheviks, but there was less disturbance to Russian social institutions by their application than would have occurred in any other part of the world, because the people had these habits or folkways that fell normally into the Marxian system.

Many things were taken from the West, including the principle of material exploitation and the mechanical technique for getting it. The social technique, however, was purely Russian. A state Artel, so to speak, was formed after the Revolution as immediately and naturally as it

was formed by convicts on their way to Siberia. Existing and new coöperative organizations maintained life until more formal state control could be established. At the beginning of the War there was a dairying coöperative with eighty thousand members, mostly illiterate peasants, which exported some of its products even to New York.

A soviet, which is the union of representatives of functioning social units, was the only possible form of political organization that could have been expected. There was a period of "comparative chaos," but it was of surprisingly short duration considering the completeness of the turnover. The time taken for the restoration of order after the French Revolution was many times longer, because the French slogans of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity had no reality in previous practice and no program for realization.

It has been customary to criticize Communism as being desired by the masses only because it means a common sharing in consumption goods, but, according to the Russian habits, there is also Communism in responsibility for production. Its success so far has come from elevating that responsibility to a religious level. The difficulty in the application of Communism in the West would be just the lack of a sense of communal responsibility in place of the desire for communal advantages.

The mysticism, which was emphasized by Stephen Graham in the quotation on page 106, was probably more Oriental than Christian, though it had adopted Christian symbolism. New terms now define it, but everyone who has been in Russia recently catches the religious spirit which is the drive of Communism. There is the willingness to sacrifice, the consciousness of a mission, and a devil to resist — the devil is capitalism.

At the time of the celebration of the eighth anniversary of the Revolution, opposite the mausoleum of Lenin was a great red banner which said: "Comrades carry the flag

of Lenin around the world." It reminded one of a banner which used to be hung before a missionary organization in America which proclaimed: "Evangelization of the World in this generation."

The old religious organization stood for the maintenance of the old order. The clergy were instruments of the Czar, and the people were kept in ignorance. The holy pictures were everywhere and churches were myriad. They gave a ritualistic satisfaction to the ignorant and the helpless, but as moral and educational institutions they were valueless. They have no place in the new order, but, however much the people themselves may claim to repudiate religion, the psychological basis of religion remains and, even with its atheistic professions, is certainly more rational, by every measure, than what it has displaced.

Before the War religious demonstration in Russia was almost unremittent, both in the large centers and in the country. People in the street cars or walking on the streets, the drivers of droskies were constantly taking off their hats and crossing themselves when they passed the innumerable holy ikons. In railroad stations and hotel dining rooms there was always a light burning before an ikon. One met pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem and saw simple souls kissing dirty holy pictures. The priests were generally unintelligent and seemed to be chosen for voices good for intoning services. There were undoubtedly intelligent persons among the worshippers and real spiritual leaders among the clergy, but one felt deeply impressed with the overdoing and emptiness of religious form.

An unplanned by-product of a revolution is the emancipation of subsidiary institutions and habits that were not involved in the original objective. In some ways these may be almost as important as the primary overthrow of political and economic systems.

The revolt against religion in Russia has been a shock

to the outside world, but it was normal under the social-political circumstances and consistent with the materialistic-socialistic logic. Stereotyped religions are inheritances of rationalized superstitions originating in primitive fears and hopes. Now, even among the most emancipated adherents of accepted religions, there are many elements that show traces of vestigial remains.

Tolstoy insisted that faith should be in harmony with science. Science, however, has succeeded for a time in dominating the field of Christendom to the exclusion of faith. As human thinking goes, this was necessary in order to clear the mind of much of its clutter, but the demand for religion remains. Old religions have been primarily personal. The horizons of religion will broaden to satisfy both the psychological demands for a driving motive and to conform to increasingly complex human relations and to a comprehension of universal laws. It is conceivable that it will not even be called religion.

Gandhi says: "Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God Is within You* overwhelmed me. It left an abiding impression on me. Before the independent thinking, profound morality, and the truthfulness of the book, all the other books . . . seemed to pale into insignificance."

Tolstoy has been, since the Revolution, not highly popular in Russia because he wrote about the aristocratic class, but he was very truly Russian in his outlook and inspiration. Dostoievsky, who is also a mystic but who wrote about the common people, is very popular. It is inconceivable that a large group of people with religious traditions should continue indefinitely without some form of religious expression, however strong their reaction from old forms.

Hindus¹ explains the collapse of religion as the result

¹ *Humanity Uprooted*, by Maurice Hindus, New York, 1931, Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, is one of the most illuminating books that has been written about the new Russia.

of the fact that, instead of being the religious mystics that Stephen Graham claims the Russians to be, they were never really religious, but by their present reactions are merely fulfilling a pattern just as they are doing with Communism. Religious history shows that such enthusiastic atheism could not have come so soon if there had existed deep religious conviction.

There were, as we have seen, very distinctive social inheritances in Russia; habits of autonomous coöperation, discipline to authority, with machinery for its enforcement like the secret service which has been retained, and unusually broad and humanitarian outlooks, and the deep thinking of such men as Tolstoy and many others. This is the foundation on which the Revolution has undertaken to build a social structure, new, but not undreamed of in many parts of the world. The conjunction of historical and intellectual events has worked to its advantage. We may look upon the Soviet Union as a vicarious experimenter with special fitness for its problem.

It would have been impossible to succeed in most of the details at an earlier date. To use a favorite European word, *ideologies* not of Russian origin had made ready for most of the revolutionary program. Not only were monarchies falling everywhere, but the social institutions which the Soviets began scrapping with fanatical zeal, thinking perhaps that they were prophetic innovators, were all being universally challenged. The validity of the claims of the church, the family, the status of women, uncontrolled birth rate, capitalism, moral codes, parliamentary government, treatment of criminals, education, class and race attitudes, individualism, and nationalism were already undergoing severe criticism; open revolt and much serious and constructive discussion of them have continued outside of Russia. All these institutions had become so warped and crystallized that the mythical visitor from Mars has often been called upon to witness their absurdity.

What we have in the Soviet Union is a controlled experiment along lines that have often been proposed. It is controlled because it is being consciously performed by enthusiastic partisans and at the same time it can be compared with alternative contemporary cultures. There is enough present knowledge of social science to check its results. Plato outlined a plan for an ideal society without any practical possibility of trying it out, so that for more than two thousand years Plato's Republic has been a classic in logic and literature, but never a program. Russia has a program that has been based on both pragmatic and theoretical principles.

The weaknesses of capitalism were being exposed, not only by the Socialists but by its inherent breakdowns, and, while the economic aspects of the Russian Revolution are central and of the utmost interest and importance, other aspects in the social structure may, in the long run, actually be of equal or even greater significance. So much has been written about the economic policy and practice which are evolving within the frame of the Soviets that it is not necessary to discuss them at length here.

When we consider each of the institutions that have been radically modified, we find that the germs of modification are by no means confined to the Soviets but often came through argument and incentive from the outside. Let us consider each of those enumerated above in terms of the ideas and practices that were already beginning to have influence on them.

Ever since the modern scientific period began religion has been on the defensive. Its comprehensive claims included too much that could not be supported, and its ecclesiastic system had become so involved with the political organizations of control that, in democracies, its authority was being questioned.

Another Slav group, the Czechs, when the Russians were still in theological darkness more than two generations ago,

built up an attack on religion that was quite as atheistic as the position that has now been taken by the Russians. To be sure, it began in America, but its roots were in Europe. When the first Czech immigrants came to America before the Civil War they brought with them the deep opposition to the domination of the Austrian government which was closely tied up with the Roman Catholic Church. The early leaders in America became familiar with Thomas Paine and Robert Ingersoll just about the time that Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published. Out of the combination, with the animus they had against the oppressive use of the church in governmental affairs at home, they organized the Freethinking Movement which at the time of the World War embraced more than half of the six hundred thousand Czechs in America and had wide repercussions in the Czech part of what is now Czechoslovakia. They were militant atheists and brought their children up with as much care to protect them against religious indoctrination as is now being shown in the Soviet Union. They were taught that the church, through its teachings, was deluding the people and that science was the real explanation of the universe.

In Western Protestantism, first higher criticism undermined the literal authority of the Bible; then modern science after raising doubts finally furnished the basis for a mechanistic philosophy; then the failure of the church to retain a vital interest in the rapidly changing social system resulted in a marked indifference or open antagonism throughout the Christian world. At the same time, travel and the study of comparative religion cast doubt on the ultimacy and absolutism of Christianity. We see, then, that the Soviet attack on religion, while it has been ruthless, can be explained in part by prior political experience and is not out of harmony with what has gone on elsewhere or with what might soon have happened without a revolution.

The institution of the family and the emancipation of women have undergone as rapid changes as those of religion. The two are closely related because the church had assumed authority over the family. The inferior status of women made the system of the family one easily perverted by the selfishness and power of men. The emancipation of women had been going on slowly during the whole period of revolutionary activity, but the church and men dictated the moral code for women. Having once begun to get their freedom, both in Russia and elsewhere, women have had to go through a rapid process of transformation, covering in a few years the stages that men have had a long historic period to pass through. The attitudes of both men and women have had to be changed; in Russia the change is accepted, while in the rest of the world it is still in process and at many different stages, but both in and out of Russia experimentation is still going on. The civil rather than the religious sanction of marriage has in most of the Western world been widely recognized by law. The family is a social institution, but for men sex has been a personal matter. With the emancipation of women, children have been accepted as a social responsibility, but sex is more and more personal for both men and women, and its moral aspects have been undergoing fundamental changes. In a current magazine, published in New York, a book is announced with the statement that "the distinguished author takes as his thesis that sex and morals should never be considered as counterparts." This is exactly the position in practice that has been taken in Russia.

The family institution has grown up in different forms in various parts of the world and strict controls have been erected around it. In old countries like China and India, it did not have the interpretations of Christian morality to coerce it, but it had its own religious or social controls. Custom rather than personal caprice determined conduct within the family and women had a power greater than

appeared to an outsider, so that the family functioned more smoothly than in Western countries, though the wider emancipation of women there has been greatly accelerated recently by the freedom Western women have attained.

The Russian experiment in this matter may be the most far-reaching of all that are being made, for it involves directly half the human race, and its consequences in social life may be incalculably revolutionary.

The divorce rate in America under the old mores seems to indicate that marriage stability may not be any greater than under the system of the almost unrestricted unions of the Soviet. The denial of a double standard of morals by the emancipated women of the West has been leading in the Russian direction even within the region where moral and religious tradition has been strongest against it.

In both China and India and in the emancipated parts of Islam, such as Turkey and Egypt, women are beginning to assert themselves, just as only a generation ago they began in the West. Throughout the world, in spite of the strong resistance of religion, birth control has been measured against the problem of population, and there is little doubt that it will soon be as much an openly accepted policy elsewhere as it is frankly now in the Soviets.

Large areas of morality have hitherto been confined to matters of sex and family, the authority of religion, and the relation of the individual to property. With the passing of the old interpretations in regard to these, moral codes have been constantly in process of revision. For some time other factors in the relations of individuals and groups have been forming themselves into moral demands. In Russia it has come to be the responsibility of people to foster a program of human development. While the objectives have been defined differently they are rapidly becoming the same elsewhere.

The overthrow of the monarchy in Russia was only incidental to a radical change in the economic system

in which capital was not attacked, but its ownership. The Russian program was taken bodily from alien sources, and, while it is wholeheartedly devoted to its undertaking, its logic, quite independently of Russia, has been working wherever capitalism is found.

The Soviet government is based on representation of working groups within a geographical area; that is, the men and women who are doing the same kind of work send a representative to a local Soviet; the locals send their representatives to the central Soviet. The political unit thus is functional rather than geographic. With the complete lack of business organizations such as prevail under capitalism, only proletarian groups have political representation.

The weaknesses of democratic representation by geographical districts had become more and more apparent everywhere and have resulted in the growth of extralegal political devices to secure a practical working method. The actual influence of interested groups in government, representing capital, labor, social reform, or whatnot, had already grafted a functional form of government upon us and had undermined the effectiveness of our parliamentary form. Whether the Soviet plan of purely and exclusively functional representation will succeed in solving all political problems has yet to be demonstrated, but it is a forthright experiment in the same direction toward which America has been unconsciously groping.

The Russian revolutionaries recognized at the beginning that new patterns had to be inculcated into the youth to take the place of the old ones, and that the way to get them was through education. The theory of universal education had never been accepted in old Russia, but was practiced in other Western countries, and is being adopted in the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible. Old pedagogical methods were immediately changed and progressive methods that had begun in other countries, especially in America,

were taken over bodily at once, and are being modified by experience and needs.

For some years there has been a growing dissatisfaction everywhere with the content, method, and consequent results of education. The rapid increase of educated people has not brought the millennium that was hoped for; rather it is largely responsible for the wholesale disaster that has come upon the world. It has made men masters of things but not of themselves and their ideals. But the grip of old inheritances was so strong that progress in change was slow. The Revolution gave the opportunity of discarding much of this inheritance and of selecting what was thought to be best from the most advanced thinkers in this field. We cannot hope for a complete solution of educational problems in the Soviet Union, but we can observe a large-scale new departure.

In the Soviet Union there is local autonomy in education in each of the federated states, but there is much uniformity. Greek and Latin have dropped out; methods are used which are individual and experimental, and much attention is given to Marxian interpretations and the expectations of the Communist program. While it is larger in amount, the direct education for the society in which people are to live is not unlike that which prevailed in monarchical Germany or even now in America in behalf of our social and political system. Textbooks are written to prepare children for the particular purpose for which they are living. *The New Russia's Primer* must be considered a classic, both for its content and its treatment. Its truths puncture many Western myths.

In education as in almost all the rest of their undertakings the Russians are experimental. There has not been time to become orthodox on any matter, not even on the policy of Communism. While the spread of education is comparatively recent, Russia offers the first opportunity to see what immediate effects can come from training

a whole generation to a new way of thinking. Russia has received advice, but she will give in return the results of pragmatic experience.

The one problem that has most concerned Western minds in regard to a Communist system has been that of individual freedom. Two considerations should be remembered. The theory of freedom in the West had come to be interpreted as applying primarily to economic enterprise; it was limited to a comparatively small number. As was suggested in the previous chapter, the growth of capitalism has created a condition in which the economic freedom of the working man is a vanishing ideal. We must accept the fact that freedom must find new outlets in mind and morals. Russia is trying to compensate for the denial of economic freedom by giving it to personal morality. Whether she will succeed in establishing intellectual freedom is still a question. Now, though direction of thinking is being coerced by both education and politics, the methods of education that are being used are exactly those that the modern educators have advocated just because they hope to develop independence of mind. In art, Russia has shown freedom; it may be that, if economic security can be established without fear that its advantages will be appropriated by a few, a new era of freedom will come which will make old freedoms seem like slavery.

The elimination of classes has been the objective of democracies, but it has been very partially successful. Communism has made it a main purpose. It has discarded all classes but the lowest one and hopes for a classless world. The materialistic interpretation of society that Communists have made their sole philosophy had already been growing in vogue in the scientific world. In Russia, being free from the conflict with other philosophies, this interpretation can run its course and will inevitably modify all other attempts to define the universe. It is equally inevitable that it will sooner or later be modified by them.

The throwing away of complicated theories simplifies such a problem as criminal procedure. In the last century there has been great progress in the sciences of criminology and penology; but in all countries there have grown up institutions, criminal codes, prejudice, and indifference that have prevented the use of fully accepted principles. In old Russia the penal system was primitive, but, because of its application to political agitators, well-known.

Its reform was zealously undertaken. Advantage was taken of the mass of accumulated penological writings as they fitted into the Soviet program. The abolition of private property removed one of the incentives to crime; but there remained many antisocial people. The penal policy then was to solve the problem of making them social. The philosophy that was adopted explains the criminal causally rather than morally and thus removes the idea of moral blame and punishment. The Reform-Labor code has worked a penal revolution. Its objective is rehabilitation of the criminal as a member of society. Sentences are short, work is normal and paid the normal wage and, except for the proportion going to the family, is held back until the sentence is completed; education is constructive. When the author visited one of the prisons for the worst criminals near Moscow, he was impressed by the fact that none of the guards had weapons, and that, in the library, the books and the decorations were exactly like those in factories, with Communist slogans and pictures of Lenin made by the prisoners. There is nothing original in this penal theory, but its practice is without parallel.

In the chapter on race we saw that practical and scientific tendencies are rapidly undermining the basis for race conflict. In the Soviet system racial lines are completely ignored. In the chapter on nationalism, we saw that its strength is still increasing though its ultimate validity is being questioned. Immediately after the Revolution the Soviets adopted the Marxian doctrines against

nationalism and put them into practice in the vigorous and unique way which is discussed below. This practice goes farther, because both desire and conditions favor it, than in the case of the national minorities in several of the new states of Central Europe; the problem was the same for both, and the Russian solution must be considered the best that has yet been tried anywhere.

The above discussions show that the present Communist experiment is based in part on the Russian background, and in part on practical and scientific discoveries made in other parts of the world. It is thus unique on the one side and universal on the other. Some of the social reorganization that is now actually in operation was bound to have become a matter of common practice without the example of Russia; some of it is bound to come out differently when peoples with different backgrounds undertake to apply it to themselves. It should be remembered, however, that there is danger of attributing to Russia solely much theory that has originated outside and has been merely applied in Russia; and that the willingness to adopt Russian methods will depend, in large measure, on the purely abstract verification of the premises.

Strangely enough, the United States, which, from the point of view of its individualism and capitalistic interests, seems to be the farthest removed from Russia, has been the most called upon for every form of technical help. The reason for this is, first, that in America there are not yet the stereotyped habits of Europe, and, secondly, experiment is going on in America both in education and in production. America is the only other place in the world where large-scale activity is at all comparable to that projected by the Soviets. It was as consistent with their policy to invite John Dewey to give advice in education as to invite engineering authorities to help in mechanical enterprises.

It is an excellent example of the thesis mentioned several

times above, that it is possible to appropriate Western developments without a change of philosophy on the part of those who take them. In the spread of the Communistic idea the mechanical instruments of publicity are given their fullest scope. Methods of the press and the radio which are not native to Russia, statistical charts, picture posters, as well as psychological and educational methods of the most advanced type have a vogue not known elsewhere, though all imported.

It is probable that both the leaders and the masses think that they are doing something new, because the statement is new and there are enough variations from old practice to furnish novelty. The collectivization of farms seemed to those familiar with individualistic Western farmers utterly impossible, and it met some resistance in Russia; but it has proceeded at a rapid rate, and unquestionably, because there was a sort of collectivism in the communes, it has had success. There was formerly individualistic cultivation of communal land, but the wheat of a village was marketed collectively. The idea of large-scale machine farming was new, but there was so much that was old that it was much more easily adopted than it would have been under the agricultural system prevailing everywhere else.

Moscow was designated before the War by Graham as "the literary capital of Europe." At present it is too absorbed in a single idea for free literary production, but as a musical, art, and dramatic center it even now probably holds the leadership. The momentum of the past was so strong that a "dictatorship of the proletariat" has not slowed its pace, and the revolutionary drive has actually accelerated the speed with which it has branched out into new forms of expression. Futurism, in both painting and drama, has served as a model to the rest of the world. The great private art collections have been put into public museums, and subsidies to superior students in the arts have continued as during the Czarist régime. This has

been surprising, because no one thought proletarians would be patrons of the arts; it would have been impossible except for the social inheritance.

It is important that contemporary students should study the detailed processes and formal programs of the Soviet régime, and there is now much that is being written about them, but our purpose is rather to find permanent forces in the Soviet system that are more or less indifferent to the specific methods employed to promote them. As was said in the *Times* article in 1915, the significant forces in Russia are her traditional habits, which are working out with modern techniques, backed by a tremendous population that is rapidly increasing and by enormous natural resources that have as yet been scarcely tapped.

The nationalistic developments, which wrecked old Europe, and which are changing the political face of the world at the present moment, would have wrecked the Soviet enterprise if it had not adopted a policy so radical and so successful that it is one of the greatest contributions of the Revolution. Some degree of Socialism or Communism would have eventually evolved in the capitalistic part of the world where Marx presaged it, but there would have been little discussion of how to deal with cultural variants in history, language, and customs within a political unit. The way of the past had been to take people by conquest, and then to assume that they would be absorbed by the conquerors; this often happened. In the modern era there had grown up under nationalism resistance to absorption which threatened to overthrow every large centralized state. It was the revolt of the Poles, Czechs, Jugoslavs, and others that largely caused the World War which was precipitated by a Serbian nationalist.

Old Russia had been ruthless in pursuing this policy, though less intelligent and less efficient than Germany and England. When the Soviet Union came into existence, it found itself with cultural groups speaking many lan-

guages, actually almost a hundred. Some had little self-consciousness and some had very strong national feeling. Within European Russia there were three divisions among the Russians themselves, not taking account of Germans, Poles, Georgians, and others. They were the great Russians of the North who had dominated the old empire, the White Russians, adjoining Poland, and the Ukrainians, numbering some thirty-five millions in the rich land of the South. In the early days of the Revolution there was a strong movement on the part of the Ukrainians to withdraw. It was then that the policy of cultural independence was adopted; as a contribution to social science it is unique.

In imperialistic countries it has always been a matter of pride as well as policy to have the language of the central government prevail throughout the empire, and it has been made a matter of propaganda because of fear that alien language elements constituted a threat at the integrity of the whole. In the United States, before the War, there was so much confidence in the democratic theory that, except for the sporadic antagonism toward Roman Catholics, there was no attention paid to cultural variation. Immigrants spoke any language they chose, as long as they wished, and, consequently, since there was no compulsion, there was actual rapid assimilation.

The Soviets had a real problem and they immediately set up machinery for dealing with it. Rudolph Broda¹ says:

"The policy of the Soviet Union is based on the principle of a certain amount of cultural autonomy to all nationalities of the Union and a somewhat greater amount of cultural autonomy to the more mature but numerically weak groups. A still greater amount of cultural autonomy, combined with a certain degree of political and economic autonomy, is granted to several more important groups, but the principal groups enjoy full political, economic, and cultural independence. This is qualified only by freely

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1931.

connected links with the other principal groups for the fulfilment of certain practical problems needing centralized control.

"This highest amount of self-government is granted to the seven constituent republics of the Union: Russia proper, over 100,000,000 inhabitants; Ukraine, about 35,000,000; White Russia, about 5,000,000; Turkomen, Tadjak, and Uzbek republics in Central Asia, about 5,000,000; Transcaucasia, which is again divided into Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbeidshan, with together about 6,000,000 inhabitants. Inside of Russia proper and to a lesser extent inside the other republics, there have been constituted eighteen so-called autonomous republics with an even greater restriction of self-government, consisting mainly in the right to maintain schools in their own language. There are, therefore, thirty-seven small administrative units."

After the War, the new states of Central Europe, which had many minority groups, adopted constitutional provisions for their protection, and the League of Nations has a special section in the Secretariat to look after the interests of the Minorities. In Europe the idea of national sovereignty had become so rampant, with the close interrelation of language and culture identity with national aspirations, that it was difficult to find any easy way for solving the problems, especially when there are overlappings of language in the same area, and constant agitation for the right of supremacy of control.

In the Soviet Union, there was less crystallization of sentiment but no less potential threat of disintegration. There was adopted, however, a unified economic policy throughout the Union, which is enforced with rigorous energy. In general, sovereign states, however small, have had an isolated economic program which has brought about the condition of anarchy mentioned in the preceding chapter. The Soviets, to avoid this, not only let down

every bar to cultural freedom but established a central Secretariat of the National Minorities Council to deal with questions between minorities and the central government and also to promote the development of local cultures and education. In the Department of Education there is a committee, which, when the writer visited it, was composed entirely of representatives of other nationalities than Russian. It exhibited textbooks in twenty-five different languages, ranging from Hebrew to Korean. In one or two cases, where there had never been a written language, the committee put it in writing for the first time and presented it to the people.

The argument is made against an independent India that there are so many languages that unity could not be secured. There are a hundred linguistic groups in the Soviet Union, approximately the same as in India; many of them have nothing in common, while in India a comparative cultural uniformity covers the whole country. This uniformity makes the Indian problem much simpler than that of the Soviets.

The result of this cultural autonomy has been a degree of satisfaction and coöperation such as would have been impossible under any other plan. It has in it the germs of the method that must be applied on a world-wide scale as the economic and political unity of the world becomes stronger. Practically, this system has drawbacks, and seems to be running against the desirable end of reducing the number of languages in the world. There are two answers to this: first, the antagonism resulting from compulsory assimilation would have been disintegrating and would have developed psychopathic nationalism. Second, with no compulsion, the logical advantage of learning the Russian language will not long be resisted and assimilation will go on apace. It is also possible that such cultural values as exist in the language groups will be preserved and more highly developed.

The part that the Western world is playing in the reorganization of the Soviets is enormous. The material program of capitalism has been accepted in full and its methods adopted with the one difference that the State rather than the individual constitutes the unit of production. The one fundamental advance is the matter of distribution. It is of vast importance but does not represent a purpose any different from that which is well-known in the West.

An important fact is that the expansion of Russian ideas in the Orient carries much of that which England had hitherto carried and for which she had prepared the way, namely, the demand for a material civilization. Russia is competing with England not for a diminution of things, but for a different political and social system in relation to the things. This, as will be seen later, is very different from the contribution to the outside world made by China and India.

In spite of its adoption of mechanical processes from the West, the knowledge of the West in Russia is vastly less than that possessed by either China or India. Even before the War there was comparatively little travel or study by Russians in the West. What there was, only a very small part of a single class shared in. Since the Revolution, first-hand experience by Russians has been practically prohibited both by other countries and by the Soviets themselves. The result is a distorted and purely academic understanding.

The Chinese have not only had laborers in many countries, but the whole modern movement in China has been carried out by Chinese who have studied abroad. Indians have been in close contact with both English institutions and English life. There are advantages in this provincialism to the Russian experiment, for there are fewer inhibitions, but on the other side the whole non-Soviet world is out of perspective to the Russians.

The part which the Russians are playing in the outside

world, however, is beyond all measure. This falls into two spheres of influence; that contained in the theory of Communism, and the actual power of the Soviets as a competitor of the capitalistic nations.

As has been said, the theory of Communism is not new to the world; in spite of the claim of capitalists that it is against human nature, it makes an appeal to everyone and would be very satisfying to human nature if it could be secured. Until this experiment came along, there was a widespread conviction of the unobtainableness of the benefits of Communism however much they might be desired. As soon as the news began to spread that it was actually a going concern there was not a corner of the world that did not feel some degree of sympathetic response. The political power of every country felt that its status quo was threatened and proceeded to legislate against Communist activity; but no one of them was able to satisfy all its citizens by its own system as it had previously done. However garbled either the news or the propaganda has been, it has aroused fear in some and hope in others. The means of communication have become so highly developed that no place has been distant enough, and no government has been powerful enough, to keep itself isolated from the influence of news of Russian success.

It has been a favorite illusion in America that a man has control of his own destiny. This idea has lasted even when specialization in mass production has involved hundreds of thousands of men in one industry who can be thrown out of employment at any time without resources by the arbitrary closing of the factory door.

The claim of individualism under these conditions has become absurd. The educational system, by putting its emphasis on historical facts, tended to hold back an awareness of the actual condition to which we have arrived. The influence of Russian ideas comes at a time when an awakening had begun and this, in part, accounts for the

great interest in the Soviet system. The conditions which Marx had anticipated the capitalistic system would bring about have become acute. The appeal to the underprivileged, who always constitute the vast majority, by a specific attack on the power of private wealth, in a society which has become preëminently economic rather than political, has tremendous potentiality.

Another factor is the idealistic appeal of Communism, by its denial of privilege to race, birth, or wealth. At this moment, when race is thrusting itself on world consciousness, and the old methods of dealing with it are proving futile, Communism offers one way out.

The theory of Communism may, however, have limitations in its appeal; but, along with it, now has come a more challenging power, namely, its competitive success. The population and resources of Russia cannot be ignored if they can make themselves effective; they are now reaching the point where this is becoming manifest. This first appeared at the moment when the world-wide economic depression was most serious. The Soviet system was the only part of the world which did not suffer exactly as the rest. The result is that from the most unexpected sources there have come suggestions that some of the Communist principles must be adopted.

The chaos which has come from individualistic production without any recognition of needs or methods of adequate distribution, has forced attention, until business men, economists, occasionally a statesman, engineers, and amateurs have begun to talk about the Russian advantages. It is quite obvious that, with comparable natural resources, the elimination of profits and of the waste of competition without an equable distribution of products, Russia can succeed in competition even if it is only approximately as efficient as capitalism. The realistic fact has been demonstrated that the Soviet Union has enough efficiency to show promise of success. This pragmatic proof is hav-

ing far-reaching repercussions over the very same area that has been stimulated by the theory.

It is conceivable, though not probable, that the Western peoples will adopt a sufficient degree of collective organization to enable them to save themselves from complete Communism, but there are those who feel that some form of Communism is inevitable.

If time can be taken for working out the logical steps in the adoption of the main principle of the Russian program in terms of Western conditions much tragedy will be avoided. This can be done only if there is a quick recognition of the necessity. The real problem lies in the fact that the only model we have is Russia, and, as has been repeated several times, both the habits and conditions of the rest of the world are radically different from those of Russia. The provincialism of Russia does not recognize this fact, and our eagerness to find some substitute for present conditions may not take account of these fundamental differences. Just as in Russia communal thinking was habitual, so in the West is individualistic thinking. Russia has started with a uniform, illiterate mass of people, while the West has differentiated and sophisticated peoples. Russia has not enough to go around, however distributed, while the West has vast surpluses.

Communism is undoubtedly going to change the world economic system, but it will have to be developed synthetically rather than formed according to the strict Russian model. The danger is that we may adopt the model rather than wait for the synthesis. Putting it in other words, fundamental though this Communist idea is and rampant and successful as the Russians may be, theirs is not the ultimate nor the only course which the world will follow. It will be like capitalism, which made its valuable contributions, had its day, and then had to yield to its own weaknesses. Some day a successor of Marx will come who will indict the Communist order for its restrictions.

It is inconceivable that the primitive forms of Communism, or the academic formulation of its principles by one man, or the practical experiment of a single culture, should be able to exhaust the possibilities of social organization and human psychology. When it comes, the alternate and widely different experiences, of China and India as well as of the West, will furnish data for the next stage.

The inherent limitations of the Russian experiment are the emphasis on material things as the end of life, and the setting up of such a highly organized and centralized machine for the securing of these material ends. It promises to be as inflexible and incomplete as the capitalistic system has been, when it achieves its goal.

The isolation of the Soviets with their definite and conscious program is probably fortunate. The Soviet system is large enough to give the opportunity for a complete experiment; but we may be sure that the Soviets will not discover the whole truth, either logically or psychologically, because their lines of development are, in the first place, based on their own elemental practice, and in the second, on the absolutism of their premises. The evolution of their own ideas takes place with less influence from the stimulation of ideas in other parts of the world than is true in any other area. They are so egocentric that they think these ideas can be accepted everywhere. The great obstacle that they will meet is the fact that the elemental social organization in the other countries, like Japan, China, and India, as well as in the West, will absorb but never conform. It is the universal error of rationalization to think that an ideology is capable of becoming dominant over a psychology. Before it can succeed the theory will be changed. Communism may be called a "noble experiment," but it cannot be considered the ultimate experiment.

Nevertheless we must recognize the fact that the Soviet system is at the present moment stimulating a changing world as nothing else has ever done.

Chapter VIII

THE ASIATIC ANTIPODE — JAPAN

Geographically and culturally Russia and Japan are at extremes, though the territory of the Soviet Union almost touches Japan. In spite of distance and difference they have many parallels. Russia, even more than the West, of which it is a fringe, is young, naïve, inarticulate, self-conscious, unconcerned with history, maintaining continuity through habit rather than purpose, and dynamic because of its interest in the future.

Japan, which only yesterday learned of the West, is old, sophisticated, self-confident, dominated by history, and dynamic because of the power of its heritage. Russia has appropriated the discoveries of modernism in order to make something new; Japan has appropriated them to build onto the old.

New ideas began to germinate in them both at about the same time, approximately seventy-five years ago. Both came to the modern period with absolute monarchies. While in Russia the Czar had vast authority, there was local freedom; Japan, on the other hand, gave its Emperor only symbolic power, and obliterated individualism. Russian Communism was elemental, Japanese solidarity stereotyped. The Russian population has a Caucasian base with Mongolian intermixtures, while the Japanese has a Mongolian base with other Oriental infusions. Although Russia has twice the population of Japan, both are growing by natural increase faster than any other peoples in the world. Russia has vast areas to expand into; Japan has already filled her circumscribed limits. Both Russia

and Japan have thrown consternation into the world; the former by pointing out ways in which change may come in the future through the overthrow of existing institutions, the latter by its national expression through a military system such as the rest of the world is trying to forget.

The population of Japan proper is 64,000,000, with some 25,000,000 unwillingly included in the empire. The islands on which the Japanese live are not only small in area, but are largely mountainous, with arable land much limited, being about equal in size to West Virginia, while the total area is about three and a half times that of the state of Ohio. To this, however, should be added the range for fishing, which is six times that of the land and produces one-fourth of the world's supply of fish.

Although the people of Japan are a biological amalgam, their conscious unity is unparalleled. The semireligious status of the Emperor, who is the 124th in a dynastic line that has lasted for seventy-one generations, has furnished an emotional symbol around which Japanese life has been organized. He represents the accumulation of national consciousness magnified by the Shinto religion with its ancestor worship.

We have come to think of the Japanese as unique in their imitativeness but what they have done has been to graft new things on old predispositions. The speed with which they have succeeded in this has been due to the paternal organization which put the government into business and made them, according to Moulton,¹ the first "modern nation planners." The assimilation of modernism, however, has been strangely conditioned by what Lafcadio Hearn has called "the rule of the dead." This authority of the dead past, continued by the family cult, determines what is right and wrong and has generated such a power in the virtue of obedience that it explains most of what has been mystifying in Japanese character.

¹ *Japan*. The Brookings Institution, 1931.

The feudal system, which has been technically abolished, still exercises its ghostly control through crystallized habits. The result is that we have in Japan an intimate and involved juxtaposition of medieval, and even premedieval social forms, and ultramodernism. The paternalistic family and clan system that disappeared thousands of years ago in Europe still has power in Japan.

In the feudal system the Samurai, as a professional class of soldiers, were the highest of all social classes. "They were a privileged class, and must have originally been a rough breed who made fighting their vocation. Coming to profess great honor and privileges, and correspondingly great responsibilities, they soon felt the need of a common standard of behavior, especially as they were always on a belligerent footing and belonged to different clans." ¹

The ethical code of Japan, then, was fixed by its military professional class, and had many superlative qualities. "Bushido" permeated deep into the people of Japan and the prestige of the Samurai lasted. The other social classes were equally fixed. The farmers, who came next in order of prestige, might marry with Samurai; then came the artisans; and fourth were the merchants. Samurai despised commercial affairs. Below these four classes was an outcaste group that shared but slightly in the general Japanese system.

In 1868 when Japan began to modernize, the Samurai were temporarily thrust into the background by the development of commerce and for a time suffered great hardships. Out of this group, however, have come some of the high-minded liberals, whose characters have confused those who see only the medieval in Japan. It would be inconceivable that 2,000,000 Samurai, after centuries of unquestioned dominance, should give up their sense of responsibility and love of prestige. The great zeal and

¹ Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*. London, 1903.

efficiency with which the Japanese adopted the European military methods and the constant existence of the "military caste" in Japan are explained by persistent Samurai tradition and blood continuity.

The merchants, on the other hand, were prepared in some degree for the new economic activity in which they had to play at first the leading part. They had not been so fully inoculated with "Bushido," for they had occupied a despised position under its ægis. The result has been that, while the Japanese as militarists in a world that magnified military things give the impression of great efficiency, the merchants give the reputation of a people addicted to sharp dealing. As many stories may be told of the tricks of business men as of the austerity of the military atmosphere in Japan.

Much research has been made by Japanese and foreigners into the Japanese feudal system and its ramifications into the whole fabric of social organization. It should now be studied for the light it throws on present Japanese social values. The aggressive military activity of Japan may be rationalized by emphasizing the need of more room for expansion, but the heedless way in which it has plunged ahead is the product of patterns, not reasons. The Japanese have gone through several stages in world opinion. They were ignored at the beginning, respected and feared when they had shown a capacity to compete with the West as a military power; then despised for their ruthless attack on China.

They were ignored because the Oriental was thought to be a different order of man from the Occidental. They were feared, in part, because of the mystery which surrounded the unfamiliar, and because the world had adapted itself to an existing military status that was thrown out of focus by a newcomer who could use, no one knew how efficiently, the same military force.

The most aggressive and brutal actions that may be cred-

ited to the Japanese are no worse than every other nation has practiced, some of them very recently. The shock comes from the fact that the other nations have achieved all that is possible for them by such methods, and are building up a new code that is affronted by Japan.

This new code, symbolized by such machinery as the League of Nations, came in answer to a conviction that national diplomacy was inadequate. It still exists chiefly as an ideal for whose achievement neither clearly defined laws nor methods of procedure are yet devised. The force of the ideals is perhaps on the verge of coming under control. Japan's insistence, as a late comer in the field of imperialism, that she may run through the course as the others have done before her can find justification in history but not in the spirit of the times. Since her military caste does not differ in its outlook from all militarism, the hope must lie in the assertion within Japan of liberal forces that catch the broader implications of human relations. Such forces are unquestionably there, though for the moment impotent in expression.

It is probable that the Chinese and the Japanese, because of their common racial factors, will be driven together by the race consciousness of the Caucasians. With the ultimately inevitable cessation of conflict between these two neighbors, the present antagonism is likely to be replaced by coöperation that will be of incalculable value to both and vastly increase the part that is to be played in world affairs by this great area containing more than a fourth of the world's population.

Many of the characteristics of Japan can be understood better by a comparison with China, from which it differs in fundamental ways but to which it is similar in equally important ways. During the long centuries past, wave after wave of cultural influences has come from China to Japan either directly or by way of Korea. From China Japan learned to write and adopted the Confucian philoso-

phy and Buddhism, assimilating them to her own patterns. Japan has been integrated while China has had unity without integration. China's highest traditional class is the scholar instead of the soldier, and yet paradoxically because of some influence, probably Confucianism, modern Japan has introduced universal education, topped by universities, as rapidly as it adopted modern military technique. The family system of China has a counterpart in Japan, but in Japan the nation stands above the family, while in China the nation yields to the family.

The Chinese have shown great capacity to colonize but the Japanese crowd more closely and stay at home. Both have shown great commercial ability, but in China, though the masses are woefully poor as in Japan, coolies often become millionaires and the Chinese business man has a strongly contrasting reputation for dependability. In Japan fourteen families possess the great mass of wealth, and, joined with the military caste, have striven to put down radical agitation, while in China each recent succeeding ineffective government has been radical. China's discipline has been philosophic and personal, with freedom to pass from one class to another, while the discipline of Japan has come from above and its classes have been maintained by heredity.

Just as Japan of old copied China, so she is now appropriating the West. Much has been written about this, and we have the superficial custom of speaking of the Japanese as the world's greatest imitators. It is, of course, startling that in a single lifetime, a people should have been able to pass from isolated Orientalism to an even partly modern scientific nation. The capacity to do this is a fundamental sociological problem which may be hinted at but cannot be explained without vastly more knowledge of the laws of the social process than anyone yet has. It may be demonstrated by further study of Japan that it is impossible for a culture to make as complete

a transition as the Japanese claim and as the world has credited them with doing.

Race consciousness, nationalism, and revolution are rampant in Japan. They grow out of the relationships which Japan bears to the West, but they must be interpreted in terms of what Japan is.

From now on we shall be dealing with culture patterns which are not only Eastern, but which have an antiquity which gives them a depth and inclusiveness not known elsewhere. The continuity of the same philosophy for several thousands of years and the combination of the various social developments — always under the influence of that philosophy — have bred a universality of practice which has been naïvely thought of as the instinctive variation characterizing the peoples of the East. It covers every aspect of personal and social situations because it runs through such long experience.

Japanese nationalism is a unique thing in the world and is older than any other nationalism. The Emperor, as the head of the family, symbolized the nation, and everyone except extreme Communists takes for granted the continuance of his importance whatever other changes may come. This has brought a unity such as the Communist system demands and a psychology for which chauvinists in every country vainly hope. One would have to be brought up in Japan to feel the reverence and at the same time to understand the degree of democracy which may exist under it. In other words, while the Emperor has absolute authority attributed to him, he confirms but does not initiate. Radical changes may take place without disturbing the monarchical position. Such a relationship could only have developed by tradition and could not be defined by code or constitution.

The other great traditional background is ethicoreligious and has resulted in a code of life called "Bushido," which combines both Buddhistic and Confucianist doc-

trines and practice with feudal organization headed by the Samurai class. "Bushido" means military-knight-ways.

With these anchors in the past every Japanese knows that he can wander as far as he will and never lose his identity. A novice in a culture has to be on guard lest he be lost when he enters another. The Japanese, however, know that they will not be lost even if they explore widely in alien environments.

The Emperor Meiji, grandfather of the present Emperor, was a remarkable man who began the process of modernization in 1868 and won the complete coöperation of his people. It was like the head of a family who decided to build a thoroughly modern house with the approval of the whole family. They had to change some of their habits, but were the same family when they moved in.

The particular influence of America upon Japan has been very important and will continue to be important, because of the geographic relations, commercial advantages, and the familiarity of Japan with America. Even should Japan drop to the position of a second-rate power she will still possess great potentiality in this relationship.

There are three lines along which America has been making herself felt in Japan. The order in which they are named does not indicate their relative importance, for they are so intertwined that they are inseparable.

(1) Many Japanese have been educated in America, and the American tourists in Japan outnumber all others.

(2) Business with the United States is of long standing and has been constantly growing. One sees not only American automobiles filling the streets from Yokohama to Tokio but also multitudes of other American products. Formerly the business was almost entirely carried on by Americans, but eventually was largely taken over by the Japanese. England has been to a great extent supplanted by America in Japanese trade.

(3) American missionaries and Christianity. Strange

as it may seem, these two must be separated. There is not the slightest fear that the "soul of Japan" is to be changed by Christianity.

The evaluation of missionaries is exceedingly difficult though their work cannot be ignored in the explanation of the awakening of the Orient. As individuals, they are generally likeable, often intelligent and liberal. Sometimes they inspire one with their heroic singleness of purpose. There is not in Japan the feeling of opposition to Christians that one finds in most other countries. The Japanese Christians do not feel that missionaries are now much needed except those of the very highest type.

Christianity has a good reputation in Japan. The two English daily papers, the *Japan Advertiser*, run by an American, and the *Japan Times*, by a Japanese, give as much space to missionaries and religious news as you would find in a specifically religious paper in America, and it is said that there is a good deal of the same sort of thing in some of the Japanese papers, the biggest one being especially sympathetic.

At the coronation of the Emperor the presidents of the five imperial universities were officially present. Three of these presidents were Christians, as were the wives of the other two. The Emperor gave a hundred thousand yen, fifty thousand dollars, for the new Y. M. C. A. building in Tokio, and for years has given a subsidy to the Salvation Army for its social work. Anything which the Emperor, or government, approves has a peculiar preferred standing in Japan. The Japanese have identified Western culture and Christianity, and therefore have wrongly attributed many things that they admire to Christian influence.

Because of the identity of Western civilization with Christianity the most influential leaders of the liberal movement are often Christians. There are many such and some of them, like Nitobe and Kagawa, are men of great power.

It is worth while to consider Kagawa in some detail since he sums up a tendency in a different direction from that in which Japan has been driven by the force of her tradition.

Kagawa is a personality already well-known. If he lives he will perhaps be reckoned one of the great prophets of the age. He is only forty-five years of age and is already mentioned with Gandhi. Kagawa made his reputation as a novelist and poet and is reckoned as the best in Japan. Of good family, he has lived most of his life in the slums. At the hour when one of his books was put on sale simultaneously throughout Japan, he was in jail for leading a labor movement in Kobe. Recently he was appointed head of the Social Bureau for Tokio by the mayor. While he does not advocate near nakedness as Gandhi does, his coöperative organization has developed a workingman's suit, Western style, which costs 2.70 yen, about a dollar and a quarter.

Kagawa is a Socialist — a Christian Socialist — but he is opposed to the Russian Marxists because they leave out the element of love. He is a leader of the left wing labor movement, but since he knows more of the condition of the poor in Japan than anyone else, and because he is so intelligent, he cannot be ignored by the right wing. While he is inevitably superficial in some of his knowledge, its breadth is simply astounding.

He is the leader of an evangelistic movement to get a million Christian converts in Japan. There are now just over two hundred thousand. When accused of bigotry, he laughs and says that he is trying to substitute the Nazareth myth for the imperial family myth. He believes that industrial and political problems can be solved by love, and that the best exemplification of it is found in Jesus. Although he is a Presbyterian minister, he brings to his Christianity the Bushido tradition. The fundamental doctrine of the Buddhist element in Bushido is mercy. This gives to his theology something that Westerners have not

known. In general, Japanese Christians are middle-class people, rather than low-class as in many countries; this accounts for the good reputation of Christianity. Kagawa wants to make it potent with the masses.

Christianity in both Europe and America is in a sort of stalemate. Its medieval inheritance and association with discredited governments have given it trappings that are too great a burden to it. One can well imagine that out of Japan may come a rejuvenation which will result in a modern adaptation of what is universal in Christianity, which will retain the old symbols with quite a new meaning.

In marked contrast to China, in which religion has always been insignificant, the Japanese live in an atmosphere of religion. It is the national expression derived from ancestor worship and exploited by those who gained an advantage from it. Buddhism, whose rejection of the material and rushing world is poles apart from Japanese habits, has since its introduction in Japan occupied an important place and is now undergoing a revival there which is more vigorous than anywhere else in the Buddhist world.

The nature and significance of Shintoism is merely ancestor worship, but its religious importance is social rather than personal. There is no necessary conflict with other religions, because it primarily stimulates only loyalty to the group, while Confucius, Buddha, and Jesus provide suggestions for personal conduct. These are combined into behavior patterns which the people do not analyze into theology but accept without criticism. Kyoto, which was founded eleven hundred years ago, and the spirit of whose founder is still worshipped, is the center of both Buddhism and Christian education. The Japanese have so completely identified religion with their national life that they are less ashamed of it than most people. This applies to all classes and not to the masses alone as in most countries.

The imperial family position is undergoing an evolution.

For more than twenty-five hundred years the Emperor has had a position of divine apartness. He had to live with the simplicity of a God, while the Shoguns were of this world and lived in magnificence. Now, democratic organization has taken the place of the rule of Shoguns, and the Emperor, though still receiving veneration, is more of this world. Since it was always possible to marry into the aristocracy, and aristocracy could be raised at any time, the imperial stock has not run out as it has done so often in Europe.

The imperialism of the West has been adopted by Japan with all its evil effects, but the capacity of Japan to retain its ancient heritage will make this experiment in the synthesis of East and West most important.

In some ways Japan offers an opportunity to study what would have happened if ancient Egypt or Babylon had been brought into sharp contact with modern times.¹ It also indicates the difficulties which arise in a period of social and political uncertainty when the very strength of an efficient, strongly centralized government, plunging without experimentation, opens itself to the possibility of serious mistakes that could have been avoided or meliorated if the changes had come more slowly.

Japan has great capacity to learn, but she has learned many of the wrong things. There need be no doubt but that she will set herself zealously to learning other things, and will, as the Eastern outpost of Asia, serve as an important adjunct to its vastly more important neighbor, China, in the impending rise of the East.

On the other hand Japan labors under two very heavy psychological handicaps. The first is the deep interpenetration throughout the population of the habits that go with militarism. This brings a haughtiness in relation to other people that is offensive even though it be accompanied with the measure of politeness that is characteristic

¹ See Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan*. Macmillan, 1924.

of a military society. In dealing with her possessions, as Korea, she shows a lack of imagination of other points of view that will utterly defeat her purpose of assimilation. Along with this is a patriotic loyalty that makes for military efficiency, but renders an objective analysis of herself almost impossible.

The second handicap is an inferiority complex. This may be difficult to define. The basis of it is that Japan is playing a modern rôle without having had time to learn it. She is exceedingly sensitive of the opinion of outsiders. Also, her territory is an island of limited extent so that there is a constant fear for existence. Her immediate neighbors, China and Russia, are vastly larger and potentially more powerful, both in armies and in wealth. There is no psychological escape for Japan except by over-compensation. This appears in the assertive self-confidence which is so different from that of China, whose confidence is not based on these fears.

From a sociological point of view there are so many vestigial remains of a highly organized social system entirely unfitted to the modern scheme of life that Japan has laid out for herself, that a series of shipwrecks seems to be inevitable.

However much the Japanese may imitate the West, there will be an intrinsic resistance to fundamental modification. Human beings are essentially the same but cultures are profound, and that in Japan is deeper than in most peoples and has less variation. The deeper culture patterns do not imitate, but rather absorb; modernism of machines and science will be appropriated by Asia and still leave its force of cultural variation going on for an indefinite period. One may doubt whether deep-lying habits will be changed, except superficially, for ages to come, however much the outward appearance may change. We have scarcely punctured the surface in the formulation of the laws of social imitation.

The incoherent development of sociology at the present time makes it possible to indulge in such play of imagination as will be impossible when its categories are more fixed. It is necessary, however, in order to get a better notion of the social process, to realize that arbitrary standards cannot be set up, that each social group is an experiment station, and that where society is going is dependent on an infinite number of factors, of which habits and spiritual systems are, for the present, more potent than any possible scientific schedule.

The ultimate importance of Japan in the Eastern scheme is probably very much overestimated. The power of a well-organized military culture such as is now focussing attention on Japan is effective for a time far beyond the justification of her numbers. The whole trend of present-day social organization is putting a discount on what Japan has magnified. Now that the world has so shrunk in its distances, however much of a momentary success Japan may make, we may be sure that quickly she must assume a place in proportion to her real importance. There is nothing mysterious or superhuman about the Japanese. They have lately been trying to carry water on both shoulders, their acclamations of internationalism on one, and their ruthless military nationalism on the other. Consistency will eventually come. Their sensitiveness to outside opinion is an expression of their inferiority complex. This will result in internal readjustments.

The real importance of Japan has been that she has succeeded in escaping the domination of the West and thus commanded respect for the yellow race which otherwise would have been delayed; and also that she is bound to have a constantly growing influence on China. Whatever attention may be directed at Japan, it must never be forgotten that the real giant in the Orient is China, and that whatever superiority Japan may hold for a time, China is bound to win in the end.

Chapter IX

THE CASE OF KOREA

On March 1, 1919, all over Korea, with shouts of "Man-sai" the first post-War revolution in Asia against imperialist control began. It was a non-violent demonstration against the harsh military administration which Japan had imposed on the Koreans. It had been organized so secretly that even the Japanese secret service was taken completely by surprise. The whole people were in it, including the pupils of the mission schools whose teachers had been excluded from the secret lest they might be compromised. The opportunity was the delayed funeral of the late Emperor for which the assembly of crowds was permitted.

The demonstration was met by reprisals so vicious that when news of them smuggled to America finally got into Japan there was a reaction that resulted in the appointment as governor of the liberal Admiral Saito, who immediately began to ameliorate conditions. The Koreans, however, are indifferent about the kind of governor who rules them as long as he is appointed by Japan. They have only one dominant interest — independence. During the years that have succeeded these events there have been practical concessions in outward relations of the Japanese to the Koreans but no change in the fundamental purpose of holding and controlling Korea. The Koreans know the iron hand that remains within the glove, for it does not succeed in concealing itself and national feeling is actually stronger than at the time of the revolution.

The case of Korea contains some conditions unique in the Asiatic national movements. It is the latest example

of an old territory brought under the control of conquest and the first experience of Japan in imperialism. Korean culture is older than that of Japan and her people are of the same race. Her numbers are large and welded together by long history. Manchuria, which is part of the same story, lacks the political continuity of Korea.

There were transfers of territory after the War but in no significant case did people fall under governments more alien than those which previously held them. In 1910 Japan formally annexed Korea in repudiation of existing treaties and promises given until just prior to the event, though she had had complete control since 1905 when she had beaten Russia in competitive intrigue and final war to secure a dominant influence. Thus began Japan's first essay into the field of colonial administration, with the exception of Formosa, which came as a result of the war with China in 1895. In times past she had made assaults on Korea, but those were in the primitive period when treaties and international law did not constitute an element in the world's political and moral fabric.

As a result of the victory in the war with Russia, Japan suddenly found herself in the class of the great powers of the world and undertook to strengthen herself as they had done. When she saw what had happened to the rest of Asia, she clearly had justification in her military methods, for without them she would have been reduced as China, India, and other parts had been; but in her relations to Korea she entered upon a course for which she was unprepared and at a time when the other powers were beginning to discover the futility of their enterprises.

From Japan to Turkey, almost a third of the circumference of the globe and including approximately half the population of the world, with the single exception of the small kingdom of Siam, there has been since the beginning of Western expansion no part that has not been dominated by imperialism in some form. China, the Philippines,

Indo-China, the Malay peninsula, Java, Sumatra, India, and the Near East fell under European domination when national morals saw no wrong in exploiting any people its power made possible, doing it both for economic advantage and for glory.

Now, however, even France, in Indo-China where she rules with the iron hand that was common in the last century, proclaims that her intentions are temporary and for the good of the people. Great Britain, which dominates most of the rest of the territory, having been barbarous in the past, has given up most of her power and accepts the fact that she must soon relinquish it all. The Dutch in the Islands to the south paternally exercise absolute power, while the United States, coming late into the imperialistic game and dominated by the vestiges of democratic idealism, has always anticipated the freedom of the Philippines. In every case, outside of Korea, the dominated people have had not only racial but also cultural variations from their rulers so complete that there has never been any intention of assimilation, but rather only pious rationalizations about the "white man's burden."

Japan has paid lip service to the political and humanitarian principles of those who had begun to claim to govern people for the people's good, but she differed from all the others in Asia in interpreting the "good" as necessitating making the Koreans into Japanese. In this she had the logical justification which European powers have lacked because of the close similarity between Japanese and Koreans; but her own confidence in the superiority of Japan and the blindness of military leadership gave her no conception of historical and psychological processes and have made her commit herself to a course that cannot succeed.

Korea is a peninsula thrust out from the mainland of Asia almost to Japan. It is the bridge not only to China but to Europe with a branch of the Trans-Siberian railroad running the whole length of it. The political identity of

Korea runs back into the dim past. "Mansai" is interpreted to mean "ten thousand years," and those who shout it feel the assurance of dignity and age. For centuries China collected tribute and exercised suzerainty without interfering with the internal life of Korea, but that was entirely different from modern political arrangements. It was in order to escape the intrusion of alien influence that the Koreans centuries ago adopted the policy of excluding foreigners and prohibiting Koreans to travel away from home. It was not until 1880 that the Hermit Kingdom opened its doors and sought to learn of the methods by which it had heard that Japan was making such rapid progress. Baron Yun, who as a young man was on the first commission to go to Japan to see what was happening there, is still living and was the first Korean to get a modern education in an American college. In the days of isolation, corruption and decay were undermining the dynasty; in the years following, the Emperor and his court were inadequate to defend themselves against the intrigues of Russia and Japan and to bring the nation out of the decrepitude into which it had fallen. Youthful reformers appeared, however, and struggled in vain against the weakness of the Emperor and the growing power of Japan. These same youths, now growing old, have furnished the nationalistic inspiration which now embraces practically the whole population of Korea.

The problem of Korea is in many respects identical with that of the Irish, Czechs, and Poles, though there are local and historical factors that will affect the development in the future. The oldest continuous culture groups in the world in the order of age are, probably, the Chinese, Indians, Koreans, Jews, and Japanese. Of course, there is a great deal of myth connected with the earlier years of each, but the continuity and age are unquestioned. The Koreans know that they are older than the Japanese and that they mothered much of Japanese culture and from

this knowledge draw a strength of resistance that will not be overcome. The laws of assimilation are very complex, depending upon various intangibles, but it seems to be clear as we shall see further illustrated in later chapters that the older a culture the greater its persistence. It also is fairly well demonstrated that there is a close relation between relative numbers and the speed of assimilation. Numerical proportion, however, may be modified by a difference in prestige. For example: in the time of the Roman Empire, which was perhaps the most powerful that the world has ever seen, the primitive tribes of France and Germany were overawed by its grandeur, and for a time succumbed to its influence. They had no literature, no architecture, nor legal system comparable to that of Rome. All of these were imposed on Europe; languages and institutions took the color of Rome; but even so the peoples were not assimilated into Romans and eventually regained their own national characters, apparently only superficially changed by what they took from Rome.

Japan, with as much self-confidence in her institutions as ever possessed the Romans, set herself over Korea; but the Koreans were very different from the wild tribes of Europe, however much their momentary backwardness may have reduced them. They had history and literature older than those of Japan; they found themselves subjugated at a time when a call was sounding throughout the world to the effect that it was proper to resent imposed power and when from distant America President Wilson was telling the world that there was such a right as the right of self-determination. We do not know how many Romans settled permanently in their colonies, but the proportion was perhaps not very different from that of the Japanese in Korea where there are four hundred thousand to twenty-two million. The testimony of history is that if there is any assimilation in such a case it will be that of the Japanese to the Koreans. Institutions will be taken

over bodily, but the language and the history will stay Korean. In the case of the Jews we have a people who have always been in a minority, have never had numbers equaling those of the Koreans, and have had no country in which to organize themselves; but still they had a literature and a history and, in spite of their dispersion, have never entirely lost even their spoken language. The hold of the past on the Koreans lacks the religious factor that has been so strong a binding cord in the Jews, but the Koreans have had many advantages that the Jews have lacked. They have concentrated population on land that has been theirs for four thousand years or more; they have been unified by repression and revolution; they know of treaties that have been broken; they have heard of the success of others in getting freedom; and now they know that they have common cause with the great mass of the Chinese who are older than they.

The importance of the Christian missionaries who came shortly after the opening of the country in 1880 is probably greater than in any other region where they have been active. There was no indigenous religious institution to combat them; the people had set their eyes on a new order; and the Protestant missionaries represented the outside world and offered an educational program which could become immediately effective. Shortly after he arrived, an unknown medical missionary, Dr. Avison, stopped the bleeding of a wounded officer of the Emperor and won a place of confidence and esteem that gave all missionaries good standing. These missionaries took no part in politics, but they did try to improve both character and conditions, and in their lives and in their teachings suggested both self-respecting individuality and better political conditions. During the period of revolution most of the leaders have been devout Christians. Japan with a population of sixty millions and a favorable attitude towards Christianity has only two hundred thousand Christians, while Korea has

three hundred thousand in a population of twenty-two millions. In Korea there is no alternative religious absorption as in Japan.

Although Buddhism went to Japan by way of Korea, it had been in disfavor in Korea for five hundred years. It had played politics with the preceding dynasty, and, when the Yi dynasty came in, was put under the ban. There was a deep undercurrent of Confucianism, but Korea was probably the only country in the world that could be said to have no accepted religion. This, of course, meant that there was no organization that could resist or compete with Christianity, whose influence became much greater than its numbers would indicate.

After the Chino-Japanese war in 1895, the old idea of education represented by the Chinese was given up and was followed in Korea by a reform movement which sought to substitute modern preparation for government service for the examination in Chinese classics. The mission schools were the only places where this preparation could be secured, so they occupied a most important position at a crucial time.

The reasons for Japan's taking possession of Korea were military, economic, and benevolent. The examples of similar policy by European countries in Asia were plentiful and their justifications were the same. Some emphasized the military, some the economic, but in latter years all pretended the benevolent. Unfortunately Japan had in herself unusual military tradition and had adopted Germany as a model for her further development. This meant that, however great was the economic urge or however sincere the plan for the good of the Koreans, they were accompanied by military methods and administered by men trained in the military stereotype.

The military reasons are fairly obvious. Russia and China had been playing for advantage with the weak old government, Russia being particularly aggressive, and

China had exacted tribute, off and on, for ages. Japan had beaten them both in war and, as is the custom of conquest, entered into their heritages. Then, the geographical position of Korea is such that if it were under the control of a hostile power, it would be dangerous to Japan. Probably at the present time, however, the strategic advantage, which always seems imperative, actually figures less than the economic.

The economic argument has plausibility even though it may lack moral justification. Japan does have a limited area and an expanding population as we saw in the last chapter. The increase in population was possible through the change from an agricultural to an industrial economy and until the breakdown of economic prosperity resulted in an improved rather than a depreciated standard of living. It is not so much for bread as for jam on the bread that Japan needs more territory, but with a loss of trade the new status does become precarious and fear of the consequences explains the frenzy of Japanese politics. Japan made Korea a place for investment and profit, not an area for absorbing her own surplus population. The control of the banks, railroads, and rice production accrues to the advantage of Japan and gives the appearance of great progress to the country. The four hundred thousand Japanese in Korea are not settlers but the agents of government and capital. In the long run it is doubtful whether economic advantage extracted by force rather than by free coöperation will result in gain rather than loss. The Koreans as well as all other exploited peoples in the world are denying the right of profits by conquest and will soon make them very expensive.

On the benevolent side much can be said. Japan is in some respects an advanced country and in some respects Korea is very backward. She had not succeeded in modern self-government; her education is backward; her sanitation and economic conditions are primitive. We often hear

with regard to the responsibility of the United States for the civilization of Mexico exactly the kind of argument Japan has used.

There is probably no problem of greater practical difficulty than to know what is the duty of an advanced nation with regard to a backward one. The obvious thing is probably not the true one; we must get back to a psychological analysis. A people loses more self-respect by being ruled than by being hungry and ragged. The other question which imperialist governments find it difficult to understand and which tourists and business men utterly ignore is "What will be the ultimate result?" The question of the immediate practical affairs is pressing. Capital is invested and a social explosion may destroy it. Practical reason tries to hold the present and let the future take care of itself.

Nationalism in Korea has reached the psychopathic stage which makes impossible any hope of allaying it by ameliorating conditions. There is some coöperation with the government, but at least eighty per cent of the people are biding their time while carrying on national agitation to the limit permitted by the police until the time shall come when they can reassert their independence. The cleanliness and order of the capital, Seoul, are so much greater than what preceded the coming of the Japanese and the Japanese are so efficient in presenting their case that the large number of tourists who visit "Chosen," as the Japanese call Korea, get no inkling of the deep feelings that agitate the population. It is true that when the Japanese came Korea had dropped to a very low level, but whatever forces had begun to work within Korea for its regeneration have been greatly accelerated by the presence of the Japanese.

Governor Saito, whose understanding of the Koreans was unusual, said that the "Korean complex" is a superiority complex and an inferiority complex rolled into one.

That is exactly a typical reaction of psychopathic nationalism. The compensation by emphasis on age and long-lost superiority over the Japanese is necessary to equalize the actual subordinate position they now occupy. The Jews maintain a conviction that they are the "chosen people"; the Irish have stories about the time when they had a culture in advance of that of the English, and the Hungarians with their small numbers surrounded by Slavs reiterate "a thousand years" to remind themselves that they had a state a thousand years ago just as the Koreans shout "Mansai." The Koreans are reverting to both history and myth to symbolize Korean nationality. Everyone knows that they are older than the Japanese, that they have had an honorable history, and that their language is highly developed. This creates a situation which will offer unlimited resistance to the Japanese purpose, and will render the contributions which the Japanese are making instruments which will eventually be turned back against them.

Japan has modernized education, but the Japanese language occupies the important place and Japanese rather than Korean history is emphasized. Before the revolution of 1919 even the teachers wore swords. The reserve and assumption of superiority on the part of the Japanese are comparable to that of the Anglo-Saxons, but the Japanese are dealing with people of the same race, while the English, for example, have always found their manner effective over peoples of different races who, for a time, have admitted the superiority. The Koreans do not admit it. Some high officials like Admiral Saito have treated the Koreans with consideration, but the middle class and the police have not concealed their consciousness of superiority and power.

The benevolent policy has been good for exhibition, but it is subordinate to the economic. Much capital has been invested, but though the towns look prosperous the masses

are as poor as or poorer than they were before. Most of the Japanese are either governmental officials or concerned with commercial enterprises; thus by their very presence they advertise the advantage that they have over Koreans. It is inherent in the capitalistic system that disproportionate opportunities come to those who are on the capitalist side, especially when it is so closely bound with political purpose as in this case. In these respects Korea is part and parcel of the world problem which is rapidly reaching a climax. Korea has the most acute reactions to both a nationalistic situation and to an economic system, for which the stimuli are coming freely from the outside. "Dangerous thoughts" are both political and economic. The Soviet territory is but a few miles from the Korean border and many Koreans are settled there whose personal influence is felt in Korea. In China Communism is rampant, and the Chinese are making common cause with Korea against Japan. Now that capitalism is so obviously bound up with government, the effort to stop the spread of "dangerous thoughts" will be as fruitless as trying to stop the blowing of the wind. The possession of Manchuria by Japan instead of isolating Korea from these influences is bound to increase their power. Korea has had only fifty years of exposure to new ideas, but these ideas have come so fast and all of them have been so cataclysmic that the minds of the people are wide open and will discriminate only in favor of those that fall in line with their new purposes. There are too many Koreans in the outside world and too many awake within the country to make it possible to do more than delay new ideas. Social movements are psychological, not rational, but they are resisted as though they were rational. A peculiar thing about them is that the more force is used against them, the more they are aroused.

There are two million Koreans, more or less, in Manchuria. Some of them occasionally make raids into Korea.

These are classed as bandit raids; since they often touch nothing but police stations, they really are political. They are quite frequent, but the news about them is usually suppressed.

The government claims to have established freedom of the press, but the two largest Korean papers were each suppressed between fifteen and twenty times in 1929. This is considerably less than formerly. The Koreans may not hold political meetings without police surveillance. This, of course, is a constant stimulus to nationalistic conversation. Koreans are not conscripted into the army.

The Japanese are getting increased control of the land. It is said that since the Japanese came the agricultural area has been doubled, but that there is a smaller proportion of Korean peasant owners than before. Illegal usury is not stopped by the government and squeezes the peasant out of his land.

One sign that the Japanese are not having a successful influence in their plan for assimilation is in the lack of imitation of Japanese dress. When assimilation does take place this is always the first form of imitation. We see it among our immigrants; in Japan it shows in the adoption of foreign clothes. Although the Japanese are said to have originally received their style of clothes from the Koreans, it is now quite different and the Korean style is very old and altogether unique.

An example of police control is furnished by the experience of the author when he was asked to speak before a Korean group in Seoul.¹ The account is taken from a diary written the following day.

¹ One afternoon seven men came to see me. A Ph.D. from Zurich, the editor of an important paper, two prominent lawyers, a college professor, a man who had been in prison seven years, and one other. They were officers of a nationalist party which the government permits to exist, though constantly suppressing its activities. They talked to me for three hours. What they said I cannot repeat, but there was both feeling and intelligence in it. It was their group that was getting up the meeting.

Although the area and population of Korea are small, what is going on in Korea is symbolic of the awakening of Asia. Japan has already demonstrated that she cannot succeed in assimilating the Koreans, and at the same time has furnished them the stimulus for their own regeneration. She issues gorgeous reports with illustrations and statistics to show the benevolent results of her rule, but they have the quality of misleading propaganda and do not show the psychological facts. The story of the ancient and recent

Soon after they had gone the police inspector came to see me. He wanted to find out what they had said, but as he did not know English very well he did not learn anything. He came again in the morning, however, and, as I happened to have a Japanese caller from Johns Hopkins, he acted as interpreter. The officer wanted to know what I was going to say in the evening; he finally agreed that the meeting could go on. On the evening of the meeting, our hosts took us to a restaurant where according to the custom we removed our shoes at the door, went in, and took our places on mats on the floor. Since only a few spoke English, it was rather quiet while we waited to be called to dinner. Of the thirty men who were there, about half had been in prison for political reasons. In the next room was another dinner with geisha girls. When we went into the dining room we found a table about a foot high loaded with the best examples of Korean cooking. It was indeed a feast and we managed to eat successfully with chopsticks. There was a speech of appreciation to me so bold politically that I was amazed, especially as there probably was a policeman in the next room.

When we entered the hall for the meeting, it was packed. There were some thirty policemen present, mostly in plain clothes; before I began to speak they sent over word that they would hold the interpreter responsible for anything that I said. When we went on the platform a policeman in uniform with a dangling sword came up and sat down beside the desk, and another, who apparently knew English, sat beside him. The police were there to keep me, not the crowd, in order. It was not a condition to inspire eloquence. I tried to be most general in what I said and made what might have been called a good introduction when the restraint became so compelling that I stopped. The interpreter asked me to tell something about Czechoslovakia. I knew that it was a dangerous subject, but I proceeded to tell about the gymnastic society that had disciplined the whole people, what a great man President Masaryk was, that the map of Europe had been changed by the War, and that the Czechoslovak Republic was going well. At these last words the policeman shouted "Stop!" The whole experience showed what may be considered dangerous thoughts by Japan.

history of Korea must be read to get an adequate idea of the injustice to which the Koreans have been subjected and the potentiality that lies in them. The story of Japanese pretensions and practice in Korea must be known in order to get an understanding of the Japanese policy with regard to Manchuria. Manchuria lies just over the border from Korea and is a richer and more unexploited plum. The repudiation of treaties and at the same time the pretense of keeping them has been repeated in Korea as it has been begun in Manchuria.

No better illustration can be found of the immorality of the military procedure than the claim of virtue with the practice of ruthlessness that has characterized Japan in her treatment of Korea, her invasion of Manchuria, and her action at Geneva. Nor can a finer illustration be found of an aroused national feeling than that which exists in Korea, and though for the present she is making no apparent headway towards freedom, she is accumulating a power that will realize itself when imperialism has run its course.

Chapter X

STATIC AND DYNAMIC CHINA

It has been a popular assumption that the Oriental mind as found in the Chinese cannot be understood by the Occidental. The reversal of familiar customs and the self-contained poise of the individual have seemed to the West to be beyond comprehension.

Now that a breakdown in institutions and attitudes has come as the result of the impact of outside forces we find that Chinese react as other people do and we get a glimpse of what preceded the breakdown. The introduction of new forms of life and thought into China has brought the same kind of result as that which comes from the immigration of a people into a new country. What is going on in China is what goes on in European groups when they come to America. New values are grasped by the young but resisted by the elders with the resulting break in the authority of age. The Jews who have practiced ritual and believed in a theology as the foundation of life find themselves faced with children who ignore the ritual and reject the theology. The Chinese whose social institutions had the symbolism of ritual and whose philosophy had the power of religion have a new generation that has adopted new economic, educational, political, and ethical systems and repudiated the time-honored and approved systems of old China. Bewilderment and chaos are the inevitable result in China as they are with any people who have transferred an old heritage to a new environment.

There is a fundamental difference, of course, in the fact that the immigrant is only a minority in the midst of

a dominant culture, while the Chinese are a countless majority among whom the new has come. Nevertheless the prestige of the new ideas that have come with such suddenness and power has brought the same kind of crisis that is characteristic among immigrants. In fact just as immigrants have expected the Promised Land, so, for a time, the Chinese have hoped for a solution of their problems by Western democracy and education.

The unchanging habits of the Chinese through thousands of years have created a static society which could only be modified by a shock; the shock has come and China is changing; there are dynamic forces which grew out of her very static qualities that will persist however much outward forms may indicate that she has turned her face in a new direction. There is no aspect of life in which revolution is not taking place in China, but whether it be in the family, in political organization, in philosophy, in education, or in economics, China will still be China and her power will be dynamic.

Psychological readjustment is a slow process. When it is held back by great masses of people whose habits are stereotyped, the social change will be greatly confused and modified by the influence of these habits. The phenomenon of disorganization and demoralization which is so common among immigrants is one of the pictures which China presents to us. There is the difference, however, that the immigrant resists inevitable assimilation into the new culture while the Chinese are striving to assimilate it into themselves. In both cases, however, the first result has been that the younger generation assumes the superiority of the new and swaggers with it before it has been entirely assimilated. The children of European peasants throw off the symbols of their parents' nationality and boast of their Americanism. In the same way the representatives of the Westernizing China adopted wholesale the trappings and ideas of an alien culture. In both a

reaction has now come. Thanks to the overemphasis on superficial assimilation by American superpatriots, and to the failure both of democratic institutions to be efficient and honest, and of economic institutions to be strong, the immigrant has been disillusioned and is now merely giving lip service where before he gave devotion. So in China the period of exultation over being Western has passed. No longer are the things Chinese to be depreciated, but proudly to be displayed.

The disruptive effect of a steel mill on the family of a European village peasant is like that of the revolutionary influence of democracy and industrialism on China. The Chinese political organization survived easily so long as it was in isolation but its dilemma in the face of the problems of international relations and radical economic change has made modification necessary. The demoralization of orthodox Jewish life in America is as great as that now going on in China under the influence of present conditions. The Jews, in spite of the mass of forces against them, are making strenuous and promising efforts to retain the values of moral and intellectual interests though in entirely new forms. The Chinese are trying to do the same thing.

"Thus far in its history whatever has touched China has been absorbed into it rather than imposing itself on China . . . It has been said of the Chinese that if a Ford car or a monkey-wrench be sent to China direct from an American factory and given to Chinese to use, after three months that car or monkey-wrench will be working satisfactorily and quite as it ought to, but it will not be quite the same car or monkey-wrench that it was when it was shipped from San Francisco and not quite like any car or monkey-wrench that remained in the United States. It will look just a little different and work just a little differently. Something will have happened to it. It will have taken on a certain Chinese character. The same may be said for Christianity, constitutional government, com-

munism, Grand Rapids furniture, American college life, or anything else taken over from the West." ¹

Although Westernism has come into China in various ways, the dynamics of both extroversion and introversion have come through students. Yung Wing, the first student to come to America (in 1847) was filled with the idea of taking back what he had learned and of saving China for herself. Every student who followed him has had the same purpose. This accounts for the power of the youth movement and the social and political strength of the students in China.

"These thousands of Chinese students who went to other countries with the idea of taking back to China whatever they thought would be useful to her development as a modern nation, differed from other students in foreign countries in that they all conceived their personal destinies to be bound up with the reforms and changes which seem so bitterly necessary to China. It was the future of China that they dreamed of and planned for during the years of their voluntary exile, and it was with the conviction that they would be able to accomplish the regeneration of China that they returned to their native homes." ²

These students in their "exile" unconsciously and consciously threw off many traditional institutional controls in dress, philosophy, and politics. The result has been enthusiasm which, because of the peculiar prestige of scholars in China, spread rapidly. For example, it was a new idea to the Chinese to think of China as a whole, for the wholeness of China had been a social fact, not an idea, and, except for the interests of the dynasties in power, had been taken for granted, not promoted. To be sure, under the old system students from any family might pass

¹ Nathaniel Peffer, *China: The Collapse of a Civilization*, p. 204. John Day, 1930.

² Tsi C. Wang, "The Youth Movement in China." *The New Republic*, 1927, p. 82.

examinations and get government positions, yet the people themselves had no political consciousness. The social structure had been maintained by the customs of the family, village, and province and there had been no preparation for the problems of a central government. The solidarity that prevailed in Japan had no counterpart in China.

The sharp break with the past comes in the effort to transfer the unit of consideration from the family to the nation, and yet the power of the family will not be entirely yielded. The evils of nepotism and localism still exercise their dominant influence at the same time that larger patriotism is growing.

Historic events have been having a positive influence on the self-confidence of the Chinese. The World War taught them that the Europeans needed colored people to help them kill other white people, and that neither European power nor theories were as great as their reputation. When the Germans were deported by Chinese from Shantung on the request of the Allies, it became evident that Chinese could deport whites, and when the Russian exiles came to Shanghai and were reduced to begging, the prestige of the white race lost a position which it will never recover. The aggressions of the Japanese taught the use of the boycott and gave a consciousness of common purpose and power which China had never known before.

At the very moment that imperialist capitalism began to retreat Russian Communism appeared. It repudiated the very same things that the Chinese were beginning to oppose. Its appeal has none of the basis that it had in Russia, and in the Russian manner cannot possibly be made effective in China because of the lack of any conceivable centralized political solidarity. Since, however, the family with the consequent lack of personal individualism is the individual unit, one aspect of Communism is easily understood. The eagerness with which Communism is at present being accepted corresponds to that with which Westernism was

greeted but a few years ago. In the end it too will yield to the power of the static forces of habit and organization and will be modified as is everything else that comes into China.

Even though a Ford may be modified, nevertheless it is an automobile and does not take the place of anything that is Chinese. It is likewise true that a vast number of other innovations both mechanical and social fall into the same category. Their introduction into China brings some revolutionary change that cannot be attached, except most artificially, to any habits that are already there. This applies to the industrial system which cuts across families and guilds and takes people out of their villages.

The tying up of things which have no place in old China with the emotional demand that they be in some way China-fied will come both from habits and from the national spirit which is even now reacting against the nations that have been most responsible for the new techniques already adopted. Only a few years ago Japan dominated the Western imagination. Now, in spite of the military aggressions of Japan, the whole world seems to accept the fact that China is of overshadowing importance. China has been arousing herself and we may wisely seek to find what may be the sources of her power.

There are five obvious and absolutely unique facts about China which give her a significance that is unparalleled in the world. The first is her numbers — four hundred millions or more — approximately one-fourth of the human race. Second, her age, with folkways, organizations, and institutions historically continuous for nearly six thousand years, and traditionally much longer. Third, a dominating philosophy which has been the backbone of Chinese culture and purpose for five hundred years longer than the Christian era. Fourth, a family system through which a moral and economic discipline has enabled the Chinese to survive terrific strains. Fifth, cultural unity through a system of writing which has made available through the whole period,

in every section and without translation, the vast accumulations of philosophical and literary production.

1. *Population.* There is no way to estimate the population of China even approximately. The lowest estimate is about 350,000,000 and the Chinese estimate from 450,000,000 to 500,000,000. It is probably somewhere between these extremes. There is considerable biological variation which is not easily explainable. The people of the North have a stature comparable to that of Europeans, while the Southerners are prevaillingly short. It is known that invaders and outlying peoples have been absorbed into the Chinese but now in their own minds the Chinese are one people. The Manchus, who under the recent reign of the Manchu dynasty held themselves distinct, now completely identify themselves with the Chinese, even, it is said, admitting Manchu origin with reluctance.

The physical and mental vitality of these masses makes a dynamic of incalculable power. In spite of age, there is no physical senility in China. Conditions have never coddled the weak, for bad sanitation and life at the starvation point have secured the survival only of those who were strong. The social disapproval of childlessness puts a premium on fecundity and has created one of the most difficult problems of China, but it kept old China from physical deterioration.

We hear a good deal in these days of voluntary birth control. Long before it was talked about, the birth rate had fallen wherever the standard of living had risen. It is doubtful whether a campaign for the limitation of families can compete in efficiency with the desire and possibility of owning an automobile. When this, or its equivalent, comes to China the birth rate will fall as everywhere else, whatever Confucius and his commentators may have said about it. Chinese ancestor worship has not produced any larger families in China than were common in New England a few generations ago.

Modern hygiene can reduce infant mortality without any appreciable rise in the standard of living of the masses and will result in an increase of the population. This will be temporary. Since the dominant desire for children is to be assured of sons to pay proper respect to the spirits of the ancestors, when the death rate is reduced the number of children necessary for this function will decrease. The emancipation of women, which is moving rapidly, will also affect the birth rate. Nevertheless we must expect that the work of medical foundations will for a time increase the burden of overpopulation through the reduction of the death rate. This result has been demonstrated in Japan.

On the mental side we also have a force to be reckoned with. Comparative intelligence quotients and peculiarities of Chinese mental processes are unimportant. There are now and always have been enough strong minds in China to convince both Chinese and outsiders of their existence and strength. If we grant China the normal two per cent of superior minds, the total is eight million. This number in connection with social emphasis upon scholarship will give China a powerful leadership. The only other people in the world with a comparable interest in education are the Jews. We are familiar with their disproportionate eminence in the intellectual field. The probability is that the Chinese will give us a similar example.

2. *Age.* The beginnings of Chinese history are merged with tradition but there are authentic records that go back between four and five thousand years and indications of events that preceded that period. Family records often go back twenty-five hundred years. The mores of China are older than those of Japan and their power of resistance is greater. This is illustrated by the fact that Buddhism, which did not come to Japan until long after it had established itself in China, brought the Japanese much more into conformity to Buddhist practices than it did the Chinese. Missionaries from India began to come in the

first century after Christ, and by the fourth century Buddhism was in full swing, covering the whole of China. The wisdom and devotion of these missionaries were very remarkable.¹ They found Confucianism already with a running start of more than five hundred years and made acceptable adaptations to it, becoming an integral part of Chinese life for fifteen hundred years. There are still temples and priests and ritual practices everywhere, but Buddhism is now no genuine part of Chinese culture and will probably soon die out almost completely. The momentum of three or four thousand years of Chinese culture could not be fundamentally modified. Everywhere else Buddhists sit on the floor; the Chinese already had chairs and kept them. Buddhists could eat no meat and burned their dead. China continued to eat meat and to keep the burial of the dead as a preëminent social institution. The nearest approach to religious observance that the Chinese had was the regard in which the spirit of ancestors was held. This fitted into the Buddhist theology, and now the priests play a part in the funeral ceremonies, which are really not Buddhist but pre-Buddhist.

The unworldliness of Buddhism was also at variance with the practicality of the Chinese. That did not limit its vogue, but it negated its influence. The present question is whether the influence of Westernism, which comes after China has had fifteen hundred years more of crystallization than Buddhism found, will absorb China or be absorbed and modified by China.

Credit must be given to the Christian missionaries for much of the impetus to the awakening of China, but the resultant nationalism and the sympathy with Russian Communism constitute a militant force against Christianity such as never challenged Buddhism.

There has been time enough for old Chinese patterns to penetrate to every part of Chinese society. In illiterate

¹ See James B. Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*. Macmillan, 1928.

peasant villages, you may find the streets named after the Virtues of Confucius. The ethics of family responsibility cover every stratum of society.¹ It is the enormous numbers with a stereotyped system of folkways that will prove to be the greatest resistance to modification. What matter if a few thousands or a few hundred thousands wish to make things different! An illustration will give a better notion of this persistence. At a recent Moon Festival—a holiday in the fall which the new national government futilely forbade—the students held the usual seasonal celebration at a University in Peking. There were students and instructors from widely separated parts of China, but the “moon cakes” were of the same form whether from Canton or Peking. The government may be very sure that whatever drastic measures may be adopted to stop the celebration of the Moon Festival they cannot succeed. The West offers no institution of such old, universal, and uniform observance as this, and it is only one of myriad such in China.

3. *Philosophy.* No attempt will be made here to outline the Chinese philosophy which has taken the place of religion for the Chinese and has dominated their social and political lives for twenty-five hundred years. Mencius, Lao-Tse, and Confucius are the classical names, but the system of Confucius has been the basis of education and morals. Proficiency in the literal knowledge of his writings has been required of all scholars down to the last decade. The students who have come to America until the most recent years have all started their education in the classical manner. It had weight not only from its prestige as learning, but also from the universal practice of its precepts. Since its authority was not a matter of belief, as in the case of religion, sects did not spring into being as in the case of India. Since we shall find elements of this philosophic influence running through the discussion of the rest of this chapter, it is necessary here only to emphasize the

¹ See Pearl S. Buck, *The Good Earth*. John Day, 1931.

universality of the influence of Confucius on the whole history and organization of China.

Twenty-five years ago China was accepted as the example par excellence of static culture. Seventy-five years ago an Englishman said, out of much experience in China, that it was inconceivable that it would ever change. One reason for this is that scholars constantly turned to the same philosophic authority. That philosophy has given the scholar the first place in the Chinese social order for ages uncounted. Scholars are always conservative, but in China because of this peculiar fact they were more so than elsewhere.

The same classification of social position that put the scholar at the top, put the soldier at the bottom. The development of China has hitherto been improperly compared with the progress of aggressive military cultures. With no prestige for the military career, it has never been possible to arouse in China an interest in aggression by force.

In the era into which we are now entering, this non-military ideal and practice will have many advantages. In the first place there is no traditional militarism to overthrow. If China were like Japan in this respect the next stage in world organization would have quite different problems to face. In the West we cannot understand our own countries except through military narratives. European history from the earliest period has had few heroes whose glory was not military; the episodes of history, even those of the Church, have turned on military exploits. Almost all the public monuments in Europe and America are either statues of soldiers or memorials to military heroism or victories. Patriotism is taught by the stories of achievements in war. All the national anthems of the West refer to enemies or to freedom obtained through fighting. In Westminster Abbey honor has been paid to warrior knights altogether out of proportion to other men. It is difficult for a Westerner to think of his country or his culture without the power of arms to promote or defend them.

China, which prelived them all and will continue when many of them have passed away, has nothing of this. There are few places where soldiers are so ubiquitous, and no country where one feels so little of militarism. Peking under martial law does not seem so martial as Tokio under normal conditions.

There are no war heroes in China in the Western sense, few stories of freedom gained by war, few lands gained by conquest. There have been wars and some soldiers who won respect for their military prowess. Many of the popular classical plays have generals for heroes, but none the less this has been incidental rather than central in the history of China, and never had any place comparable to that found in the Old Testament, which has been a guide book in the philosophy of Western civilization.

The momentary splurge of Ghengis Khan, tremendous as it was, is insignificant in Chinese history. Kuan Yu, to whom there are temples, were military defenders of freedom, but they are magnified for their chivalry and virtue rather than their victories. The writings of Confucius and Buddha, on whom the spirit of China has been nurtured for millenniums, contain nothing like the Biblical references to the leaders who slew their tens of thousands. Even in this most modern period of imitation of the West and of constant recurrence of wars, no generals have popular esteem unless they happen to be scholars also. This, of course, is almost never. On account of the poverty of the country, men go into the army because they get food and sometimes pay, but never because they can find a career that will give them standing in their communities.

When Roosevelt was trying to arouse us in America to show our virility through arms, the most stinging insult he could hurl at us was that we were "Chinified." The victories that China has won, and they have been substantial, and the freedom which she has and will secure,

have come primarily through other means than soldiers. This may be said in spite of the military resistance offered to the Japanese. The peasants who have migrated into Manchuria have already defeated the Japanese there without knowing or intending it. The boycotts, however brief and however little they may have really affected trade, have put fear into exploiters and imperialists and made the Chinese conscious of a weapon of great power.

The West is just setting itself about the task of unlearning war. China never knew it and is not in the slightest danger of more than temporarily learning it. The dynamic power of peaceful methods gives China a running start in the competition of the era into which the world is entering.

Next to unity and lack of military interest, the third most important present asset of China is her disorganization. She is disorganized, but in no danger of disintegration. The integration is based on the intangible consciousness of unity which can be counted on to persist even though it may be temporarily overthrown throughout China and locally have little significance. It depends, of course, on time to prove the validity of the thesis of this book whether in the long run the persistence of culture patterns can resist and overcome the alien and internal forces that are attacking them. Political chaos, which seems to be so deplorable, makes China unconquerable. The conquest or control or corruption of the central government, or the capture of a province here and there, are mere flea bites. China is like a great piece of limp cloth which may be soiled, or torn, or trampled on in spots, but the rest always remains intact. Old Germany, with its strong central government, fell like a stiff pole. Japan could be conquered by getting control of the central government. China would be almost unaffected by such an experience. China is full of problems, many of them insoluble at a given time; they can only find a way out by evolution. The whole world is also going through an evolution, and,

until it knows better at what it is aiming, nothing is more valuable for China than the elasticity of political inefficiency and decentralization, in spite of the problems that they involve. It would be indeed a world calamity if four hundred million people should organize and be efficient for going in the wrong direction.

One of the dynamics of China, then, is her complete freedom to be led in a better and better direction. She is not static. She is merely waiting for a chart, compass, and rudder. The ship is solid.

4. *The Family.* There is nothing else in the world that exactly corresponds to the Chinese family. It is in one a biological, educational, religious, moral, and economic institution, and unquestionably accounts for the stability and high character of the Chinese people. Such religion in China as is universally accepted is found in the spiritual value that clings to the relation of son to father. Notwithstanding the evils and excesses that have grown up around it, it is the continuity of the family backwards that gives significance to its extension and perpetuity forwards. Sons must not only exist but they must be worthy of their ancestors.

As was stated above there is Communism in China. The family is both a social and an economic unit. No constitution and laws could possibly teach how it was to be run. In China every family knows by the universal social heritage who in the family should receive respect and who should exercise authority. There may be jealousy and intrigues but the grandfather, uncles, brothers, and all the women have a place in the scheme that is accepted and understood rather than defined.

This has developed ethical as well as economic relations. Responsibility may not be shirked however selfish the individual may be. In America we have to have laws to compel children to take responsibility for their parents. Such a law would be inconceivable in China. The place

of women has been from some points of view inferior, but their position is recognized and important, and women have easily taken an equal place with men in modern education and promise to have important political influence. There has been no shock to Chinese susceptibilities as women have emerged into this modern period.

The economic survival and economic promise of China are both to be found in the family. The fearful poverty through which China has lived forced the family ages ago into a form of mutual responsibility that has enabled it to survive on a minimum, and is the basis of such wealth as is achieved. Everyone works in the common enterprise of the family. What is owned belongs to the family and extends to collateral lines which custom and not law defines. It has resulted in a phenomenal power.

Chinese business succeeds against overwhelming odds just because of this. In Manchuria where the Japanese government gave advantages to Japanese business men through railroad rebates and tax remissions, a Chinese family will set itself up beside the Japanese and beat him out. It is said that Chinese merchants will sell their goods at cost and make their profit out of the sale of the packing boxes and often drive the Japanese out of business. In one city a great American oil company had to reduce its price below cost because a Chinese had bought a ship-load of independent gas in California which he sold at cost, making his profit on the sale of the tin cans in which it came. In Manila most of the business is in the hands of Chinese, who can get rich on such small profits that no one can compete with them. In Indo-China, Siam, and the Malay Peninsula they are getting control, not only of the small businesses, but of the largest, so that there are multitudes of Chinese millionaires in countries where the French and the English had all the advantages at the start.

In view of the disproportionate lack of natural resources in China, which will make it impossible ever to develop

an industrial economy of the sort found in the West and in Russia where resources are abundant, we must look forward to a continuation of this economic family system which has shown itself capable of holding its own on the largest as well as on the lesser financial scales.

It must also be credited to the family and to the prestige of education that China has never developed a class or caste system. Since the elders must always be shown respect, the eminence of younger members of the family does not permit them to feel superior to an old uncle, however inferior he may be, and, since position was secured through scholarship, the most humble family might aspire to have a member among the great. The result is that there is no such thing as an hereditary class in China.

Another value in the consciousness of family responsibility is that no one can be so poor or so outcast that, if he has a family, he cannot get help from it. The methods of charity as practiced in the West have an entirely different problem when they are taken to China. At present the crowding into cities is making an acute problem that corresponds to the problems of the West and calls for the application of methods with which the Chinese are unfamiliar.

On the negative side of the family system, serious indictments may be brought. There is a decentralization of national responsibility very different from that which obtains in Japan, for the funeral of a father is more important than a crisis in the state. If a man holds an office it is more important that he take care of his relatives by giving them jobs than that he serve the state well. As yet there is little public opinion which demands otherwise. Often an individual who might advance is chained back by his duty to his family. Individualism within the family is communistically limited, but there is the individualism of the family, which, even if it militates against the solidarity of the state, is perhaps a higher form of social freedom than

that now possible in Russia or than that which is growing up in capitalistic countries. The great problem both under capitalism and Communism is to find some freedom for individualism. China at least offers the compromise of primary group individualism.

It is the religious element in the family commanding sons to respect the spirit of the father that accounts for the excessive increase of population. This will be very hard to change. It has justified the multiplication of wives, and, with the increase of children, has made more than ever necessary the communistic integration of the family. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the grinding poverty, with the devastating famines, a high birth rate has been necessary for the survival of the people, and the high death rate has been a selective agency that may have increased the virility of the stock.

It is in the family that the uniform and universal habit of politeness is transmitted. In the close relationships of a crowded population the Chinese learned codes of conduct highly articulate and formal which meticulously regulated human intercourse. They have become so automatic that they now greatly smooth the contacts of the Chinese with the outside world.

The cruelty and indifference towards outsiders that are often attributed to the Chinese also arise from the concentration on the family. Outsiders must take care of themselves. The humanitarianism which is characteristic of Western civilization in China is limited to the family. It accounts for the survival of the Chinese but it makes very difficult the organization of a central government. In a public meeting in China a foreigner will be impressed by the confusion, because family groups carry on their tea drinking and conversation with complete obliviousness to one another. This cannot be considered impoliteness because mass meetings do not fall within the range of traditional practice.

The compact family unity and the universal pressure of population on food supply have developed the code of conformity rather than the initiative of variation. This has led to the popular description of Chinese culture as being static. It has been static, but it has survived, while other cultures have come and gone in rapid succession.

5. *Cultural Unity.* Aggression by outside powers is a stimulus to unity and is important chiefly in accelerating modernization, but the unity is already solidly established. This unity is the most dynamic factor in China.

This unity was made possible by the fact that the very old language used ideographic rather than phonetic writing. In its origin the picture form of writing depends on the fact that people have similar impressions of objects and ideas. A tree is the same thing to whoever sees it whatever the sound he may make when he indicates it. There is thus no difficulty in having different spoken languages and the same characters to represent them. Under the phonetic system the form of the word follows the sound, so, in the evolution of language, as the pronunciation changes the spelling also changes. No one knows how ancients pronounced their words before writing, or after writing, in China. In English, we get a hint of the changing differences from Chaucer, whom no one can now read without learning the language, but whose date would be only the day before yesterday for China.

The dialects of the coast differ so much from one another and from those of central China that they cannot be used in vocal communication, but if the people are literate they can write to each other. The forms of the dialects are the same, all being monosyllabic and without grammar in the Western sense of the term. There are differences in "tones" that cannot be expressed phonetically. The Japanese language, which adopted Chinese ideographs, is polysyllabic without tones or accent. The uniformity of Chinese may be compared to that of European languages in which the rules of

grammar are similar. If it had not been that the form of writing made the literary heritage accessible in common to all parts of China, instead of being one in consciousness China would now be as divided as Europe.

Fortunately from the earliest times there were in China important writings in this ideographic language, culminating in Confucius and his immediate successors twenty-five hundred years ago. They made the "classics" about which all learning has centered down to the present generation. Since government officials had long been chosen from those who were proficient in the classics, and since they were always sent out from the central government, they carried the official dialect to the uttermost parts of the country.

These government officials were chosen by examination and had prestige, power, and wealth and they had everything to gain by holding to the same forms and traditions. This secured both continuity and conformity because the scope of the examinations did not vary and so maintained a changeless background through many centuries unaffected even by changing dynasties.

Quite contrary to accepted opinion, the sharply divergent dialects are found only on the coast. It is estimated that ninety per cent of the people of China can now understand one another, thanks to the form of the language, to the method of choosing administrators, and to the free movement of peoples along the great rivers.

In those sections, however, where the spoken language differs, there is no break in solidarity. Students from the South come to Peking and have to learn the new dialect. There is absolutely no difference, however, in their feeling about China and the feeling of Northern students. They have a knowledge of the same past, the same moral and social code, and the same food customs. There is much less difference in all these respects than between the North and South in the United States. Peking people may have

a certain pride because they live in the old capital, but it is less self-conscious than the feeling of New Englanders towards the Middle West. There are no forces in sight that can more than momentarily disturb this unity and there are many that will increase its strength.

The accepted language now is Mandarin and there is no apparent jealousy in regard to learning it. Now that the classic form of the written language has served its purpose, unintentional though it was, it is now safe to undertake reforms in the method of writing. These have begun, and, in spite of the inherent difficulty, we may be sure that simplification with more of the phonetic element will not be long delayed.

Added to these five unique conditions to which nothing else in the world is comparable, are numerous subsidiary conditions. China has no all-embracing religion such as all the peoples in eastern Asia developed, and, while she is the largest nation in the world, she never deliberately expanded through conquest.

China lived through thousands of years in isolation and self-sufficiency. She had her own internal political troubles, and dynasty succeeded dynasty age after age with little effect on the fundamental form of Chinese culture. Finally the aggressive West discovered China and ruthlessly took advantage of the riches that it found there which the people, whose technique of resistance was primitive, could not defend.

From 1860 to 1900 the great powers of Europe assumed that China was legitimate prey. The monarchy which was falling into decay was utterly inadequate for a modern state and would have been followed by another, as had happened often in the past, if the stimulations of the West had not furnished a new idea of the possibility of political organization on modern lines. Suddenly this monstrous and aged body began to wake up and assert itself and is

now displaying a virility which comes from its very age. Beginnings of awakening had already appeared but the shock which completed it came with the defeat in the war with Japan in 1895. From that time to the present China has been shaking off her slumbers, and is starting on a career of incalculable significance to all mankind.

The leadership and symbolization of the movement have been centered in one man, Sun Yat-sen, who must be counted with Lenin and Gandhi as one of the dominant world leaders of the times. Single-handed he made the revolution which overthrew the monarchy and established the republic. He fought through its turbulent first years, then set himself to the task of arousing nationalism to the pitch of religious enthusiasm. In practical situations he did not have the genius and tact of Lenin and Gandhi, but he formulated a program of political and economic reorganization and national self-respect which has grown since his death in 1925.

Sun Yat-sen was in school in Honolulu from the age of twelve to eighteen; then he graduated from an English mission medical college in Hongkong. He was twice in America and Europe studying intensively the forms of government to see what might be applied to China. His revolutionary activity necessitated his fleeing to Japan on several occasions; he used his exile to formulate the social and political philosophy that is now the basis of his dominant influence. This philosophy aims to fit Western developments into the peculiar needs and possibilities of China. As a philosophy it may fall short of ultimate value, and as political science it may be too much of a patchwork to be considered a great original contribution, but it is the powder from which the Chinese explosion has come. It fits into the Chinese tradition of formulating a social program on a philosophical scheme. Confucius has been relegated as a fundamentalist, and Dr. Sun is the present prophet; but his power will be accentuated by accretions from the momentum of the old social codes. As a person-

ality he will probably diminish in importance in spite of the artificial efforts to magnify him, but his movement will go on.

The keynotes of Dr. Sun's program, which, since his death, have been elevated to a sacred document, are: NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, and THE LIVELIHOOD OF THE PEOPLE.

"Nationalism" is the movement first to get rid of the political and economic inequalities which were imposed on China during her period of slumber and weakness, and secondly, to arouse a unified China to take a dignified and constructive place in the modern world.

"Democracy" outlines a constitutional form of government. After studying the forms of Western constitutions, Dr. Sun found them out of date and inadequate, and added to the executive, judicial, and legislative divisions found elsewhere, civil examinations modernized but still in harmony with the ancient Chinese examination system for office-holders, and censorship. The political power of the people Dr. Sun *laid down* in "suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum."

"The livelihood of the people" aims at an economic reorganization which, like that of Lenin and Gandhi, looks to the masses. The program lacks the confidence and explicitness of the Russian plan, though Dr. Sun was greatly influenced by Russian Communism. The aim is the improvement of the lives of the people by economic development which is to be kept under state control so as to prevent the abnormal economic inequalities that have developed in capitalistic countries.

It will be many years before a large part of this program can be achieved, but as symbols the personality and writings of Sun Yat-sen occupy a place comparable with those of Marx and Lenin in Russia.

Since the Sun leadership fell into turbulent times and his program is imposed from above, it has not yet been

absorbed into the masses. The present leaders with practical problems to solve have held to his name but have divided radically among themselves as to the application of the principles. It may prove in the long run that Sun Yat-sen set off but will not control the direction of Chinese evolution. The world dispersion of era-making ideas makes every local program unstable, and the insistent pressure of communistic principles as well as changes everywhere in political and economic thinking will influence any program in China.

The disorganizing influence of Communism and the threat of Russian inspiration and aggression are matters of concern both to China and the outside world. The conditions of extreme poverty in China justify a feeling of animosity against the rich, and there can be little doubt but that the idealistic effect of Russian Communism will be strong in China as elsewhere and will be one of the forces in the modification of the economic order through which China is passing. In fact Communism may win China before she can establish any other form of government.

China already had an economic system as deeply rooted and as characteristic as that of the Russian peasant, and it will be as persistent in the future development as the old Russian communistic forms have been in the Soviet Union. In Russia there was village Communism which was easily expanded to state Communism, but in China it is family Communism. The present great difficulty in organizing a strong central government arises in part from the very strength of the family system.

To some degree the students are rejecting the family pattern, and the growth of industrialism will lessen its control, but for the hundreds of millions of villagers it will last far into the future. Even in those who reject the most obvious limitations of the family pattern we can expect the persistence of important vestiges both in education and in sense of responsibility. The qualities of social

relationships expressed by a great variety of customs such as forms of address and expressions of humility have become so much a part of the fabric of Chinese life that they will not be sloughed off easily.

Such is the China that has now come face to face with modern civilization, and that has suddenly been stimulated by the birth of fanatical nationalism to a revolt that is going to bring her the freedom to work out her own salvation and to make an impress on the course of world events. What the outcome will be only generations to come can know.

The most obvious fact of the present China is that it is changing, while at the same time it is holding to old habits. The process of change will follow the same laws that prevail among all people, modified only by the potency of mass, age, and integration that is peculiar to China.

China's present disorganization is characteristically Chinese and incomprehensible to the West. Vast in area and with a population of one-fourth of all mankind, it has an actual and conscious unity that cannot be overestimated. The civil wars are never sectional wars. The wars may be inconvenient, but while they are going on there is complete coöperation between the non-fighting agencies in the fighting areas. If transportation and communication are possible there is no break in the relations of the people in the opposite sides of the battle area. The independence or disloyalty of local political administrations in relation to the central government is a mere incident of only passing importance. An army, in the words of one writer, is only "the stage property of a politician."

The popular claim that China is passing from medievalism to modernism has an element of truth, but it is more nearly like passing from the renaissance period of the fifteenth century in Europe to the twentieth. The "Dark" period of the Middle Ages had long been passed in China while still inky in Europe. When China was old in culture

our Western ancestors were primitive tribes who needed centuries to bring them under the social control of Mediterranean culture before they could advance. Then, having only elemental roots in the past to hold them back, they leaped forward with amazing speed, taking with them, however, much of the brutality of their tribal life.

Enlightenment in China has been continuous during the whole period of the history of Europe, and has now merely gone stale in spots. The present need is not the complete making over of the fabric, but the catching up where it has lagged behind, and modification where it has no fitness for present conditions. Some of these modifications must be revolutionary in character. It is to the task of making the adaptations that the present nationalist movement is devoting itself, sometimes wisely and sometimes unwisely, but always dynamically.

The awakening China is embodied in the nationalist movement. It has had a constantly accelerated growth since the establishment of the republic in 1911. The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, which had ruled for two hundred and sixty years, was easier because the Manchus were always thought of as foreigners. The present nationalism started with a revolt against the domination of China by foreigners, and centered attention on the internal problems of the country. Its value in stimulating thinking and action as well as solidarity is greater than anything else could have been. Vigorous as it has been in its accusations against the West, its suggestion and its technique, except the boycott, are all taken from the West. The complications of the situation have multiplied problems which will require time for solution, and are likely to show apparent failures.

All other nationalist movements struggled many years, and often generations, before they secured even the semblance of sovereignty. The Jews, the Irish, and the Czechs have many leaders who have grown old in fighting for their

cause. Chinese nationalism is so recent in origin that no one has had time to grow old in its service. One obstacle to an immediate solution of problems is the youth of the leaders. Plato, in the *Republic*, said that philosophers and statesmen should be over fifty, and the experience of history has shown that this age is normally reached before authority is won or conceded. In the China of the past where the examination system of administrators called for great knowledge of the classics and where age received unusual respect, there must have been an overweighting of age as compared with the rulers of other countries. If we consider the age distribution of the rulers of old China as in the form of a pyramid, it must have bulged between the ages of fifty and eighty. When we look at the present situation, we find that the whole of that thirty years has been lopped off. In considering the problems of China, this fact must be remembered. President Eliot of Harvard used to urge such reduction of the time of the college course as would permit men to get established and become grandfathers by the time they were fifty-three because they would then be able to pass on to their grandchildren the *judgment* which only age can have, and which comes even in spite of limited education. There are now not five statesmen in China who have reached this age. There are two things peculiar about the present government of China — its youth and its foreign education. At the time this was written, the president, Chiang Kai Shek, was forty-two years old; the oldest member of the cabinet forty-eight, and the youngest thirty-seven. The average age was forty-three, or twelve years less than that of President Hoover, whom we thought about the right age for a first term. Chiang studied four years in Japan, and every other member of the cabinet studied in the United States. This is undoubtedly the youngest responsible government in the world; it leads the oldest nation and faces most difficult problems. Nowhere else could a case be found

where every member of the highest official group was educated abroad. When one government is overthrown it will be succeeded by exactly the same sort of leaders.

The judgment of grandfathers has for the time being been repudiated in China, and Ph.D.'s from America, mostly under middle age, are in the saddle. Their theories are perhaps as sound as the world affords, but difficult problems call for experience and judgment which, on the average, middle age has not attained. This leadership of youth makes stability impossible. It has an energy that age lacks; it can be reckless where age would hesitate, impatient where age is patient; but it cannot command the respect that is normally given to age even more in China than elsewhere, and it cannot have the judgment which comes only with age. The number from which these new leaders can possibly come is only a few thousands; thirty years will roll by and the numbers will increase rapidly, not only from the two thousand a year who are now going to America, but from the great number that are getting modern education in China.

The interesting question then will be whether China will turn back to her own cultural heritage, or, having won her way against the aggressions of the West, will embrace all that is Western. She will do both. Secure in the knowledge that there is a great past, she can for the time ignore it; the outcome will be something unique and essentially Chinese.

China will furnish a demonstration of the relative strength of material and cultural forces, and will show more clearly what are the limits of patterns that need to be modified. The political organization must change with the introduction of communication, transportation, and commerce, but the world has not yet discovered any ultimate political form and it may well be that China has many usable contributions to make. China has been a world in itself with local autonomy. Something equivalent to that must be found for the whole of human relations.

Likewise the family relationships of China must undergo change, but families in some form will remain to the end of human existence; it is not probable that the Soviet system will entirely supplant that of China.

Philosophy determines the outlook on life and strangely enough penetrates below both realism and technology. The validity of much of Plato, Aristotle, and Francis Bacon has not been shaken by later discoveries and political revolutions. China's characteristic philosophy will not be shaken. Confucius in details is inadequate for modern life, but his teachings have been so ingrained into Chinese life and have dealt so wisely with problems of human relations growing out of a crowded population that in a time when a shrunken world needs ethics as never before many of the Chinese applications of his philosophy will find themselves in harmony rather than in conflict with coming needs. It must not be forgotten that one-fourth of the human race when its momentum is attained will act more potently than it is acted upon. The modification of the automobile suggested above by Peffer ¹ indicates the type of influence that will be vastly more effective in social institutions which everywhere lack certainty of form. One cannot be prophetic about specific developments, but we must not judge change by the limited knowledge we now have of social laws. What will happen in the emergence of China will increase our knowledge of these laws.

Close to philosophy in the search for the more permanent and real elements of life is art. In China it is shown in manners and in craftsmanship. In carving, painting, drama, and literature its history is long and its forms unique and exquisite. It had its periods of rise and fall but its accumulations are enormous. They are the product of fine workmanship and constant incentive. Just now practical problems which militate against art are occupying attention, but the skill of artisans has not been lost and

¹ *China: the Collapse of a Civilization*. John Day, 1930.

popular opinion which puts a poet above a general still remains. The classical drama attracts crowds of villagers; painting and embroidery are still done. The American movie is now losing in popularity to Chinese movies; though Chinese architecture has had an American as its leading advocate, it is proving to be so adaptable to modern use that it will persist. In all national movements we find that the art products of the past furnish a motive and the continued creation a justification of self-respect and independence. The mere mass of art treasures puts the Chinese in a class by themselves in this field.

Two forces actively at work on China are the agitation of the minute handful on top and the mechanical and scientific innovations from the outside. Effective social movements never reach fulfillment, however, until they are driven from the bottom. By the time these two forces have penetrated to the bottom they will have been fundamentally modified. They will tear China loose from many of her moorings. It is always in the masses that traditions are preserved. The masses in China have not yet been touched by modernism and when they are aroused they will assert their strength clear to the top. Under the old conditions the peasants and the coolies had few contacts with the government except in the collections of taxes. They still have the same and little more. The radicalism of the students, which often for the moment burns fiercely, will frequently burn out and leave conservatives, but this flame will spread to the masses, keeping alive and accumulating power.

The Chinese are the only people in the world without a national inferiority complex. In Europe history has justified every nation in harboring fears because of which it overvalues its assets and conceals its liabilities. The Chinese have had a history of continuity which gives them confidence. In their first contacts with the West they were impressed by its power and progress and admitted their

own backwardness; but at the same time they have maintained a pride in the things that are Chinese. The national movement is increasing their confidence, and the present confusion reduces the prestige of the West. Although their nationalism shows psychopathic symptoms it lacks the one derived from a consciousness of inferiority.

The Chinese did not need to compensate by bragging like the Americans, who are young; or being sensitive like the Japanese, who are small and uncertain of their future; or being aggressive like the English, who live on an island. They admit their social backwardness and are depressed by it, but they do not need to make personal adjustments which lead either to excessive pride or to denial.

Another most dynamic fact, then, in China, is the frank recognition by those who are awakened that China has problems which may be solved in part by looking backward instead of forward. In other words China is facing the future with relatively little uncertainty about herself.

A Western student may or may not have some sense of social responsibility; no Chinese student, however selfish, can escape it. This means that the contribution of each person who is prepared to do something will be vastly greater than under the easier conditions of the West, where there are plenty of problems but not such pressing ones, and where the possibility of comparing them with better standards is lacking.

The most difficult problem in China is not her political system, for that can well wait for evolution and maturity, but it is the inevitable dislocation of human life which will come with the introduction of labor-saving devices and which will, for the time, throw millions out of work.

No Westerner can fail to be depressed by the tremendous waste of human energy in the labor of China, but he must not forget the tragedy that results when the old methods of production are dislocated. It brings in acute form what is called technological unemployment.

The world depression has given pause to those who have believed that production and more production was a way to the solution of social problems. China and India with almost half of the world's population are a warning indictment that human values must be taken into account. The blind resentment that the people express cannot find a solution, and there is no escape from some tragedy. The poverty of China cannot be reduced without the help of machines, but the method of their introduction cannot help stimulating the Communist movement whose foothold in China is more important than news dispatches would indicate.

In the fall of 1929 the 'rickshaw men in Peking had a concerted strike against the street cars which were competing with them. They smashed fifty cars. Twelve of their leaders were executed; but the problem was not solved. Unless there is leadership like that of Gandhi a strike against modern modern machinery is as futile as a strike against a flood or a drought.

Most of the transportation in China is done by the muscles of men. The lumber is made by handsaws. The writer was interested in watching one log upon which two men spent nearly a week. These same two men, with a portable sawmill, could have made the log into boards in fifteen minutes. Their skill, which is remarkable, will be useless in competition with steam, gasoline, or electricity. Household servants, without limit, are pleasant for those who have them, but they are a prostitution of human energy when they are partly ornamental and partly substitutes for labor-saving devices.

Strikes cannot prevent the coming of mechanical efficiency any more than Mrs. Partington could keep out the Atlantic Ocean with her broom. For some time the cheapness of labor will compete with the cost of capital, but in the long run capital will win. It will bring temporary tragedies, and government after government will fall because it cannot adequately deal with them.

When the next stage comes, however, we shall have released for constructive production a labor power of vast proportion. The great drawback of China is the lack of natural resources out of which to build up an industrial economy. The essential resources lie in Siberia to which Chinese will inevitably migrate, though in the meantime Lower Mongolia and Manchuria offer sufficient opportunities both in space and resources. What has happened in Manchuria where nearly thirty millions have gone in the last twenty-five years will happen in Siberia. There are no natural boundaries to prevent it; the claim of Russia has only a very brief historical basis; and the land is now almost unpopulated. China has economic potency but almost insuperable obstacles to be passed before it can be effective. The obstacles, however, cannot be avoided, and, in the long run, will be surmounted.

In spite of crushing poverty, with no prospect that it can ever be more than relatively reduced, the Chinese are perhaps the happiest people in the world. In the West and in modernism it has been assumed that the end of civilization has been the accumulation and distribution of material things. The civilizations of China and India have persisted and produced much of the finest values in the human heritage under conditions of extreme deprivation of these material things, and it may be that the millions of these two countries will by the very force of their numbers and the power of their culture compel the world to revalue its objectives. The simple life, shorn of the extremes of hardship through modern instruments, may be the richer life. Oriental politeness, which has been bred in the close intimacy of crowded life and nurtured on a philosophy, may smooth some of the rough places brought from the individualism and competition of the Western peoples who have for the moment set their stamp upon the world.

The social and mechanical achievements of the outside

world will radically modify but not destroy the cultural heritage of China. There are both ideal values and ingrained habits that neither politics nor machines can overthrow.

At present there are revolutions directed against both foreign control and internal organization. Exploitation has nurtured nationalism. Poverty and injustice are the fuel of Communism. Inexperience and youth are inadequate for political efficiency. The family system and provincialism delay national integration. Nevertheless through the myriad problems that are pressing so heavily there runs a feeling of confidence and responsibility that is beginning to direct the drift.

In reply to those who may claim that Chinese characteristics must yield to the force of the times we need only point out the Jews whose scattered numbers have been subject to all the influences of modern life, but who, whether conformists, scientists, capitalists, revolutionaries, or Communists, have been inspired and constrained by their social and spiritual heritage. There is much more power in the concentrated and older habits and philosophy of the Chinese whose characteristics have less in common with the West than the Jews had with Europe.

It is, then, a tenable expectation that in a reorganizing world the Chinese will contribute their ancient heritages to which will have been assimilated modern techniques, and that with them both China will spring into a leading rôle in human affairs.

Chapter XI

AROUND THE CORNER OF ASIA

THE PHILIPPINES, INDO-CHINA, SIAM, AND NEIGHBORS

Between China and India live peoples who share in the blood and culture of both, but who have also had long cultures of their own. The Philippines, the islands of Java and Sumatra, the Malay peninsula, Indo-China, and Siam are all in the throes of race consciousness, revolution, and nationalism.

The bubble of white superiority has burst before the eyes of the yellow and the brown races. The American movies, the War, and post-war blundering have all contributed to the disillusionment of both these races and they are now equally determined to rid themselves of its dominance.

On one side of the struggle are the United States, France, Great Britain, and Holland, who have been profitably exploiting and at the same time proclaiming the "good" of the natives as a justification of their continued administration. The popularity of the slogan "The white man's burden" came when his right to bear it began to be questioned.

On the other side are the peoples who are caught in the spirit of the movements that are rushing on at top speed in China and India where disillusionment as to the claim of white destiny first appeared. These peoples, relatively small in numbers but old in tradition, were in an eddy when the modern period hit them. Even in these distant places, over and above the resistance to immediate rulers, the United States, through its missionaries, its trade, its education of foreign students, as well as through its own

story of revolution and democracy has had a constant influence on all struggles for independence and self-respect. Only recently, by its possession of the Philippines, has it been tarred with the brush of imperialism.

The United States, like Japan, entered the field of conquest after ideals had begun to change from the days when the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French needed no excuse for appropriating all they could get. It was lacking in administrative experience, but undoubtedly was actuated by a certain honesty of purpose to prepare the Filipinos for independence at the earliest possible moment, and felt that the benevolence of its economic system would be mutually advantageous.

Education in the American form was introduced immediately and with great enthusiasm, under the conviction that it would hasten the time when the Islands would "be ready for self-government." The inherent difficulty arises from the lack of objective standards to determine when the degree of readiness is reached. As time has gone on, the issue has been complicated by the fact that race prejudice in the United States toward the Negro has conditioned attitudes toward the Filipino, thus reducing confidence in his capacity for self-government, and by the fact that the opportunities for business investments in the Islands offered some advantage to Americans. Also there came a thrill of satisfaction because ruling colonial possessions put America in the class with other great powers.

Now that sugar interests are discovering that Philippine competition is disadvantageous, new arguments have appeared for granting independence. Self-interest and idealism will combine in a gesture of magnanimity and freedom will be granted, but it will arrive at the same time that it is being secured elsewhere by the irresistible struggle of dominated peoples throughout the world.

In spite of inexperience and changing policies, there is no question but that the United States has made a con-

sistent effort to promote the advantages of the Filipinos, and has often been surprised and hurt at the appearance of dissatisfaction and revolt among them. Few Americans are aware of the fact that there had been an almost continuous struggle against the Spanish for four hundred years with frequent major revolutions, and that they had almost succeeded in throwing off the yoke just before America appeared on the scene and "freed" them in 1898.

Hundreds of books have been written about the Philippines and we are now learning that they are not so primitive as we had thought but that their history is a long and rich one. They are geographically, tribally, linguistically, and religiously divided. One of the major contributions America has made to their history is to accelerate the national consciousness and thus prepare for a new unity.

In the Philippines as in most of the other areas considered in this chapter, the Chinese have long been constituent elements, and promise to be of rapidly increasing importance. Archeological discoveries show that there has been trade between the Philippines and China over a very long period, and we know that Chinese blood is found in some of the leading Filipino nationalists. American exclusion laws cannot keep the Chinese out, for the coast is very long and the distance from China is short. Already both retail and wholesale trade in the Islands is in the hands of the Chinese, and the Filipinos feel that their inevitable future belongs with China rather than with America.

The ability of the Filipinos has been demonstrated. Starting thirty years ago without modern background they have, thanks to the policies of the United States, a larger share in the management of their own affairs than the Indians have secured in a hundred and fifty years. The University of the Philippines, founded by Americans, is now entirely in the hands of Filipinos. Although they have national leaders coming from the pre-American conflict, their modern educated group is of exactly the same

age as that of China, and is equally dominated by nationalistic enthusiasm. The Philippines show that once the national aspirations have started it makes no difference whether the alien rule be harsh or benevolent. From the Korean point of view the treatment of the Filipinos is considerate, but the manifestations of national activity differ not at all.

The complaint that is usually directed against nationalists everywhere is constantly heard in the Philippines, namely, that they are so completely absorbed in their revolt that they do not give attention to solving their internal problems. The reply to this is that nationalism is always psychopathic and cannot be cured by the application of force and no conclusion can be drawn as to fitness for self-government until it is accompanied by responsibility. In the Philippines as elsewhere a dominated people does not show gratitude to its rulers but appropriates all that it can absorb. As in China, the Western methods of education and faith in its objectives are accepted wholesale and then turned against those from whom they came.

The lack of a common language is a serious difficulty. Formerly Spanish was the official language and Spanish influence is widespread, but since the American occupation English has been promoted by a vast educational program. Now the older leaders use Spanish but the younger ones do not know it at all. The vast majority of the people know only their local dialect. As in all other groups fired by nationalism, serious attention is being given to the question of a common language.

Outside the two millions of Moslems in the southern and western parts of the Islands, the Spanish had converted a large part of the population to Christianity. This gives one element of common background to the diverse tribes, however superficial their Christian understanding may have been. The use of Spanish over the whole area and the present spread of English furnish a medium through which

common purposes can be expressed while awaiting the development of a native language. As was to be expected, there is now under national consciousness a sharp turning away from the religion of the conqueror.

The Philippines have large natural resources which have attracted the envious eyes of American business. When left to themselves the Filipinos may be slow to develop them, but what is needed in the world first is not the further immediate exploitation of nature but the liquidation of the causes of conflict. It is probable that the immediate attainment of sovereignty among the Asiatic peoples will not, as they confidently expect, allay the antagonism to their color, but in the long run this will put the handicap on the white rather than on the colored side. The United States is destined by its geographical position as well as by its historical development to have the closest relation with the colored races of Asia; unfortunately it is handicapped by its deep-seated race prejudices. If it delays in making adjustments which scientific facts and political necessity demand it will be to its own great loss.

There are evidences of ancient and long-continued cultural interchanges between the Philippines and Indo-China on the mainland. For at least five thousand years art and organized society have been continuous in both places. As has already been said, the French took Indo-China as their part of the booty when in 1860 the Western powers were making an uncontrolled scramble for possessions and privileges in eastern Asia. The whole area is divided into five parts corresponding to historic and cultural divisions. Cochin-China, in which the French-made city of Saigon is situated, is ruled directly by the French; then there are the four nominal kingdoms of the Tonkinese, the Annamites, the Laos, and the Cambodians, each with a king whom the Chinese describe as "a bird in a golden cage." These four differ among themselves in dialect and customs. The Tonkinese in the north are not easily distinguished from the

Chinese, but the masses of the population to the south and west are racially different. The total population is about twenty million natives and thirty-five thousand French.

The French colonial practices differ from those of the English, Japanese, and Americans. The French do not make the personal display of superiority which is so characteristic of the English, whose control over their subjects can largely be maintained without show of force, because they never overstep the barrier of caste which they have built around themselves and therefore can permit a large apparent degree of freedom while still holding their position. The French raise no impassable barriers of race. They mingle freely with their subjects of whatever race, and often marry with them, but they rule by a constant display of military force. One English policeman without weapons has more self-assurance and influence in a mob than a battalion of French soldiers. The power of Great Britain is invisible but that of France is kept obvious. The Japanese and the Americans are new and crude in the business. The Japanese have only the experience with Korea. They have shown themselves efficient and tactless. Americans in the Philippines have many of the qualities of the English but are uncertain of their aims and consequently vacillating in their methods.

In Indo-China, besides the French only the Chinese have any direct influence. Indirectly, however, the national movements elsewhere are strong forces. The independence of the Philippines or of India will make not only Indo-China but all other subject peoples difficult to hold. Shortly after the beginning of Gandhi's campaign in India, there was a non-violent demonstration in Saigon. Students who go to Paris, like those who go from other countries to England and the United States, become leaders in the nationalist movement. The French secret service, which is most efficient, tries to keep the lid down tight, but agitation goes on and outbreaks have begun to be frequent.

The French have prohibitive tariffs on imports from countries other than France. Therefore the natives think that French goods are inferior to those they might get elsewhere. The government has a monopoly of mines and some other things, but practically all the important business is in the hands of the Chinese. These Chinese are filled with the spirit of the movement at home, and one may see the pictures of Sun Yat-sen conspicuously displayed in the Chinese city adjoining Saigon. How much leadership or help may come directly from the Chinese is difficult to estimate, but they are generally in sympathy with the opposition to French control. The contribution of the French to the awakening and development of Indo-China is very significant. The good roads, archeological discoveries, and education are all working toward the elimination of the French power by making the people more compact, by bringing back to them their forgotten history, and by furnishing them tools of knowledge.

It was while motoring over the four hundred miles of excellent road from Saigon to Angkor, passing *écoles élémentaires*, seeing native villages springing up along the road, and hearing the Annamite chauffeur in bad French express his animosity to the government, that the idea of the "Cosmic Good," discussed in the Introduction, came to the author. Compared to China and India the country is sparsely populated. There was a collapse in its civilization and a loss of the monuments and records of history, but there is an abundant folklore which finds its basis in the archeological discoveries that the French are making. Without the French the natives might have slept indefinitely but now they will some day soon assert themselves and build on what the French have given them.

There are many relics of an ancient culture in Indo-China, and the ruins of Angkor stand as an exhibit of recent power and ability. Angkor belongs to the past of the people who now live in Cambodia. It is a place which

only superlatives can describe, and the people are vaguely aware that it is their own heritage. Angkor is incredible for two reasons: here in the jungle are ruins both stupendous and magnificent, in many ways surpassing those existing anywhere else in the world, and yet for centuries completely unknown, and, when discovered, a baffling mystery. The archeologists, however, have an uncanny way of adding two and two and getting a hundred. They translate a little Sanscrit on a wall, compare architecture in Java, find a letter in China, dig out another ruin, and unravel a mystery.

It was immediately obvious when the ruins were accidentally discovered, in 1860, that they were the product of a highly developed and rich civilization; further discoveries have shown that it was of longer duration and wider extent than anyone at first thought. The greatest mystery was that no one knew about it, though it was young as ruins go. The Great Wall of China was built twenty-one hundred years ago, but Angkor was in its glory only eight hundred years ago. Twenty years ago little could be read about it, but now much has been written. By far the best things are still in French, for the French archeologists have been both intelligent and indefatigable.

Here in the jungle, covering an area several miles square, are distributed massive stone ruins, still largely erect, covered with miles of carving in low relief, many perfectly preserved. Crowning it all is the great temple, Angkor-Wat. It is the newest structure, having been built about two hundred years before Columbus discovered America.

Since a high culture was once developed there, the question arises: can it happen again? Since we happen to live in the era when the temperate zone has had its first innings, we have been nurtured on the idea that enlightened civilizations are limited to cool climates. This is but another of the rationalizations of history. We have admitted that Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece had great cultures, but

we gleefully think that they are dead and we are alive; but we have not been alive very long. Angkor was flourishing at the time of King Alfred of England. We overestimate English history because we are its inheritors, but it represents a very crude life until a few hundred years ago. Its higher culture has not yet been as long as that of Angkor, and already there are signs that its most glorious day is not in the future. Such eminence as England attained was not due to the initiative and energy of the native stock, but to the stimulus that came from the Saxons and Normans and the period of expansion and aggression which gave form to national life. It is evident that a people will go to sleep unless it has some sort of stimulus which comes from conflict, competition, or oppression.

History repeats itself because the psychological processes are similar. Cultures without outside stimulations never come to much fruit, and those that ripen fall into decay. An apparent exception to this rule is China, where internal conditions have furnished the stimulations up to the present era. Another generalization which seems fairly clear is that the æsthetic culmination comes just before the fall. This was true of Egypt, Babylon, Greece, and Angkor. Putting the above conjectures together, the conclusion is that Angkor may teach sociological processes as well as archeological facts. It is near enough the present, while belonging to the past, to make observation possible. As though it were a dream in their sleep, the Cambodians are claiming their relation to the Khmers of the past. The French have come with their commercial enterprise, governmental authority, and archeological interest. All of these are creating, in the Cambodians and the other natives of Indo-China, a feeling of restlessness and restraint which will probably lead to a full awakening. Without the French they might never have discovered themselves. An increasing hatred of the French will turn them back to a consideration of their own ability and former preëminence.

There is no reason why a high culture may not again develop in a warm climate. Whether it will last as long as those in temperate and cold climates, no one knows. Since it is easier to live in a warm climate and there is an easier surplus over needs it is possible that our recent theory about the necessity of the stimulus of cold to drive people to the cultivation of the civilized arts is all wrong. Angkor was possible because of the labor of slaves. Now capital and machinery have given us vastly more than could be secured by slavery. Science, with sanitation and control of temperature, has revolutionized the possibility of living conditions in the tropics, so that starting with the natural advantage of rich resources it is conceivable that the future center of enlightenment will return to the places from which it started.

Siam somehow escaped foreign exploitation. It has been until very recently an independent absolute monarchy — the last one in the world. It was largely by accident that it did not fall a prey to imperialism as did the kingdoms of Indo-China. While it suffered for a time from the imposition of concessions by the powers, these concessions have now been given up and we have an example of a self-respecting people developing under the old institution of absolutism and modernizing themselves with great rapidity. Its present and its recent past are more distinctive than its future is likely to be. It does, however, show the world that native people can rule themselves, though not according to Western rules.

The economic ability of the Chinese immigrants is rapidly putting them in possession of the resources of Siam. The government is fearful of the results but shows no promise of ability to compete with the Chinese. Approximately half of the population of Bangkok is Chinese; for some time past the Chinese immigration has been excessive. There are plans for an immigration restriction law to stop the influx but it will not avail much, even though the

limitation were absolute. The Siamese admit that the Chinese already have a strangle hold economically. They own every rice factory in Siam. The Siamese still own and till the land, but the Chinese are beginning to buy it.

The Siamese get on well personally with the Chinese and like to have the two peoples intermarry, but in the recent immigration the Chinese have been bringing their women and the amount of intermarriage has greatly decreased. The Chinese in Siam share in the Chinese national consciousness, and are establishing schools for themselves. They have many cultural advantages; as one Siamese said, they drink only tea while the Siamese drink the dirty water of the canals and die of cholera. The taxes of Siam are very low, and the fear is that some time the government may try to tax the Chinese more than they will stand and thus cause the Chinese to take over the government.

The kingdom of Siam strikes one as a kingdom of a fairy book, where everyone is happy under a good king. At the time of fairy stories all the kings were absolute and the bad ones could and did say "Off with his head," but the good ones were considerate and thought first of their people. Siam is the story of a good king with one marked difference, however. Siam was until the other day an absolutism in the modern age, where it occupied a unique position. Its standards of comparison were not courts of the same sort but progressive democracies; Siam is exposed to the public opinion of the world, and is trying to be worthy of comparison. It made its transition to a constitutional monarchy without the violence with which history is familiar. Even under absolutism it was not possible for a monarch to be very bad, for the pride and responsibility of the whole royal family exercised their restraining influence. One cannot give too much credit to the grandfather of the present king, who was a Buddhist monk until he was forty-eight, and to the great king his son, father of the present king, who set out to make Siam modern.

It is an interesting experiment, but there is more than a feeling of pessimism about its future. "A sinking ship" is the way one prince spoke of it, and many others feel the same way.

The author told the university students that unless there were ten thousand students in the university in twenty-five years, Siamese culture was doomed. Now there is only a two-year premedical and pre-engineering course in the university, and the number of students, together with those of the medical and engineering schools, makes a total of only two or three hundred who might be called university students out of a population of ten million, and even among these only a small number are well prepared. If you compare this with the seven thousand in the University of the Philippines, the tens of thousands in China and the over-filled universities of Europe, Siam is far behind; the fifty or a hundred who go to Europe or America are insignificant, especially as they are limited to the highest class. From a cosmic point of view, something very different is going on in Siam from that which is taking place in Indo-China. There the natives under an alien rule are being aroused, while in Siam the natives possess the political power but are daily losing economic power and lack confidence in themselves. When the Cambodians come back the Siamese will have declined, perhaps just because the king of Cambodia is now a puppet and the king of Siam all-powerful.

The Siamese themselves came as immigrants in somewhat the same way as the Chinese are now doing, probably mostly from south central China, although there is one theory that they came from Tibet, and are of the same stock as the Hungarians and Finns. It is they who conquered the Khmers of Angkor and copied their art. Now, like the Cambodians, they are most gentle and unwarlike. Culturally, there is little hope for the Siamese, but cosmically the territory of Siam will be interesting to watch.

In the Malay peninsula the English have established themselves in apparent security. The number of natives is small and they are without political traditions comparable to those found among the other peoples we have been considering. They also are now unhappy under alien control. After the political and economic power of England has been lost in the larger areas of China and India there is little hope that anything more than small vestiges can be retained in this extreme portion of Asia. It is inevitable that the commercial roots that the Chinese have put down will be so strong that the heritage will for the time pass to them. The city of Penang which was founded by the English only a hundred years ago is said to have a larger proportion of millionaires than any other city in the world, and these millionaires are Chinese, who control rubber, sugar, and trade.

The Chinese also have a slight foothold in the Dutch East Indies, Sumatra, and Java, and a slighter one in British India, though they constitute an element in the population of Burma. They are likely to be met in these places by large masses of old peoples who will resist them. The Chinese success in recovering their own country and resisting the prestige of the white race will have its repercussions among the smaller peoples who are beginning to feel the same resentment.

The Dutch have ruled their possessions with iron-handed efficiency, but without the caste superiority which the English practice with deliberation. Java is the most intensively populated area in the world, and has been made efficiently productive. Some of the old rulers have been retained, but the Dutch have complete control. They have introduced widespread education and admit natives both full-blooded and mixed into the administration of government. The beginnings of revolt are already apparent, and what happens in the rest of Asia will be followed there.

In all this corner of Asia European germs of social and

economic life have been planted and the necessities of international trade made basic for the continuance of life. Half the products of Sumatra have been sent to the United States. This means that, however much the peoples may live their own traditional lives, the barriers of isolation have been broken down and the ultimate cosmopolitan relationships made inevitable.

From this time forth the faces of the people on the "Corner" will turn to China and to India. In the long past and over great periods of time the infiltration of blood and institutions from these countries gave form to their lives. Now quickly in the moving events of the present they will cast their lots with their neighbors, revived by the mechanical and psychological incentives that have been given them by the alien nations of Europe.

Chapter XII

THE SEARCHING OF THE SPIRIT — INDIA

Just as Russia is attracting attention both for her idealism and her realism, so also India is now holding the imagination and interest of the world for her idealism and her realism. Though India's idealism is of a totally different sort from that of Communism, its attack on contemporary political and economic organization has much in common with Russia, in spite of the great difference in the proposed programs.

There is a universal awareness of the epoch-making significance of the Indian revolution, not only because it has been a revolution involving the largest number of people of any revolution in human history, but also because its technique and ultimate consequences may modify the course both of empire and religion far outside the boundaries of India.

Although interest has been focussed on the spectacular events of changing political systems, and on the picturesque personality of Gandhi, the facts of real importance are the form and the momentum which underlie Indian culture, and which must be comprehended in order to understand the power of Gandhi and the possibilities of India.

The admonition is often given that one must not make generalizations about India, because there is so much of which the reverse is also found, and the forms of social life offer almost infinite variety. This admonition is valid if one looks only at the surface. Below the surface, however, there is a unity and simplicity which may be grasped if one remembers that religion has always been the dom-

inant force in the lives of Indians. It has shaped and will continue to shape the course of Indian history.

In outward appearance the complications and variations of Indian life are so difficult that to consider them alone would be like counting the waves and the ripples on the water in the hope of understanding the ocean. There is the same deep water underlying Indian culture, which, through the ages, has been as little affected by invasions and storms and bizarre sectarian offshoots on the surface as are the deep waters of the sea by the winds or the passage of ships. India is as deep as an ocean and its substance as full of consistency. Its salt is the universal struggle of man for religion. When it is extracted and refined no other source of supply in the world can equal it.

There are several comparable parallels between India and China and many marked differences. In age, numbers, and continuity, China and India stand unique in the societies of man.

Although mist clouds the beginnings in India even more than in China, the beginnings of the two are practically contemporary; each people has had five or six thousand years available for the continuous development of essential characteristic patterns. The recent discovery of a buried city puts Indian history back farther than anyone had suspected and shows that the social organization of the time must have been highly developed.

India is sometimes called a subcontinent, thrust off as it is from the main body of Asia; its area is almost equal to that of Europe. Its population of 350,000,000 is also comparable with the 375,000,000 of Europe outside of Russia. This gives it a much smaller area than that of the Soviet Union but with approximately twice the population. The disunity of India, even though it were as great as its critics claim, is less than that of Europe, which is divided into twenty-seven sovereign nations using forty different languages. Europe is nominally Christian, but

the church has three major divisions and several subdivisions with traditional conflict between sects and a continuous history of wars between nations.

While the Chinese are preëminently of common though varied and assimilated stock, the Indians show traces of many stocks, some of which retain relative purity, while others are largely absorbed. Notwithstanding the biological differentiations which at the beginning undoubtedly were accompanied by differences in institutions and culture patterns, they have now so completely merged that India is as much a unit as is China, though the unity arises from totally different sources.

India offers an historical example of the well-advanced process of assimilation of different stocks in which the United States is just at the beginning. What the original stock was is as unimportant in the pattern set as the American Indian has been in the cultural development of America. It is an open question whether the Dravidians, who were on the ground when the Aryans overran it with a dominance like that of the Anglo-Saxons in America, were themselves aborigines. They were of dark color and have given a darker shade to the Aryans in spite of caste division which prevented intermarriage. Although the caste system tended to prevent rapid biological assimilation by laying religious inhibitions against intermarriage outside homogeneous groups and thus without doubt greatly prolonging the period of amalgamation, nevertheless much mixing has taken place. The significant thing, however, is that whether the stock of a region is Dravidian, Mongoloid, Semitic, or Aryan, the only cultural differences are local variations. High and low spots cannot be absolutely assigned to racial stocks, for they seem to be scattered indiscriminately throughout India. In America not over a third of the population is of Anglo-Saxon stock, but Anglo-Saxon institutions make American culture; in the same way Hindu culture covers India.

Although Dravidian elements are found in widely separated areas, actually the southern peninsula (Madras) is more largely inhabited by the Dravidian stock. However, centuries of contact — social, marital, and economic — have resulted in the assimilation by the Dravidians of Aryan culture patterns, and in the adoption of institutions characteristic of Aryan social organization, such as the Vedic religion and the caste system. They accepted the fourfold caste divisions and created the “fifth” or “untouchable” group. They outdid their model by degrading “untouchables” to “unapproachables,” the sight of whom is considered polluting. This is similar to the devotion of central European immigrants in America to the Anglo-Saxon models.

In America, Anglo-Saxon inheritance appears most clearly in democratic outlook and legal system, while in India the Hindu contribution appears in the universal religious interest which has emphasized and worked out a way of life. There is no aspect of life which has not been dealt with by religion. To be sure there are regional variations and a multiplicity of Gods, but they are variations from a common type, and trace back to one God. The unity into which the Indians have been molded is comparable in its solidifying possibilities to that into which, in a sense, the Chinese were born.

Again, like China, India has had no real interest in militarism, in spite of many internal wars. After the various invaders had taken possession of India, they settled down contentedly and never showed any further interest in wars of aggression. In China it is an ethical code that makes the attitude against war; in India it is religious practice. It is true that there is a military class in India and there have been many warrior Emperors. The greatest of these was Asoka, who reigned in the third century B.C. and ruled all of India. He was a Buddhist who after an invasion “had been so deeply impressed by the horrors of warfare

that he had given up the desire for conquest and devoted himself to conquest by 'religion.' What the religion was is explained in his edicts. It is purely ethical, independent alike of theology and ritual, and is the code of morals as laid down in the Buddhist sacred books for laymen. 'If a man's fame,' says Koppen, 'can be measured by the number of hearts who revere his memory, by the number of lips who have mentioned and still mention him with honor, Asoka is more famous than Charlemagne or Caesar.'" ¹

We thus have two groups of people, one constituting nearly a fourth and the other nearly a fifth of the total population of the world, whose whole historical development has been in opposition to the military emphasis which has covered most of the rest of the world.

Another similarity between India and China is the widespread condition of poverty and crowded population and resignation to the lot which these conditions bring. The philosophy of China led to ethics without mysticism; that of India led to religion with an emphasis on the mystical. Although the formal codes of ethics in India are not dominant, the right way to live is always interwoven with the search for the meaning of life, or the fulfillment of the meaning of life that a mystical faith had given. In the solving of practical problems, probably China is better prepared than India. India is also aware of these problems, in fact is seriously concerned, but though less efficient she approaches them with a calmer faith than China does.

Whole libraries have been written about Indian philosophy and religion, so much that one sympathetic Englishman thinks it will be a thousand years before the outside world can translate and assimilate what India already knows. To make any generalizations, then, about India, one must overlook the variations at the top, give up hope

¹ Article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

of mastering the details of theology, and try to see the broad sweep of the universal concentration on religion.

To human beings everywhere the question constantly recurs: What is life for? Both individuals and whole cultures follow will-o'-the-wisps that they think will give the answer; off and on, there are those who suggest that the reason for life is some intangible objective that can be comprehended only in terms of spiritual value. This has been India's special field. The Western mechanistic interpretation of life is certainly one element in the explanation, and for a time it seemed as though it would gain sway as the only method of approaching the problem. It is so simple, however, that it lacks adequacy to deal with many human experiences, with the result that there has sprung into existence in America a multitude of cults that aim to meet a demand that mechanism does not satisfy. We even have an extraordinary growth of the popularity of astrology and clairvoyancy, as well as of many bizarre sects. These Western attempts at somewhat surreptitious supplementations of scientific explanations of the universe lack the long experience and historical perspective that the Orient furnishes and the West is now beginning to realize the limitations of its findings for satisfying the wide range of human possibilities.

Although polytheistic cults have multiplied in India, at the bottom of Hinduism there is only one God, whose supremacy runs complete through life. Each new cult generally began with a profound philosophy, which, of course, could not be understood in its intricacies by the illiterate masses whom it converted. In many cases the founder or some principle which he emphasized was deified, with the result that unessentials often became magnified as central values. In spite of all that is absurd and often repugnant in the excrescences from the main stem there is running through them all much that expresses the character of the culture or "the soul of the people." Although Buddhism

spread to far distant parts of Asia, it has virtually disappeared from India because Buddha was merely a reinterpreter of things already implied in Hinduism. Much of his teaching was absorbed, but from the Hindu point of view he must be considered not an originator but a "purifier"—not even a "protestant."

One of the central elements in Hindu religion throughout the ages has been the search for the attainment of ultimate values through self-denial and the renunciation of wants.

We can assume a natural explanation of the origin of this tendency. The tropical climate, the jungle, and dense population made life hard and short, so the emphasis on the virtues advantageous under these handicaps received religious sanction. Asceticism also has its constructive side both morally and socially. Ascetics have contributed much that is of permanent worth in leadership and in ideals. Of course occasional individuals, East and West, have always reacted against the coercive codes of their cultures. There are self-seeking Indians, and mystical Westerners, but these exceptions do not change the outlines of the picture. In spite of its practical efficiency, the West has enough mystical background in Christianity and enough feeling of the futility of material objectives to catch a glimpse, for example, of the validity of Gandhi's methods and purposes, but the significant fact is that it takes no effort for an Indian to understand them. It is the pattern of life that Indians are used to. It makes no difference whether they be illiterate peasants or intellectuals, nor how much they may differ as to details, Gandhi's method to them is a normal method.

Since the prime goal of Indian endeavor has been the search for the ultimate and the absolute, it has been inevitable that there should grow up superficial disunities. A mystical value cannot be proved on the spot, however vigorously the discovery of the ultimate truth may be

claimed by any individual. Unity is only possible when its object is near and obvious, like empire, or power, or efficiency. The subjective character of these conflicting definitions of truth makes it impossible for conclusions to be found at once that will be acceptable to everyone. The present problems laid upon the Indians seem tragic in their immensity and their difficulty, but one does not need to be sorry for them. Travail of soul and pain of body are so interwoven with their religious beliefs and so inescapable in their political and economic life that they may even acquire strength where others would succumb. What if a century or two is needed for the next step ahead! In their history of six thousand years there have been long alternating periods of dark failure and brilliant success, so that another dark and difficult period cannot be so overwhelming as it would seem to more youthful peoples who are now solicitous only as to whether India can *quickly* solve her practical problems. A Westerner looking at the complicated extravagances of dogma and ritual might well conclude that they must all be abandoned before progress can come. India knows better, for these things are but the surface storms of the deep ocean of striving to find an answer to the eternal question of life. Modernism and enlightenment will modify and gradually eliminate much that is untenable, but the Indians will continue in their laboratory work with a momentum of which the unstable West knows nothing.

The influence of the Indian contribution to the world is not going to spread itself into the West by having Westerners become devotees of Hindu cults, nor by having society women become patronesses of Indian swamis. It will be the gradual response of the West to whatever is universal in the principles that India has clarified by experience and analysis. The attention which has been focussed on India by recent events will greatly accelerate the effort to understand the more or less mysterious power

which has been made manifest in India. On the other side, the influence of Westernism on India has been revolutionary. This has been exercised through contact with science, through communication, and through the recent awakening which the political and economic situation has brought. Modern ideas are penetrating the universities and many students are rejecting religion; but this revolt has not penetrated to the masses. The students are reacting against traditional religion as they are doing everywhere in the world, not only because so much of it contradicts the scientific conclusions at which they are arriving, but also because the Hindu religion is so cluttered up with irrational inhibitions that antagonize their emancipated minds. Neither basic habits nor fundamental principles are touched by these defections. These irrationalities, moreover, have been attacked by many reformers within the religious fold. They discovered that all of the things which were so obnoxious had crept in gradually and insidiously during the ages. The result was that rigorous religious reform movements were started which, among other things, deny the vicious elements in the caste system, and the limitations that are put upon women. Tagore and Gandhi are the contemporary leaders in this movement, but there were many before them who prepared the ground, without going so far. The Arya Samaj is a protestant Hindu body which insists that the most liberal ideas fitted for the modern world were laid down in the ancient Vedas. They are fundamentalists, while the Brahmo Samaj with greater tolerance may perhaps be called ultra-modernist. These intellectualist forces, however, could not expect to extend their influence very far except during a long period of time.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to offer the content of Indian religion and philosophy. That would take a whole library, and a lifetime of initiation into the spirit and practices which make the atmosphere of India. What

we are trying to see is the social force of Indian religion and philosophy, both within India and by seepage to the outside, and to get just a hint of the permanence of their meaning for the future. Both ancient books by Indians and contemporary books by Indians and foreigners record the facts.

The power of this religious philosophy is demonstrated by the reaction of the Indians to outside influence which it has either absorbed or rejected, and by the success of its peaceful methods of transmuting the people among whom the Indians have settled. Indo-China, the Malay peninsula, Java, Ceylon, and other places came under the influence of the Hindus culturally rather than politically. Colonists and not conquerors went to settle. They went as far east as the Philippines and Japan, and as far west as the east coast of Africa, and transplanted Hindu culture wherever they settled. More recently Hindu culture has gone to South Africa; we cannot foresee what its result there will be, but we may be sure that it will be important. The presumption is that these two characteristics of Indian culture (to absorb or reject alien cultures) will run in the future true to their form in the past; namely, that newcomers to India will be absorbed and made Indian, and Hindu influence will reach out into the world through acculturation without political involvement. In both of these characteristics we have a close parallel to China.

Long before the period of comparatively recent expansion, probably before the people who were to become Hindus left Mesopotamia, they had a decided influence on the groups who migrated westward. The history of this period is shrouded in darkness. No one knows the historical events which started the migration but the philologists may sometime show how the other Aryan groups were influenced by the same basic religion and philosophy which developed into Hinduism. For instance, we shall

need much research before we can be sure of the early influence of Hindu religion on Judaism. The fact that Abraham came from the head of the Persian Gulf makes it possible that he found his monotheistic idea in Hindu sources. This is perhaps an untenable hypothesis, but there is much discussed evidence of the Indian influence, especially through Buddhism, upon the founders of Christianity.

Instead of being coerced by one philosophy or set of ideas as in China, the mystical basis of intellectual activity made it possible to carry the formulation of dogma in a great variety of directions. This had two very important results: first, it gave the world a unique example of tolerance, and second, it produced a body of psychological experimentation in religious practice that could not have been secured by any other means.

At first sight India is a country of inevitable and all-pervading religious conflict, but the reverse is actually the case. Divisions among theological interpretations began so early that the *modus vivendi* of accepting a divergent sect as an equal became a matter of course. Along with the theological divisions went social integrations, which, however irrational from any other point of view than the normal result of their genesis, have lasted long enough to illustrate the workings of social adjustment.

While China has neither class nor caste, but has a unique family system, India has organized its political, economic, social, and family life on the basis of caste. In origin the castes were functional and for the most part hereditary, but since they were not primarily economic or political, there have probably been fewer heartburnings on account of class than in countries of democratic pretensions where classes possess power rather than function.

The four functional caste groups correspond to the social divisions in China: the first, teaching and preaching, which made the priest caste; the second, administration

and protection (military); third, agriculture and commerce; fourth, service and manual labor. These functions do not carry with them economic rewards and never result in economic classes.

As in China, the scholar is put at the top, but since the caste was hereditary and had religious functions, and because there was no examination system in India as in China, the prestige of the Brahmin often suffered, though it succeeded in maintaining itself because of the religious sanction in the caste system. Neither capitalism nor Communism offers an adequate solution to the functional problem. Capitalism provides for the attainment of functional advantages, and Communism puts the economic value of activity into the supreme place. Both will have disturbing influences on the caste system. Whatever its weaknesses and injustices the caste system is a strong form of social organization, and is one of the agencies by which an unusual degree of tolerance was developed, for the castes were composed of peoples who lived side by side in exclusiveness and harmony, each with its own laws and customs.

Hinduism, which is the basic religion that gave the set to social institutions as well as to underlying ecclesiastical division, now permeates all of these social institutions and must be accepted as more authoritative than the formal statements, doctrines, and codes of the various sects which often seem completely antagonistic to one another. Twenty-five hundred years ago the Jains and the Buddhists set themselves up with variant interpretations, under the leadership of such dominant personalities that they amounted almost to new religions; but the founders were thoroughly impregnated with Hinduism, and, though their zeal as reformers was great and Buddhism had many followers in India for many centuries, it was eventually in part reabsorbed and in part rejected. The Buddhist university at Nalanda, founded in the fifth century and continuing

until the twelfth, had at one time ten thousand students and was an agency for the spread of Buddhism "from Ceylon to Siberia and from Egypt to China." The Jains never attained such a following, and are even more strict in their control over conduct than Buddhists, but have nevertheless held their own in India. Jain temples are found in many places with all the independence and dignity of Hindu temples. The remarkable thing is that people feel that whether one follows Hindu, Buddhist, or Jain or some subsidiary variation of Hinduism, it is not an occasion for hostility. In fact it is not uncommon for a religious man to visit a series of these "denominational" temples in the course of a morning's worship.

The most disturbing religious element came with the conquering Moguls who brought Islam, made many converts, and at the same time set themselves up as rulers and maintained their position for many centuries. With few exceptions, however, these Moslem rulers had great breadth and tolerance even though they were in their religious practices antagonistic to the Hindus. It must not be forgotten that the converts to the new religion were also Indians, thoroughly adjusted to Indian life. This explains the fact that they and Hindus have lived in villages together for generations with only an occasional conflict. When it was made clear to them that there were political possibilities of prestige involved in the assertion of religious rights, the trouble began. The claim of Gandhi that much of the conflict between Hindu and Moslem has been fomented by the English seems to be pretty well substantiated. At least it is exactly what is usually done when the dominant power is threatened; namely, the opposition is weakened by being divided. The division between Moslem and Hindu, however, is much less than generally prevails among people of such potentially antagonistic religious customs. Since it was the custom of castes not to eat with other castes, the meat-eating Moslems created

less shock to the non-meat-eating Hindus than would have been the case had it not been impossible for them ever to eat together under any conditions.

Along with sectarian divisions there have been social integrations and adjustments that have made it possible for people who differed most widely to live amicably side by side. This situation has never been found elsewhere. The Buddhists, Jains, Parsees, Moslems, Jews, Christians, and others are groups whose religious teaching precludes caste but inevitably have an integrated caste organization of their own outside the framework of Hinduism. They could all find a place in a social order which was based on the assumption that groups could intermingle and at the same time be apart. As a result of this long experience with a multitude of religious forms the fact that the English came with another religion did not offend the Indians, and the more devout an Englishman was the better he could be understood. Since Lord Irwin, who carried on negotiations with Gandhi, was a very ardent churchman he was held in such favor that, in spite of the strain of the situation, he was accepted with more confidence, than, for example, Lord Reading, his predecessor whose piety was not strong. Another result of this tolerant spirit is that Hindus are not interested in propaganda. A Hindu should be a good Hindu, but that is no reason why anyone else should be a Hindu. Buddhists were missionaries, and Hinduism spread at one time in the very early days, but now, at least, there is no idea that anyone should be converted to Hinduism. Of course the caste system which determined by birth the status of an individual within the religion made it impossible for one born outside to be brought in. This fact may have had some part in making the zealous in former times start reform movements that rejected caste so that they could proselyte, though their primary object was "purification." In the last hundred years, growing out of the contact with modern ideas, there have been many

eminent men who have given their lives to theological and social reform, always, however, building on the foundations of the traditional mysticism. The clash between fundamentalism and modernism is a familiar experience everywhere, and, since the modernistic promoters have in India, in almost every case, consistently given up material advantages, their sincerity has been accepted and their influence has spread widely. The possibility and success of Tagore and Gandhi, who have been critical of practices very dear to the hearts of millions, are explained because each is the sort of Holy Man so familiar in Indian experience.

It was the wealth of philosophical writings that first attracted Western attention to the great background of Indian culture. Some of them have been translated, but the bulk is still in the original. Those who have devoted themselves to it feel that it is almost an inexhaustible mine.

Much has been written on the psychological side also, but more of it is known from the actual manifestations of the subconscious power to control the body. Such exhibitions of this as have come to the West have been astounding, though often partly faked, but it is nothing compared to what has been common in India itself. The whole theory of the importance of the subconscious is new in psychological interest in the West, but though laws regarding the subconscious were not formulated, its control power has been well understood in India. When the door is fully open to the modern psychological method developed even more than at present, inviting free access to the body of knowledge on the subject of the subconscious in India, its significance will be vastly enlarged. In general, the Western knowledge has been no deeper than the thin superficial level of individual experience, while in India it has been devoted, narrowly but profoundly, to the underlying levels of human and social possibilities. The objective has been at the antipodes of materialism, repudiating the ultimateness of the physical world in the search for reality. What-

ever delusions may finally be developed in this search, it was a field of experience that had to be plumbed before the claims of mysticism and the subconscious can be rejected.

Although there is dogma in Indian religion, it is not so important as experience, while in Western religion theology and dogma often entirely supplant experience. It is for this reason that now, when new methods of thinking undermine the validity of hitherto accepted Western theology, there is a minimum left, and Christianity is losing its power except for the residuum that has been incorporated into practice. We may thus be said to have a Christian way of life that is growing stronger while the interest in its dogmas is growing weaker. We explain the individualism of the West as the result of a sparse population with vast material resources; the ethics of China as due to a congested population; and the religious interest of India as the result of a congested population in a climate where life was precarious and short so that attention was early turned to finding a compensation in something beyond life. It is not necessary to know the details of the philosophy nor the ramifications of the theology to discover that a heritage has come down in the people of India that is even more characteristic than Communism to the people of Russia, and as persistent and highly developed as the social system of China, and, like each of these, proficient where the rest of the world is weak.

We have discussed the diversity of blood in India; that of language is much greater. China has one language and several dialects. India has eight or more distinctive languages and a hundred and fifty different dialects. The Indo-Aryan language with many dialects is spoken by about two-thirds of the population. This language is Sanscrit at base and is closely allied to European languages. This discovery made by the philologists in the last century shows a relationship that has not been so clearly worked out by the historians.

In contrast with the West where wealth and power have been the standards for the measure of success, in India poverty and unworldliness were defined as Good, and the men who have attained the highest influence have espoused them both. Just as in the West the poor imitate the rich so that they may pass for what they are not, so in India many of the same sort without genuine spiritual interests have imitated the Holy Men. It is not easy to distinguish the fakes, and homage has been paid them, but their existence shows that it is humanly possible to posit as good exactly what in the West is considered bad. The millions of beggars who live miserable existences know what gives social prestige and go after it. There are many Indians who are wealthy and make great display of their wealth, but a penniless "saint" has incomparably higher standing and often more power than they. This has bred a habit of charitableness which is entirely unscientific in the Western sense, but takes care of the situation with an efficiency which, for the circumstances, has the same quality as that found in China. It cannot be defined and must be understood by growing up with it.

The pattern of life and thought that has been India from time immemorial furnishes the groundwork for the building of a national movement which only awaited the awakening now common to the rest of the world. Whether or not Gandhi had appeared to give the unique turn to the revolutionary movement, it would have come at the same time in some form. When it did come it involved the greatest number of people ever engaged in a revolution and it is against the greatest empire that ever existed. The weapons which it has used and the character of its leader give it a uniqueness without parallel; but when it is observed more closely there emerge exactly the same developments and tendencies that are found in all nationalistic revolutions. These we shall consider in the next chapter.

Chapter XIII

GANDHI AND THE INDIAN REVOLUTION

It is not necessary to bring special indictments against the British administration of India to explain the causes of the revolt of the Indians. Examples of bad faith and blundering methods are abundant and the case against England is strong, but, even within its own proper jurisdiction, the people of every country are enraged at the inadequacies and injustice of their own governments. All governments are born in selfishness and grow in corruption.

England came to India by way of the East India Company, whose scandalous commercial practices were stopped only when the government assumed political control. No one can now be found who will defend the methods of this earliest intrusion of England into India.

There have been two motives and an excuse for British possession of India. The first is economic; the second is glory; and the excuse is the good of India. England has thrown dust in the eyes of critics by saying that the administration of India is an expense instead of a source of income; but India is a foreign market of immense size that has been controlled for the benefit of British capital. There are masses of statistics to show the trade advantages that England has received from India, but an immediate indication of their importance appears when an Indian boycott almost blotted out certain lines of manufacturing in England.

The thrill of satisfaction felt by Queen Victoria when she became Empress of India has been shared by British subjects everywhere. The loss of India means the reduction

of prestige and self-confidence of every British citizen. It is an emotional factor that colors every interpretation of duty. The moral justification which has become so much needed in all imperialistic enterprises has been unusually strong in the case of India. The English have developed efficient administrative systems that are tinged with moral idealism. They came to India as a government to right wrongs. The long line of viceroys and civil servants has undoubtedly been of higher quality and with more feeling of responsibility than the average officers in the government of any other country. They succeeded for a time in enlisting the enthusiastic support of a large proportion of the leading Indians. Gandhi himself was fifty years old before he lost his conviction that the English character and government were the best in the world. Even now he respects the idealism of the English and only opposes their government in India.

Unhappily there have crept into India the same insidious conditions that are bringing revolt against the selfishness of capitalistic governments everywhere, whether governments over aliens or over their own people. It was those conditions leading to the possible development of Communist ideas in India that brought in the harsh hand of ruthlessness that precipitated the change of feeling in Gandhi and in other leaders as well as in the masses of the people. There had long been smoldering revolt, but its outbreak could have been long averted and perhaps circumvented if there had been vision and wisdom instead of panic. India, under the leadership of Gandhi, had been loyal during the War and contributed both money and men in large measure, and expected in return at least confidence and the promised increase of self-government. Two specific acts aroused the people to fury. Immediately after the War when the hysteria against Communism was at its height the Rowlatt Act, which gave the right of search without warrant and trial without jury of anyone suspected

of being in sympathy with Communism, was passed against the unanimous opposition of the Indians. After it had become a law, never once was it invoked, but the irrevocable harm had been done. Then came the Amritsar massacre in which General Dyer turned machine guns on an innocent mass meeting. After the government had repudiated the action and retired General Dyer, the English people gave him a large sum of money to indicate their appreciation for what he had done. From the time of the Rowlatt Act and Amritsar the possibility of loyalty to the British Empire was lost forever. Since then stupid methods added fuel to the fire blundering authority was trying to put out.

It is not, in the final analysis, the badness of the government that brought on the revolution, but, in these awakened times, the resentment against any alien government, however good. It adds realism to the argument to emphasize the shortcomings of a government administered from afar by a race conscious of its superiority, and puts the reason on a different basis from that on which it actually belongs, namely, that a people with a long history is striving to throw off its own "slave psychology." (Accusations against English rule may be found in detail in Sunderland's *India in Bondage*, Zimand's *Living India* and Durant's *The Case for India*.) On the other hand there has been a serious effort on the part of the English to understand and to administer wisely. (The Simon Report, 1930, sought to outline a course to solve pressing problems. Ramsay MacDonald in *The Government of India* and E. J. Thompson in *Reconstructing India* treat the Indian question sympathetically from the point of view of Great Britain, and there are many other similar books.)

The recent focus of attention on the revolution and on Gandhi suggests that there is something new and unique about his idea and method, but nothing is farther from the fact. The Indian revolution has been mustering its force for a century, and was as inevitable as the revolu-

tion of Russia; the method made spectacular and effective by Gandhi is as characteristic of India as Communism is of Russia. All the elements possible for a revolutionary nationalistic movement have been taking form in India during the recent period that has spread nationalism all over the world.

One of the first factors to be considered is that of race. The English manner in dealing with a subject people is always reserved. When the subject people happen to be of another race the mannerisms are exaggerated. They actually constituted themselves into another caste, higher than that of the Brahmin, but the Indians being accustomed to caste were not at first offended by that. When, however, the national feeling began to bring some solidarity among the strictly Indian castes, there came a feeling of racial consciousness which has greatly accelerated the national movement.

Gandhi began his momentous career as a result of race discrimination in South Africa; though race has not played much part in the slogans, the fact that Indians can always be distinguished from foreigners, who generally have been English, has made the movement more articulate. Desire for racial and desire for national self-respect emerged inextricably tied up together. Since success in the achievement of this desire appears inevitable, some white people have solaced themselves with the claim that the Indians are really *brown* white people. There would be some basis for this claim if India were not a unit in the struggle of nationalism, for India is not one in racial composition. Originally it is claimed that caste lines were based on race, but as caste came under religious sanctions the racial idea was lost and in the same caste now there is a wide variation in color. Some Brahmins could pass for Caucasians and some for Negroes. (This latter is due to borrowing of the caste organization by Dravidians; also to amalgamation in some cases.)

The national movement had its early intercommunication through the instrument of English; now language is undergoing the same process of symbolization that characterizes most national movements. The ancient Sanscrit which was the language of the scriptures underlies several of the languages, and is perhaps nearest to Hindi. It has been decided to accept Hindi-Hindustani (the former predominates in Sanscritic script, the latter in Arabic script) as an ultimate substitute for English as a common language. For the present, all higher education is carried on in English but the interest in a national language is growing by leaps and bounds. The writer was asked, when speaking at the university at Allahabad, if he thought English would stay in the universities; he replied that it would probably not last longer than it would take to translate and write new material needed for educational purposes, and that this would perhaps not be more than twenty-five years. There was instantaneous and unanimous applause. The Indian National Congress was founded by leaders well-versed in English and its meetings were conducted in English as a matter of course until two or three years ago; then there was an overwhelming demand to use any native language rather than English though there was no language that as many could understand as well as English.

The movements in the relations of religions have also been true to type in making a genuine nationalist movement. The great leaders of the reform movements have always emphasized the need of making common cause with the present day popular awakening, whatever the religious allegiance, and have made this a definite part of their program. It has been easy to magnify the conflict between Moslem and Hindu, and there is no doubt that the government has often found it advantageous to play one against the other, and in its publicity to tell the world that tragedy would result if these two religions were left free to fly at

each other's throats. This has actually created an exaggerated and artificial situation which makes some religionists of each group militant against those of others. However, the weight of leadership among the Indians has striven to bring them closer and closer together. It is not only Hindus and Moslems that have come together, but also Jews, Parsees, and Christians.

The symbols of history in national movements are like those of religion and language and have an emotional content that fits into habits. Indian history has rich records and a succession of both personalities and monuments. The English educational system which was introduced into India taught English history and ignored that of India. Gradually resentment against this has grown and efforts are being made to offset it. The Indian history has the advantage of being vastly longer than that of the British Empire and is richer in content, and, even in its recent phases, not without flashes of brilliance. Just as the Zionist Jews turned to Jerusalem as the place to found a university that should serve as a center for the study of the past in Jewish history and literature, and as a preparation for additional contribution from Jews to the world of to-day appropriate to their traditions, so the Hindus turned to Benares.

Benares was the religious center of India so long before Buddha that when he began his preaching he went to Benares as a matter of course. It was fitting, therefore, that when the Hindu University was founded with its inspiration depending on the same sentiment that took Jews to Jerusalem, Benares, "the ancient seat of Hindu religion and learning," should become also the seat of the modern university which was founded with the purpose of meeting the needs of modern education in terms of the historic spirit. It is also an interesting coincidence which must be explained by the spirit of the times that the University of Benares was founded in 1916, at the very time

when the Zionists were laying the plans for their university at Jerusalem. Consistently with the unity of India, the support of the university comes from every part of India, both the parts ruled by the English and those under the Native Princes. It was a definitely nationalistic enterprise, and has in the brief period been a great success.

Its significance is clearly expressed in the words of one prominent Indian:

"No enlightened Hindu can fail to be moved by a reflection on the achievements of his ancestors in the fields of religion, philosophy, and science; nor can he be blind to the features of the new cycle in which human destiny now revolves amidst influences of the western civilization. While his patriotism fixes his eyes on the rapid changes taking place in the world, his national bias attaches him to the rich legacy he has inherited, which he values and cherishes all the more as it is threatened to be absorbed by the commercial spirit of Europe. The modern Hindu, in fact, is learning to identify his love of the country with a reverence for the religion and traditions of his nation. . . ."

The leadership of the struggle has been centered in the character and ideals of Mahatma Gandhi, who has introduced new methods and new objectives into the social process. He captivated the imagination of the world because he aroused a responsive chord in people whose faith had weakened everywhere, but whose hopes had not been killed.

Ten years before the power of Gandhi reached the vastly greater heights to which it came in 1930, Rabindranath Tagore said:

"To see a whole nation of different races, of differing temperaments and ideals, joining hands to follow a saint, that is a modern miracle, and only possible in India. The worst and most deep-rooted passions are soothed by the words: 'Mahatma Gandhi forbids it.' I don't agree with Gandhi in many things; I give him my utmost reverence

and admiration. He is not only the greatest man in India; he is the greatest man on earth today."

The interest of the whole world in Gandhi comes both from the fact that he is leading a movement of great masses of people and because he is giving an interpretation and application of religion which others have believed but not hoped to see practiced.

So much has been written about Gandhi that it is not necessary here to add much more except to bring him into relation to the other movements which have been described. Like Sun Yat-sen and Lenin, Gandhi found his inspiration partly in the West and, like them, he turned it into a weapon against the West by welding it into the culture pattern of India. He has had more people massed behind him than they had, but his power came from the fact that he was the same manner of man behind whom Indians have massed from time immemorial. He differed from his predecessors only in that he came at a time when a national ideal is added to the religious ideal. He was a religious reformer as his predecessors had been, but he had the added knowledge of the social, religious, and philosophical systems of the whole world to draw from and he used them with great effectiveness. Although he performed what are unquestionably political miracles, he will probably retain his eminence through the ages in India for his religious life and interpretations rather than for his political power. The Indians understand him primarily as a saint; and they understand the political implications of his program only because they are set in the familiar religious picture.

The significance of Gandhi to the outside world comes from the same source. He has concentrated attention on the practical power of spiritual emphasis at the very moment when the world has almost exhausted the satisfactions of materialism, and is facing a bankruptcy of its own religions. Gandhism and Russian materialistic Communism are poles apart, even though Gandhi has been interested

primarily in the welfare of the masses as the Communists have been. Now his interpretation of the meaning and responsibilities of life has been getting the same kind of hopeful attention as has been given to Communism. Each seems to meet a need for which people have been yearning, but they were caught in the drift of capitalism and mechanism from which they could not save themselves without outside help.

The unique quality in Gandhi's leadership is the close interrelation between the ultimate spiritual value and the practical ends to which he attaches them. His religious utterances have been in terms of universals; that is, he has laid down principles that have no reference to a particular time or culture, and still been involved in contemporary social and political problems which have to be decided practically. There may well be disagreement about his religious principles, for they must be accepted on faith and experience, but in contemporary and complicated practical situations it is inevitable that there should be sharp differences of opinion; only the outcome can evaluate his judgment. The significant thing to the world outside of India is that Gandhi has demonstrated that it is possible to achieve momentous results through the weapon of self-restraint supported by faith, on the part of millions, rather than by the conventional method of force. The method of non-violent resistance can now be copied by those who are deprived of the control over arsenals, and be used by them with a new confidence of success.

Because of the frankness of his life, the intelligence of many of his intimate followers, the wide range of his discussions, the fullness of the records, and the historical significance of his leadership, we might hope that Gandhi could escape the myths that will lead to eventual deification. It is doubtful if this escape is possible, for his great power came from the homage of masses to whom the possession of supernatural qualities does not seem strange.

What Gandhi has stood for has been the possibility of a consistency between faith and economic and political life. His symbols of faith were Hindu, but the interpretation of these symbols was eclectic and his application of them immediate and practical. The result will be rapid emancipation of Hinduism from the incrustations of formalism, comparable to the influence of Jesus on the Hebrew religion. Because he went below the surface of theology in his preaching and practice and re-emphasized the Hindu teaching that the truth underlying all religions is the same and that it can be translated into a rule of life, it is probable that all contemporary and future religions will be greatly influenced by him. The philosophy behind his spinning may also enter into economic theory. The world-wide interest in Gandhi has been not so much because of his political significance as because he harmonized his conduct with his ideals. The Indian revolution, it may be pointed out, has been the occasion for the application of his power and has forced the world's attention to his technique.

The writer happened to be at the ashram of Gandhi for three days during the week preceding the beginning of the famous Salt March which started on March 12, 1930. The following notes were written the next day.

The visit with Gandhi was perhaps at one of the great moments in history and certainly the most romantic one of all time. I say this without qualification. The contrast between the extravagant viceroy's palace and the humble ashram of Gandhi is antipodal and the men they house are admittedly the only two representatives of power in India. The events of the last two days have shown that the hold of Gandhi on the imagination of countless millions of people is stupendous.

For ten years Gandhi has been compared to Jesus. In all this time he has not made a slip to break the comparison. He has, however, subjected himself to criticism for his political policies. This is inevitable, because political policies are temporal and

open to differences of opinion; but for his eternal qualities he has lived in the presence of God. Buddha and many other Indians, and, perhaps, Tolstoy, have been as consistent, but most religious leaders were primarily interested only in the souls of men. Gandhi is the first saint actually to identify a spiritual technique with a program for the solution of social problems. This spiritual side you cannot escape when in his environment. Of course some of his followers are fanatics. But Gandhi is not a fanatic; he is a saint. To him only one thing is bad and that is sin, and he tries to escape it by constant communion with God. There is no cant or ritualism in the prayers and fastings that he performs.

Gandhi was in the best of health and spirits, running and skipping with the children on his daily walk, and on all occasions full of laughter and banter. He has girded his loins for the battle of his life to arouse and free India, with absolute confidence that the final outcome will be victory. When I asked him how large his following was, he answered that he did not know but it was necessary to start in order to find out, as well as to prove the superiority of non-violence over violence. The revolution cannot be stopped but it will be violent unless an alternative is made effective, he believes. He likened his efforts to arouse the people to a surgeon applying a blister to make a cure, always with the possibility that he may kill instead. Then he laughed and said, "But I am a good surgeon, for I have been practicing for 26 years." In reply to the claim that the English have been of great benefit to India he said there was no doubt they had done many good things; hospitals, for example, though a good thing, reach only a microscopic percentage of those needing them, and do not make up for the killing of self-reliance and the impoverishment of the masses. Much of the good they have done was a by-product and unintentional and deserves no credit, as for instance the arousing of the people to resistance. To the government's claim that its continuance is necessary for the keeping of peace between Hindu and Moslem, Gandhi said that the two religions had gotten on harmoniously before the English came. When the Mohammedans had shown a tendency to draw away, naturally the English, seizing this basis of difference, had stimulated it on the principle of 'divide and rule.' "Hindus must

be developed to such a point of self-control that the Moslems can have no fear," he said.

Mr. Gandhi, as is his custom, was sitting on the floor spinning during our interview. As I took my leave I said, "In wishing you success I do not know whether to express the hope that you will or will not be arrested." He laughed heartily and said, "It makes no difference; either is good. There will always be others to carry on and the work will never stop."

Gandhi is a racial and spiritual brother of Buddha. His consistent saintly character and practical wisdom give him a power over more people than any other man has ever wielded in his lifetime. In his own conduct he does everything that he asks of others. He lives as the poorest of India must live. His energy is marvelous. He reads widely and writes prodigiously. While he was on his march for two months before his arrest, he kept informed of what was going on all over India; made several speeches each day to enormous mass meetings; gave interviews to the papers; advised the women in detail how to picket liquor shops; gave recipes for extracting salt and exact direction for making spindles; commiserated the wounded and wrote to the bereaved; and during all this time, preserved his gentleness of spirit and preached the ideal so insistently that everyone knows that it is the development of character that he really wants, and nothing short of it will be worth having. The independence of India is an objective because he thinks that striving for it is the only way by which to become worthy of possessing it.

The world has tried to laugh at Gandhi's physical appearance but it has been a nervous laugh because the world has known that there was a man whom it could not classify. As a matter of fact his human qualities are outstanding. His eyes are fine and his humor spontaneous so that when one is once in his presence he is captivated. Few who have met him, even though filled with hostility, have been able to resist his charm and sincerity. He speaks the

modern language and has inconsistencies enough to make him part of mankind. But even his inconsistencies are explainable. His peculiarities about his food come partly because he has found what agrees with him and gives him unbounded energy, and partly because he often makes vows to eat only certain foods for a period or to fast. These vows he makes to reassure himself of his self-control. The peculiarly sacred place of the cow he maintains because the cow is the most helpful animal to man, but he carries over the inviolability of the life of the cow to animals that are harmful to man, and admits that there are problems in this that he has not yet been able to solve. He believes in the continuance of the caste though many of his followers have rejected it, because he thinks that it has functional advantages; he retains, however, none of the degrees of status that have grown up within the caste system, and has rejected all the ritual of caste separation.

The goal of the Indian revolution is *Swaraj* or independence. The dynamic is "non-violence." The technique is the paralysis of British commerce and British administration in India. The weapons are the boycott and non-coöperation. The spiritual elements are Ahimsa = non-violence = love and *Satya* or truth. The organization of control is the Indian National Congress with a wide membership headed by "dictators" and effective through "volunteers." The financial support comes from contributions and from tithes from the All India Spinners' Association.

Swaraj has been used as an ideal in Indian activity for many years but its meaning enlarged slowly until in December, 1929, it was decided to be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence. Non-violence, as was explained in an earlier chapter, Gandhi adopted after getting the suggestion from reading Tolstoy. He had won striking success with it as a weapon in South Africa when he sought advice from Tolstoy himself, and worked out details from experience. The attack on British commerce

through the boycott was an obvious weapon, but at first Gandhi was concerned only in the revival of Indian textile manufacture to save the villagers from their crushing poverty. He regretted the harm it did to those who lost trade because of it and at first insisted that no discrimination be shown towards foreign goods from different countries, but his associates quickly saw the advantage of concentrating on British goods.¹ Gandhi's own spirit in the matter is indicated by the visit he made to Lancaster where the textile factories were closed because of the Indian boycott. He had been warned against violence, but instead he charmed the unemployed by his sincerity and sympathy. Gandhi's economic theory is discussed later in the chapter.

Both the boycott and non-coöperation are directed against the administration of government. The latter is made active by "civil disobedience" which carries passive resistance a step farther than suggested by Tolstoy. Gandhi says that he was helped in the idea from the essay with that title by Henry Thoreau. Laws are openly broken but no resistance is offered to the legal consequences. To be arrested and, after offering no defense in the courts, to go to jail, is an enviable distinction. The jail in which Gandhi was confined was referred to by the people as a temple. The underlying principle is to endure suffering, never to inflict it upon your enemy, and actually to love him while he is mistreating you.² Since suffering rather than force is the weapon, it can be used by the aged and women as well as by strong men. The boycott in Gandhi's hands has become an agency for the resurrection of native industry

¹ At the beginning of the revolution in 1930 there was an advertisement in a Bombay paper suggesting that when American automobile tires were bought care should be taken to see that they were not made in Canada.

² During a severe conflict in the spring of 1930 many Indians were seriously wounded. The police were on guard the next day which was very hot. The author saw a letter written by one of the combatants which said, "It was very hot and we gave cold water to our friends the police."

and civil disobedience a mass movement. The spirit, however, is peculiarly Indian. Gandhi reaches back into Hindu writings to find the arguments and into age-long practice to find the asceticism necessary to make them effective.

Although Gandhi has played an important political part, and perhaps has sometimes been confused by the practical necessities, his claim is that he is interested only in arousing the people to their dignity as personalities, and feels that this can be secured only by the assertion of their independence and by very specific reforms in economic and social life. Tolerance, not only in ideas, but also in spirit, must be the first step towards the freedom of the individual. It could not be expected that the results would be achieved immediately. The great contribution of Gandhi has been that he has led a political movement of great popularity in the Indian way that has focussed attention on his whole program and has set a new direction for the interpretation of social life and its attainment.

Like Lenin and Sun Yat-sen, he has put the emphasis on the welfare of the masses and the necessity of awakening them. These masses were, in the three cases, very similar in their dark submergence. Gandhi has perhaps gone farther in arousing them than did the other two.

His economic program seems to repudiate the whole modern tendency, while both Russia and China accept the machine age as something merely to be brought under control. One difference in the conditions of the three is that neither Russia nor China had any traditional skill for which a sentimental appeal could be used. India for more than two thousand years had a reputation for the fineness of its textile products, which only ceased with the introduction of English machine cloths. The skill was lost, though the tradition remained. The appeal to return to self-sufficient production of cloth fell into the midst of most favoring circumstances. The tide of nationalism made it easier to repudiate the softer cotton of England and to make the sac-

rifice that was needed to recover a lost art by universal practice. Gandhi made spinning the symbol of the revolution, and at the same time the manufacturers of England felt the force of the argument as they could have been made to feel it in no other way. The boycott against English goods, according to Gandhi's reasoning, was not to hurt England, but to help India. There was, of course, no escape from hurting England, but if it could have been avoided Gandhi would have avoided it.

Gandhi saw what the Western world has since discovered, viz., that the substitution of machine production for hand labor is not a good in itself, but depends on an accompanying equitable distribution of products, and the providing of an equivalent value in life to the people displaced by the machine. He saw that nothing of the sort was happening in India — in fact, that India was actually growing poorer, both economically and spiritually, in the process. The Russian program of solving this problem is centralized production in which all the people will share in both the creation and the consumption of the goods. Gandhi's method is absolute decentralization in the effort to make each individual self-sufficient. For the present, at least, it aims at a low scale in the possession of material goods. This is consistent with the whole Indian tradition in which the ultimate good should be found in things of the spirit rather than in things of the world.

As large-scale manufacturing progresses it will be subject more and more to the Communistic forces. We shall thus probably see for the next century both tendencies, centralization and decentralization, at work; the centralization will have to wait until the exploitation of the natural resources of India makes possible a marked raising of the economic level. This rise of the economic level will for the time being make more progress by the process now advocated by Gandhi. He approves of sewing machines, because they make possible better production without

taking people out of the home. The application of electrical power will continue and amplify the small local producing units which will permit family and community life to continue. Gandhi thinks that in a hundred years India may be ready for the application of the machine methods of the West. In the meantime, the great labor power of the Indian millions will have been applied to the solution of its economic problem. It is inevitable that there should be conflicts between the Communistic advocates and the existing order; but, just as in China the Russian plan is likely to yield to traditional forms of social organization, in India it will have to yield to still different traditional forms.

India is like Russia in the possession of vast and varied natural resources, and it has a great advantage in location. Thrust down from the center of Asia into the Indian Ocean with the whole range of climate from the frigid temperature of the northern mountains to the torrid conditions of the south, and placed directly in the course of ocean traffic, with the rich continent of Africa on one side and the vast populations of the Islands, the Malay peninsula, and China on the other, it may be the best location in the world for the developments of future centuries.

It is inconceivable that the materialistic atheism of Russia can have more than an incidental effect on the habits of India. Russia is making a valuable specialization in order to expose the futilities of theological and ecclesiastical systems. Her efforts, however, are on a false basis because they were inspired by the reaction from the pernicious relationships of the Church and from the irrationalities which are now obvious to minds striving to be emancipated. Some day the Russians will make psychological analyses which will show that their zeal to inaugurate a new social system has in it a faith at one with all faith. That is the starting point of religion. In this present transition period, it is well for them to go the limit. At the same time India has gone the limit in the other direction, and has demonstrated

that even in a revolution and the reorganization to follow, religious values are as powerful as materialistic values.

Sociologically India offers a more complicated and interesting field of study than any other area in the world, because her numbers and the momentum of age-long habits cover the wide field of human interests. From now on, whatever happens, the world must reckon with India. The driving force of her power is now released and belongs to all mankind. Gandhi is the contemporary expression of the Indian movement, but he has been possible in his unique expression because he built upon a social system of which he himself is a product. There are other able men who will direct the course of affairs in the future, and they will often depart from his principles, sometimes wisely and sometimes unwisely, but they will be restrained for many generations by Gandhi's dynamic power and the culture which has lasted for so many centuries. A narrow nationalism is not apt to dominate the political policies in India because of the Indian background of universalism and the aspirations of young Indians to put India's technique of peaceful force at the disposal of the world. India will take her place as a self-respecting and ineluctable power along with the forces represented in the cultures of the Soviets and of China.

Chapter XIV

THE CRADLE OF RELIGION

All the great religions of the world have come from roots that sprang up in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers or in their immediate neighborhood. Even the major subdivisions that came later and spread far trace their lineage through myths and history to the region of Mesopotamia. Persia on one side and Palestine and Arabia on the other are part of the same interrelated social system. Why, since the religious needs and urges are universal, only one region should have produced organized religions that developed system after system, while all other parts of the world produced only localized folk superstitions and mythical elements of theology, is a sociological problem of great interest. The records of the Garden of Eden and Mount Ararat are not far from contemporary with the equally unsettled dates of the Vedas and Zoroaster. All of them probably developed from some prior tradition. This persistence of a distinctive tendency in a people of a certain area confirms more strongly than any other illustration we have given the thesis that, though traits may be modified, when they are deep-seated they condition for an indefinite period the peoples who possess them. Even now, though modernism is creeping in, religion is still unconcealed and unashamed in this part of Asia and must be reckoned with in all social and political changes.

More and more psychological, geographic, and population factors will be understood in their relation to the phenomena of religion, but what there was that gave the unique emphasis to religious development in Mesopotamia

cannot now be fully explained. Once started, however, through the course of centuries there has been time for persons of unusual insight to reflect on the relation of the individual to the universe. Their prophetic utterances became cumulative and turned religion from mere superstitions to theological systems whose weight has borne them through the centuries. Each of these religions when once established broke up into many sects and all expanded by going into new territory, almost not at all by proselyting from one another. They carried power because they had organization and doctrine which naïve superstitions could not resist. This expansion emptied the cradle so that there is little left except divisions of the recent religion of Islam. On the periphery, in Syria and Palestine, a conglomeration may be found. There are probably more indigenous religions in the city and vicinity of Beirut, in Syria, than in any other region of the world. There are Moslems of two sects, Druses, Bahais, Jews, and Christians divided into Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Gregorians, Roman Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Maronites, and Copts. They have fought each other with sectarian bitterness for centuries.

In the last two chapters, we discussed the power of the religion of the Hindus that came into India with the Aryan invasion as a good example of a great invasion of people taking their religion with them and stamping it upon posterity. Both Christianity and Islam went out from the same region to make converts and brought widely diverse people into their folds. Judaism, which lasted so long in Palestine, did not do this. Though most of its followers are now outside of Asia, its less than twenty millions are all in the direct line of inheritance, with no accretions from conversion. When Christianity came back to its original home in Asia it found the field already preëmpted by what had never left it. A measure of the genuine spread of Christianity is very hard to find, because its modern expansion is so closely

identified with Western civilization that it cannot be separated; but its purely religious results can safely be discounted. The interesting historical novel *The Splendor of God* portrays the life of Andoniram Judson in his pioneer missionary work in Burma. He was a very unusual and heroic character whose trials and faith were like those of Job, but he carries little conviction. In spite of the implications of the book, he did not make Burma either Baptist or Christian. His wretched city of Rangoon is now cleaned up and the jungle where he lived near the great golden pagoda has tarvia roads and a beautiful park, but the pagoda is still the most interesting thing in Rangoon and as great crowds as ever worship there.

Buddhism, like Christianity and Mohammedanism, was a missionary religion which spread to the East while the other two went West. It was a noble offshoot of Hinduism, and for centuries had a vitality that in its time must have made it seem eternal; but like Christianity its vogue was among peoples who already had customs and habits that starved it to decay. Now its strongholds are in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon, with relics in China and a revival in Japan. The efforts at reform within Buddhism will prolong its life, but at best it seems to be moribund.

Islam, Mohammedanism, or Moslemism, as it is variously called, is still a religion with which the world will have to reckon. It had its militant period of expansion hundreds of years ago and almost conquered Europe. In modern times it has been symbolized to the outside world by the "unspeakable Turk"; it has been so misinterpreted by Christian missionaries that its inner qualities and great potentiality have been despised. It is now being revitalized by the onslaughts of modernism and by complicated political entanglements.

Geographically it covers a wider area than any other religion except Christianity. It extends not only over all of northern Africa whence it is penetrating southward,

and over the Near East, but also embraces sixty-seven millions in India, forty millions in Java, about two millions in the Philippines, many millions in western China, some even in Peking. Due to their geographical isolation with its consequent lack of contact with modern movements, the Moslems taken as a group are the most backward economically and have a higher proportion of illiterates than any other conscious group in the world. This condition may not last long when the awakening which has begun gains momentum. Except for its common religious zeal Islam is altogether inorganic. Because they originated at a point where three continents and four races meet, the Moslems have no race consciousness. In fact there is no word in the Arabic language yet which can be used to designate race. In Islam black, white, yellow, and brown are all brothers actually and not professedly as with Christians.

A Christian platitude with regard to Moslems is that a thing cannot rise higher than its source, meaning that as a source Mohammed is not so high as Jesus. But in this case the real source is the belief that there is "no God but Allah"; Mohammed is merely his prophet. Given a conception of God there is no limit to the attributes that may accrue to Him. The author has asked many Moslem scholars whether Islam could be modernized and still maintain itself; they all insist that it is perfectly possible. It is a mistake to measure the qualities of Islam by a study of the Koran alone. In fifteen hundred years there have been constant accretion and evolution. We are likely to explain certain backward customs as due to the religion itself but many of them preceded its origin. For example, Mohammed actually improved the condition of women. Now the emancipation and education of women are going on rapidly in the Moslem world though there have not yet emerged many women who are outstanding as leaders. It will not be long before they will emerge. The development of nationalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and

Arabia on the one hand and the pan-Arabic movement on the other, though pulling in opposite directions, are both stimulating the awakening of Islam.

Although the Moslem is seldom converted to another religion and rarely gives up his own, he has formed several sharply differentiated sects. The Druses in Syria are one example. The most important probably is the Bahai movement which originated in Persia from Islamic inspiration and furnishes the one case where a Moslem influence has penetrated the West.

The Bahai movement is only ninety-seven years from its mystical origin, but it has several million adherents scattered all over the world. Shoghi Effendi is the fourth in the line of leaders, though he claims none of the spiritual authority of his predecessors. The Bahais retain only a few modified forms that show Moslem origin and their thinking is more closely related to that of advanced Christians than to Moslems. Their largest membership is still in Persia. The Bahai movement is based on revelation. Its prophet, Baha'u'llah, will probably gain increasing authority as a personality with divine attributes, but the intrinsic quality and breadth of his principles will constantly make both an intellectual and moral appeal. Although these principles were formulated before the modern period had clarified its mind, they are in conflict with nothing that a modern liberal now believes. This intellectual appeal may hinder the spread of Bahaiism as a religion, but real adherents pursue the program with spiritual zeal.

The central drive of the movement is for human unity. It would secure this through unprejudiced search for truth, making religion conform to scientific discovery and insisting that fundamentally all religions are alike. For the coming of universal peace, there is foresight and great wisdom as to details. Among other things there should be a universal language; so the Bahais take a great interest in Esperanto though they do not insist on it as the ulti-

mate language. No other religious movement has put so much emphasis on the emancipation and education of women. Everyone should work, rich or poor, and poverty should be abolished. The Bahais do not insist on the alienation of the convert from his own traditional religion. Instead they approve of his becoming a better Moslem, Jew, or Christian. In actual fact, however, the Bahais do form a distinctive sect and, though they firmly believe in progressive revelation, the emphasis on the authority of Baha'u'llah may make further revelation difficult. In the meantime the world has considerable distance to go before it can catch up with his program. Since all existing governments are liable to corruption and tend to use any means whatever for the continuance of their own sovereignty, thus making for separation rather than unity, a Bahai may not take part in politics though he may hold administrative and routine positions. Like all new religions it has suffered such persecutions as could have been survived only through absolute devotion and zeal. The martyrdoms in Persia have amounted to many thousands and still continue, but they have only increased the followers. Baha'u'llah was himself imprisoned for more than forty years by the Persians and the Turks. What will be the course of the Bahai movement no one can prophesy, but it is no exaggeration to claim that the program is the finest fruit of the religious contributions of Asia.

There are many lesser religions in Asia, but they are either related to the greater or are of relatively slight importance. One learns from Asia that cultures and religions are very persistent, and that they change from within rather than by conversions from without. In Protestant America there are some who fear that the domination by the Vatican is imminent and that the whole world will become Roman Catholic. Asia proves that whatever happens to the West there is no possible danger that any one religion will dominate the world until all religions become

so purified that there will be no danger from the dominance of any one. It also proves that the transmission of religious systems comes from growth rather than from persuasion; neither Rome, nor Benares, nor even Jerusalem is the original source of religious inspiration, but the irrigated desert of what is now the perhaps ephemeral kingdom of Iraq.

Prophets of religion are rare; there are greater and lesser prophets. In our time we have had Tolstoy; contemporary with us are Kagawa of Japan, Tagore and Gandhi of India. But the yearning for religious interpretation in harmony with the times is universal.

Tolstoy in his essay "What Is Religion?" says: "True religion is a relation, accordant with reason and knowledge, which man establishes with the infinite life surrounding him, and is such as binds his life to that infinity, and guides his conduct . . .

"The religion of our times, common to all men, exists — not as some sect with all its peculiarities and perversions, but as a religion consisting of those principles which are alike in all the widespread religions known to us, and professed by more than nine-tenths of the human race; and that men are not yet completely brutalized, is due to the fact that the best men of all nations hold to this religion and profess it (even if unconsciously) and only the hypnotic deception practised on men by the aid of the priests and scientists now hinders people from consciously adopting it.

"The principles of this true religion are so natural to men, that as soon as they are put before them they are accepted as something quite familiar and self-evident.

"For us, the true religion is Christianity in those of its principles in which it agrees, not with the external forms, but with the basic principles of Brahmanism, Confucianism, Taoism, Hebraism, Buddhism, and even Mohammedanism. And just in the way, for those who profess Brahmanism, Confucianism, etc. — true religion is that,

the basic principles of which agree with those of all other religions. And these principles are very simple, intelligible and clear.”¹

It is just such an interpretation that characterized Baha'u'llah and now gives such a universal interest to Gandhi.

Inhibitions against the influence of even professed religions are set up by the social habits that are prior to the introduction of the religion; the very acceptance of a religion that runs in opposition to practices indicates a lack of satisfaction in the actual values of the particular culture. This tendency is illustrated in an essay presenting a discussion purported to have been held in Peking, entitled “Religion by Contrary” by Edwin Rogers Embree, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1930. It is pointed out in some detail that the peoples of the world have adopted religions that teach them the opposite of what they practice. In the words of the Chinese philosopher who leads the conversation, “difference . . . is explained by racial inheritance, by social and physical surroundings, and by modes of living, not by religion. . . . It is not a positive influence realizing its principles in the lives of its adherents; it is rather a kind of counter satisfaction, a means of expression which may make possible the more complete adherence by a people to practices the very opposite of the doctrines concerned.”

A good case can be made for this position, but there is a difference between religions that are adopted by converts and those that grow up out of the experience of the people. Since there is only one place in the world where this latter kind can be found, much more study must be given to the matter before final conclusions can be drawn. It is clearly true in relation to Christianity where the whole development of civilization has run in the opposite direction from the teachings of Jesus. An illustration of this is found in banks and armaments in the face of the injunc-

¹ Aylmer Maude, *Life of Tolstoy*, Vol. II, pp. 598, 601. Dodd Mead.

tions not to "lay up for yourselves treasures upon earth," and to "love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." All of Christendom has gone to the opposite extreme away from this teaching. It is not true in India, where religion gets a prior hold on objectives. In reply to those who say that religion and politics should not be mixed, Gandhi says that they do not know what religion is. The Russians who have seen the falsity between pretense and practice are at the present time as consistent psychologically as the Indians are theologically.

On the whole the Buddhist missionaries must have been more completely absorbed in their work than the Christians have been, for they seem to have given themselves unreservedly to the field into which they went. Christian missionaries are unable to rid themselves of the culture that they come from. They put up guards against becoming assimilated with the people among whom they work while the Buddhists lost themselves. The Buddhists carried only a religion which eventually yielded to the culture in which it was planted. The Christians carry patterns which they cannot conceal that have had vastly more influence than the religion on which they think they are centering. They are beginning to admit that education is more important than evangelization, and that there are moral and spiritual elements in the people among whom they work that should be conserved rather than displaced.¹ The missionaries have been of incalculable service, however, in bringing back to their home countries information, even though sometimes distorted, that has been the basis of a much larger comprehension of the peoples of the world.

The missionaries have also demonstrated what is being rapidly discovered everywhere; namely, that the principles of the good life are universal, and that the problems of the relation of finite man to the concepts of the infinite do not vary. A good missionary has an influence from his

¹ See Layman's *Missionary Inquiry*, N. Y., 1932.

goodness, because it can be understood anywhere. Even though the chief element of the origin of all religions is superstitious fear, there is also capacity in man to project his life beyond his limitations; as a result some form of religion is found everywhere. The peculiar contribution from the valleys of Mesopotamia was the organization of ideals and the discovery by experience of the psychological needs and capacity of men in relation to these ideals. Whatever form religion may now take it will have to build on this foundation because it would take ages to accumulate anew what is already there. The variations which have come from divisions of sects and pilgrimages afar have brought the conflicts into the open and now the essential and the unessential can be consciously separated.

The world's theological and ecclesiastical cards are now on the table. Isolation has been broken down and each player must depend more and more on his merit. As the influence of Asia begins to reassert itself, as it soon will, out of its long search in religious experience to find salvation, it will bring forth a fund of findings of incalculable value.

Chapter XV

THE NEAR EAST

ARABS, JEWS, AND TURKS

The land, where our history began with the Greeks in Asia Minor, and from which our religion came with the ancient Hebrews in Palestine, is now occupied and agitated by three peoples who, in order, look to Mecca for salvation, to Jerusalem for their lost home, and to themselves. Once again history is beginning where history has been repeated many times. Each of the three is going its own way with its eyes intently set upon itself, but all are inextricably bound together by tradition and geographic necessity. The Arabs and the Jews have long stories which run together in the past from which they draw inspiration for their present separate and uncompromising nationalisms; the Turks have the memory of a great empire which fell into disgrace and impotence before it died and now has been repudiated and forgotten. The Arabs have the largest numbers and territory, the Jews the richest history, and the Turks the most self-confidence. All are starting in a new race, with rules adopted from outside their own lands. They have started later than any of the other peoples we have been studying, but they promise to overcome the handicap.

THE ARABS

The Arabs have two histories — history before Mohammed and history after — both are important though the latter is now overshadowing the former. They are an ancient people, for centuries on end confined in the Arabian

peninsula, then by the time of Mohammed spreading far beyond their original boundaries. They are Semitic in stock, but authorities differ on the question of early infusion of African blood. Now, however, the designation of Arab is also applied to the Moslems of North Africa, and to the full-blooded Negroes of the Soudan. The Turks who in recent centuries through their empire and religious domination were the leaders of the Arabs are of different stock and now repudiate both blood and cultural inheritance from the Arabs.

The vast deserts of Arabia made nomadic life inevitable and a settled, organized government impossible. The individualism of the Arabs which has long characterized them probably is explained by this fact. Notwithstanding the political disintegration of the past and the more concrete divisions of the present, Arab consciousness has always been unified, and symbolizes itself by ancient history, by manner of life and, preëminently, by adherence to the prophet Mohammed. It has the memory of its conquering excursion into North Africa and Europe, and its recent partial subjugation by the return conquest of Europeans. The two present centers of Arab influence are Arabia, of which the king Ibn Saoud is in the hereditary line; and Iraq, in which Feisal was set up as king by the Allies after the War in a territory that has no recent traditional boundaries. Both have increasing power because they are representatives of the dawning nationalism of the Arabs. Since both are aggressive leaders of Islam, what comes out of their political activity will send its force through the whole Mohammedan world. This world circles nearly half the globe and includes approximately one-eighth of the human race. The sectarian divisions among the Moslems, according to G. W. Thatcher in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, number ninety-one. The variations run from the very slightest to the deadly feud between Sunnis and Shias. Only one cause is able to unite them — nationalism, whether it be within a

nation, as in India, or in the pan-Arab movement extending over many nations.

The forces that are arousing this nationalism are the overt and insidious controls of the English and the French, the Zionist Jews in Palestine, and the example of the freedom of the Turks. Against the French and the English conflicts have raged for seventy-five years with constantly growing acuteness, and now with considerable success. The efficient activity of the Jews has only recently kindled a flame of hostility. Iraq, a kingdom created after the War as a mandate of England, has lasted long enough to organize some germinal nationalism against her and now has become a more or less articulate state.

Egypt with her titular kings has gained more and more freedom from England and now is completely absorbed in getting the rest of it. Arabia, in her vast desert, has never admitted the influence that Great Britain sought to secure over her. In Syria the French have tried to rule with a military hand but have constantly lost ground in the control of the people. At the same time there has been a growing development of pan-Arab feeling in all these countries, though Egypt has been too much occupied with her own national affairs to give more than haphazard attention to the whole Arab movement.

The new means of communication and travel have been revolutionary in Arab life. The automobile probably holds first place. In the well-developed countries of the West the automobile has reorganized social life, but in the isolated areas of Asia it came without the previous experience of the space-destroying railroad and was a miracle. In China its possibilities are just being felt, but the lack of roads will greatly delay its full importance. In India it has made more headway, but in the Near East with the roads built by the English and the French and the recent discovery that the automobile could be used on the deserts without roads, it is of incalculable importance. Distances

that could only be crossed in weeks by the slow-moving camel are now covered in a few hours by the automobile; since there are few natural barriers between the historical and present artificial areas occupied by Arabs, the new freedom of contact raises new possibilities of unity.

The cultural unity of the Arabs is based on language and religion as well as on a common form of economic and tribal life. The divisions imposed by external power have had some influence in making for local nationalism, but they have also, by the unnaturalness of the boundaries, greatly stimulated the growth of a larger Arab community of feeling. The Hejaz railroad was built in the early part of the century by the Sultan Abdul Hamed with money raised by contributions from Moslems all over the world. It was to go to Mecca in order to make the pilgrimages easier, and was built as far as Medina, going through Syria and Palestine. It is now becoming more and more a factor in both Moslem and Arab consciousness. There are seven hundred kilometers of the road south of Palestine in the territory of Ibn Saoud, all of which has been idle since the War because portions of it were destroyed in Lawrence's campaign. The sections in Syria and Palestine are administered as separate units by the local governments. The Moslems insist that the whole belongs to them and was not a proper spoil of war, the more so because the Arabs were instrumental in the defeat of the Turks. The importance of the use of the whole of it is very great and there are now activities on foot to do something about its control.

Although the chief symbol of an Arab is his loyalty to Mohammed, as in every national movement religion is giving way to Arab identity. Already pan-Arabism has a stronger hold than pan-Islam. The revolution in India had some influence on this since so many of the Moslems were subject to England. When news came of the Hindu-Moslem conflicts in India, the Moslem Arabs seemed to be unanimous in their support of Gandhi and in their condem-

nation of the Indian Moslems who were opposing him. The bitter hostility toward England grew out of the fact that the promises that had been given to Lawrence,¹ who had led them against the Turks in the War, had been repudiated by England afterwards.

The barrier of local nationalism such as is found in Egypt cannot stop the momentum of the movement that is already under way, nor can the fact that some Arabs are not in good standing prevent efforts to reclaim them. For instance, in northern Africa where the people have submitted to the French and where the Arabic language is not pure there has been a tendency among other Arabs to look upon them as inferior.

In Asia, however, there are Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and Arabia, embracing some thirty million people, all of whom have more Arab than either Islamic or local nationalistic consciousness. The ultimate political organization is vague in their minds, and there is only one possible leader, Ibn Saoud, king of Nedj and Hejaz. He is a very outstanding personality, and, though he is the leader of the most fanatical sect of the Moslems, the Wahabis, he himself knows how to get on with his subjects and how to deal with outsiders. However, he has never been outside Arabia and does not have a modern education. It is inconceivable that he should become the ruler of such a comparatively modern country as Syria, but he has the respect of the Syrians while at the present distance. King Feisal is a much more modern man but does not captivate the imagination of the people, and in his administration has worked too well with the English to enlist unqualified Arab support.

The present appearance of nationalism among the Arabs and in certain divisions of the Arabs is something new under the sun. For the first time in Islam, religion falls into a second place. Egypt is the first expression of this. The

¹ See *Revolt in the Desert* by T. E. Lawrence.

Egyptians relegate both religion and Arabism to second place as compared to their own national feeling; and the general reaction of the Arabian Moslems against the Indian Moslems indicates the weakening of religious solidarity in the face of the new national ideal.

Although the Koran has set its stamp on the Arabic language, its classical roots are pre-Islamic. It was inevitable that corruptions should creep in and local dialects develop. The corruptions that are most hateful come from the adoption of foreign words, and, although the Koran was a constant example, the spoken languages departed far from it. Now the characteristic effort is being made to return to classic forms, and scholars are finding bases in Arabic roots for scientific terms now based on Greek roots. The advantages of purifying the language are that it is the common background of all Arabs and will make their unity vastly more simple, and also that it is a safe anchor against the loss of identity in the whirl of the modernizing process.

Modernization is just on the threshold, having made much less headway than in the countries that have already been discussed. It has advanced in Egypt, Syria, and somewhat in Iraq, but, except for individuals and local centers, has not yet become characteristic in the whole area. In such centers the attendance at the mosques is falling off markedly from year to year. There are a few elementary and secondary schools widely separated, and but few Arabs have attended a university. Except for the few who have gone abroad there has been no opportunity open to Arabs for a modern education except at the American University at Beirut and more recently at the University at Damascus. Damascus is an ancient center of learning. This fact is being capitalized in the interest of the new university which is being built upon the medical department which came down from Turkish days. It has the promise of great influence because Damascus has peculiar sacredness in the eyes of Moslems. The American University at Beirut is

perhaps one of the most useful educational institutions in the world, because it has a cosmopolitan student body drawn from an enormous area, and has high standards, with admission requirements, oddly enough, set by the New York Board of Regents. It can never have great numbers; since its work is conducted in English it cannot meet Arabic needs adequately. Damascus will undoubtedly grow in importance and supply what the other lacks. The only modern Moslem universities in the world are in Cairo, Egypt, and Aligarh, India. Obviously they are too remote to be significant among the masses of Arabs. The education of women is much behind that of China or India, and few Moslem women have caught the restlessness that stirs their sisters in other parts of Asia.

One of the greatest handicaps to a political future for the Arabs is that there is no independent political past except that of personalities and tribal organization. The most modern portion of the whole Arab country is Syria, which is at present a mandate of France.

Syria is a peculiar country. The Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans ruled it in turn for centuries; but except for architectural ruins, they seem to have left little impression. Although there must be a good deal of mixture of blood with the various conquerors, the Syrians themselves feel that they are the purest of Arabs. There was once a language called Syriac which is still spoken in a few small villages but now Arabic is the language of the people and there is a good deal of energy put into its purification and modernization.

Geographically there is no accepted boundary of Syria. The north properly begins where the Turks live. While the desert separates Syria from Iraq, for ages it has not marked a real boundary, for the people on both sides have been unconscious as to whether they were Iraqi or Syrians. To the South, Transjordan and Palestine have always been linked with Syria but are now separated.

The unique problem of Syria is its religious diversity. The Christians, who are divided into several sects, antedate the Islamic period. The Moslems constitute about eighty-five per cent of the whole population of Syria and just under half of the population in the area known as the Lebanon, of which Beirut is the capital.

The Greek Orthodox and Maronite sects, which are very old, do not present an enlightened aspect of Christianity. Even under the Turks, they had a relative autonomy and their ecclesiastical heads are still of political importance. The Roman Catholics are the product of French missionaries. These various Christian sects have fought each other for centuries and from the Moslems have all received bitter treatment, with occasional extensive massacres. This has made them turn to outside powers for protection and the French have furnished it.

In 1860 there was an anti-Christian outbreak which it is said was the result of the feeling aroused by the Indian mutiny, but one student of Syrian history says that it would be hard to trace the connection. There are people to whom that demonstration is still vivid; however much the Moslems may have changed their attitude, they still continue to create fear. This makes the Christians incline with favor to the presence of the French. Since the non-Moslems are largely in the Lebanon, the French have given it a degree of autonomy and, by a recent constitution, have set it up as a republic with its own coinage and postage stamps.

Among the non-Christians there are also divisions. The Moslems are divided into Sunnis and Shias, the former much the more numerous. Although they despise each other, both are true Moslems. The Druses, who split from the Moslems more than a thousand years ago, have developed a highly organized religious, ethical, and social system. They are mountaineers and great fighters whose semi-independence was provided for even by the Turks.

They were the leaders of the revolution of 1925 against the French.

The French may have been acting with the greatest possible wisdom or they may have had sinister purpose in the attention which they have given to the various religious divisions. Each of the major groups is allowed representation as a group in the elections. The Protestants, however, being small in number, must join other groups, and may not elect a Protestant representative. There were historical and cultural reasons for making separate administrative units of relatively uniform cultural areas. The result is bound to be the exact opposite of what was intended, simply because the French are responsible for it. The suspicion is a common belief that it was done for the sake of creating a condition in which it is easier to rule a divided people.

The breakdown of localism is paralleled by that of sectarianism. Just as in Ireland where some of the strongest national leaders, in what was advertised as a Roman Catholic rebellion, were Protestants, so in the Arab movement, which is predominantly Moslem, many leaders are Christians. A Christian from Iraq and a Moslem from Palestine, both students in the American University of Beirut, talked freely to the author; both insisted that they were Arabs first and sectarians incidentally. This feeling is equally strong between religions and between sects within both the Christian and Moslem religions.

The crystallization of the pan-Arab movement grew out of the conflict with the Zionists in Palestine. The fact that the Zionists had the backing of England added greatly to the intensity of emotion. In some sections of Syria, northern Iraq, and to a lesser degree in Palestine, the Armenians who came in as refugees intensified the Arab feeling. In Syria alone there are about one hundred and fifty thousand Armenians. They are more energetic than the Arabs, and, when they once get a foothold, succeed against

great obstacles and their success naturally makes for jealousy. The French government has a policy of wide distribution of the Armenian population in the hope that they will be assimilated. This will be a very slow process, for the Armenians have been persecuted so long that they have many of the same qualities that Jews have acquired from persecution, and in addition now have a refugee psychology.

THE JEWS

In Chapter III, we saw that the Jews had an unusually deep-rooted nationalistic feeling without territory. In 1897 the Zionist movement was founded for the purpose of establishing a territory whose political existence would take from the Jews the stigma and diplomatic handicap of having no country of their own. At first it was thought some available land could be found, perhaps in Africa, but soon overtures were made for Palestine. Tradition and ritual had kept alive in the Jews scattered over the world a constant yearning for Jerusalem, the lost city of their birth. Arrangements were easily made with the Turkish government and the way seemed clear. Some of the leaders may have been aware of the presence of Arabs in Palestine, but it is certain that among the mass of enthusiastic Zionists in the early days Arabs did not form a part of the picture. When the Turks opened the way the spread of enthusiasm among Jews all over the world was tremendous. During the War when the Allies needed all possible help, Great Britain, with the approval of the other Allies, issued the Balfour Declaration which officially proclaimed Palestine as the National Home for the Jews. In doing this she not only failed to ask the leave of the Arabs, but also actually repudiated what the Arabs had considered a promise to them of a united Arab territory.

Jerusalem is an absolutely unique "holy city." Benares and Mecca belong to the people whose hearts turn to

them, but Jerusalem is the shrine for three contending religions, none of which admits the right of complete sovereignty to another. It is a city around which rich emotions have gathered for nearly four thousand years, and those who love it most live in distant lands. In this day when territorial rights occupy such a high place in political practice, there is no escape from some coöperative method of administering Palestine. It can never belong absolutely to the people who merely live in it. Trouble comes on one hand from the tendency of the times to justify the Arabs in demanding that, since they have the great majority of the population, they should have absolute sovereignty, and on the other hand from the Jews who claim rights because of historical priority in possession. The League of Nations, representing the whole world, granted it to the Christian English as a mandate; they in turn have given the Jews special rights, while the Arabs are demanding the right which goes with their own presence in Palestine. The impossibility of a happy solution reminds one of a Greek tragedy from which there is no escape.

One cannot help feeling that the Jews have the most extensive claim to places and traditions. The Christian claim comes next; it is completely bound up in the Jewish traditions, but has no direct personal interest in the land. Their claim is backed by the dominant peoples of the world and in Palestine is divided among Gregorians, Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Abyssinians, Protestants, and lesser sects. The third claimant, the Moslems, have had continuous possession of the land for thirteen hundred years. They have a somewhat lesser religious claim, for, while it is the fountain-head for Jew and Christian, it is the third place in importance to the Moslems, following Mecca and Medina; they happen, however, to be on the field with a population of 660,000 out of 898,000, against 150,000 Jews and 79,000 Christians. The three claimants are identified with vastly greater numbers outside the country. All the 16,000,000

Jews, to a greater or less extent, are backing the 150,000 within Palestine, and all the hundred or more million Arabs and the other Moslems who are not Arabs but feel some identity of claim with them are backing the Arab position. The Arabs are not so articulate as the Jews and need the inequality of numbers to give them corresponding power. The Christian nations are still carrying on with the spirit of the Crusades.

In the process of time the various religions have succeeded in evolving a fairly successful working arrangement for harmony in religious observances. Moslem police at the sacred Christian places have long kept the Christian sects from killing each other. The Crusades settled the fact that the Moslems could not be eliminated; the few Jews who have always been in Palestine have pursued their faith with unconquerable zeal and maintained themselves relatively unmolested because fortunately the Arabs do not know anything about the Christian sporting emotion called anti-Semitism.

The real tragedy began with the unfortunate introduction of the idea of nationalism into the world, and the notion that it could be applied to Palestine. It has no more right there than the exclusive domination of one religion. To both Arab and Jew this modern political nationalism is a new concept, and the only way out is for them both to revert to their non-national traditional habits of mind before they destroy each other. Among the Jews there are many of this opinion but there is a complication arising from the fact that the Jews are backed by money and political power, and possess the aggressiveness that often makes them feared and unpopular. The American Jews are the most important backers of Zionism in Palestine, and yet, out of a hundred thousand recent immigrants, only fourteen hundred came from the United States. The logical contribution of the Jews to the world is internationalism or no-nationalism. Political nationalism

for them, if it should succeed, would mean an early loss of their cultural significance. The peculiar Jewish values to the world have been produced by their handicaps.

The Zionists make a good deal of the fact that their presence has been a great advantage to the Arab. The Arab is undoubtedly better off in many ways, but as Gandhi said of the English, the good they do is unintentional and therefore deserves no credit. It is true that the Jews are making conscious efforts to help the Arabs, but their efforts are repudiated; though their architecture is copied, bitterness is not allayed. The Arabs have had no experience in working together to accomplish common ends and their opposition to the Jews has generally been sporadic. As one Jewish scholar said, "If they would employ a dozen Jewish organizers there would be no hope for the Zionists."

Open hostilities did come in the summer of 1929 when Arabs attacked several Jewish villages and killed many of the inhabitants. The British restored order and made a thorough investigation, but the psychological complexity is so great that no one feels that an ultimate solution has been reached. The specific occasion for the outbreak was the use of the Wailing Wall, which has been a time-honored right of the Jews, though the wall supports the temple area which is the most sacred spot in Jerusalem for the Moslems. One cannot but feel that it is unfortunate that with so many hills available both Solomon and Mohammed should have selected the same one. On both sides the growth of feeling had passed beyond that of religion and the wall had become a symbol of nationalism. Many Jews who would not ordinarily dream of going to the wall to pray went at that time as a demonstration of a right.

These conditions make Palestine the unique place in the world where for an indefinite time self-government must be qualified. It is vastly more difficult than the Hindu-Moslem situation in India. In Palestine the major-

ity of the sects who claim rights in Palestine do not live there, whether Arab, Jew, or Christian. This creates a peculiar condition of spiritual absentee possession in which the responsibilities of local citizenship cannot function normally. The difficulties of the mandate by Great Britain are increased by the unhappy association which the Arabs have with the English. Though it is true that the administration has protected the advantages of the Jews, nevertheless most of the English administrators have a touch of anti-Semitism. There seems to be no possibility of a solution until the already empty principle of sovereignty is forgotten and the old habit of cultural isolation has been given up. Then Palestine will be the preëminent experiment in cosmopolitanism. However far Christianity may have wandered from its springs of inspiration, Jerusalem stands unique in its heart; the population will continue to be largely Moslem; and the Jews with their experience, energy, and tradition will furnish the fuel for a cultural center that may radiate an example to the whole world. Jerusalem is vastly more an idea and an ideal than a place.

The Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, supported by the Jews of the world, with a purpose raised above political programs and with standards of the highest academic level, already has set the pace for such a cultural center. In 1926 the author suggested to the Mufti (president of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem) that the way to compete with the Jews was on the basis of the university, not by force; he answered that he realized this and that the Arabs had already made a beginning towards a university. He added that for the present they were "well served by the American University at Beirut," the only objection being that its work was not conducted in Arabic. Of course their first steps will be faltering, but the direction is obvious. Fortunately the Arabs have no anti-Semitic feeling, being merely antagonistic to the economic and political stranglehold they fear may destroy them. Foreigners who bring

their European attitude toward Jews with them, generally espouse the Arab cause and will do untold injury to all sides if they succeed in inculcating in the Arabs the anti-Semitism of the Christian.

The Jewish colonies in Palestine cover the whole range of social experimentation, from capitalism to religious and atheistic Communism. The tolerance of Jews everywhere to this diversity of theory is an example to a fanatical world. Their Communism is entirely social and economic, and not at all political. The Communism of the villages can be compared to that which used to obtain in monasteries, though anomalously many of the most active villages are atheistic. They constitute one of the best illustrations that can be found of the fact that religion takes second place to nationalism. In the development of Jewish national feeling religion has been the symbol and inspiration, but when the land is obtained religious enthusiasm diminishes. The need for ritual disappears when the longing which the religion gives is satisfied. Only in the pre-Zionist villages can a spacious synagogue be found.

Many of the communes are trying to rear a generation of Jewish peasants to counteract the reputation that the Jew can be only a trader or a scholar. In some cases there is a definite antagonism to an education that would lead to the university even though some of the members of the colony may be doctors of philosophy. The varieties of these Communistic enterprises are in keeping with the individualism of the Jews. Each is a law unto itself. Fortunately we can count on the intellectual interests of the Jews to make historical records of most of the various experiments, for each is important.

In their relation to the Arabs there is more responsibility laid upon the Jews because they have had wider experience, can get wiser counsel, and have a broader outlook. If they can give up the already outworn theory of political independence, and exercise the restraint that they are learn-

ing, there is no reason why Jewish nationalists may not live in Palestine just as pure religionists have been able to live there. Neither religion nor nationalism can be rooted out by force or logic, but nationalism may hope for the same kind of tolerance that religion has secured after it has thrown off the shackles of the claim of sovereignty.

TURKS

Of all the peoples in Asia the Turks are the youngest, and their history the most meager. They have no share in the rich tradition that filled the land they now occupy for thousands of years before they came. They came as rapacious nomads, few in numbers, in 1227, settled and assimilated the blood of Arabs and Europeans, but imposed their rule not only on those among whom they lived but over a vast empire. They grasped the leadership of Islam and carried it to temporary victory far into Europe and set it up in India. Their success in the government of aliens was so great that scarcely a generation ago students of political science studied the Ottoman Empire as the best example of the solution of this difficult problem. Ignorance and corruption undermined the government to the point of disruption at the outbreak of the War. The peace treaty took away the great territory of the Empire and left only the area inhabited by the Turks, about fifteen million in number. But just as the few thousand original invaders acquired an influence vastly beyond their numbers, so now the importance of the Turkish republic must not be measured by mere numbers.

The Turkish revolution which followed the War was against not only the greed of European powers that expected to gobble the country up, but also against her own institutions. The success of Turkey in wresting her own freedom from eager enemies and over night entering on the highway of modernism, while at the same time keeping

her own soul, is an example whose influence will make itself felt in far distant places and have an ultimate importance comparable to that of the Russian Revolution. The transformation of Japan was not so complete as that which Turkey promises, for Japan was held in the leash of unyielding stereotypes, while Turkey had no roots except her own tremendous energy which seems to have hung over from her days of conquest. The repudiation of a religion of which she had been the militant leader for centuries could not have been accomplished if the religion had been an integral part of the Turkish mores; actually it was as alien to the Turks as it was to the Spanish, on whom, for a time, it was imposed. The new Turkey knows that she must live down the bad reputation of the old Empire; she has recklessly thrown away everything but confidence in herself and, turning her eyes from the past, is fixing them on the future.

The Turks and Constantinople were for centuries the very symbol of Islam. In the new republic religion is as unimportant as it is in the Soviet Union. For Islam the center has slipped out and disappeared; but since all Moslems have been accustomed for generations to look in the direction of Constantinople, however unhappy the action of Turkey may make them, what Turkey is now doing is arousing in them ideas of what they also may do. What was "the Sick Man of Europe" has retired across the Bosphorus and become the energetic youth of Asia. To the rest of Islam, Turkey is like a parent who has renewed his youth and gone astray but is still its parent. Antireligious legislation has not been so extreme as that in Russia, but there has been a complete separation of "church and state." The people still consider themselves Moslems, while the Russians claim to be atheists. In Turkey, though the observance of religion may be freely practiced, those who put much emphasis on it are called "Old Turk," which is the bitterest form of opprobrium. Since they have lost

both their empire and their religion there is nothing to which they may turn that is peculiarly Turkish except themselves, certainly not even to the land. Their archeology, history, and art are Hittite, Assyrian, Greek, and Roman, their handicraft and commerce Greek and Armenian. The only rôle the real Turks played in the old régime was that of soldier. Their political significance came from the accident of location, whose importance was created, not by the Turks, but by the competition for advantage by the Russians, English, Germans, and French.

Not long ago Constantinople was the real introduction to Turkey and all that most visitors saw. Now interest is limited to the city itself whose unparalleled location and halo of history can never be taken from it. The new capital at Ankara can never get the glory or political importance which it has taken away from Constantinople, for after all it is only the interior capital of a peasant republic of 15,000,000 people. Now that the idea of imperialism is given up and a certain discredit to the military life is characteristic of our time, the only military emphasis the Turks can make is the glory of having driven out the Greeks and defied Europe. Their present leadership is entirely in the hands of those trained as soldiers, because under the old régime the only people who could study outside Turkey without arousing suspicion on the part of the government were those who went to German military schools. The result is that pashas, or generals, hold all the leading positions. This accounts for some of the energy and efficiency as well as some of the bureaucracy and absurdities.

Angora, or Ankara, as it is now officially named, is a remarkable city and a symbol of the new Turkey. The original city is very old. The old temple ruin was first Hittite, then Greek, and finally a mosque; most of it has been a ruin for many hundreds of years. When Angora was selected for the capital it was customary to poke fun at it as a mud village, in comparison with the glory and

splendor of Constantinople, but it was a most logical choice. Constantinople was altogether too grand to be the capital of such a peasant state as the new Turkey, and had many other things against it. Its whole history had been one of political intrigue, both internal and foreign, and there would have been no possibility of cutting loose from the traditional corruption. The peculiar internationalism of its population and its geographic location made it impossible to defend in case of war. Ankara was deliberately chosen to escape these complications and to have a location not too accessible. There are pride and enthusiasm for the new city and disdain for the effete Constantinople. These emotions are perhaps derived from the knowledge that the new capital is now outside the political machinations that characterized the old capital, but they also show how complete is the break with the past. Of course there is some "swank" about a good deal of Ankara and Turkey, but what can you expect of generals! There is none of the impression of extravagance that one gets at New Delhi, though there is some incidental waste. The new residences that are being built in large numbers are said to be built from plans taken from the *Ladies' Home Journal*, practical houses with no sign of Oriental architecture or magnificence.

Turkey is a republic, but there is only one political party. Suffrage for the election of members to this seems to be universal for men, and women will soon be admitted. In the old Empire inefficiency and corruption were proverbial, but in the republic there is Spartan vigor and scrupulous honesty on the higher levels. Although the masses of the people have accepted the changed system it is probable that not over ten thousand people in Turkey really understand what has happened, and what the purpose is, but those who do know are guiding the destinies of the ignorant until they shall have become aware of the new direction.

The Ghazi, Mustapha Kemal, is a social reformer,

whether largely for the sake of reform or for the success of Turkey it is difficult to say. Formerly Angora was full of beggars; now there are none — probably the only city in Oriental history without them. The Ghazi let it be known that he thought they were bad for the reputation of the city and they disappeared.

The first spectacular radical reform was the removal of the fez which had become the world-wide symbol of a Moslem. This was done to make the Turks look like other people so that they would not be handicapped by their appearance. The prohibition was not difficult to enforce because it was easy to show that the fez had been adopted from the Greeks. After the order had been issued, wearing a fez became a sign of counter revolution, and a considerable number of nonconformists were hung and the fez disappeared. The discarding of veils by women was not introduced so drastically, but was first suggested on the ground that the women's faces were too pretty to keep covered; finally the veils were prohibited.

The next drastic radical reform was the changing of the alphabet to Roman letters. This was relatively easy, as President Gates of Robert College said in the June, 1930, *Current History*, because there was such a large proportion of illiterates who did not know the old alphabet. When the order was issued it was carried out with dispatch. A time limit was set for learning the new alphabet, and every public sign has been changed. Everyone, man or woman, between 16 and 45, who cannot show evidence of ability to read, must go to school an hour a day for two years.

More important than illiteracy in making the change easy was the fact that there is no Turkish literature; all the classics the Turks had were Arabic; their alphabet was merely the Arabic alphabet adapted to a language that differed radically from the highly developed literary language of the Arabs. Translations, or rather translitera-

tions, are being printed as rapidly as possible. There are already textbooks for all the schools. For the present the older students can read the old alphabet, so they can read those things that have not yet been reprinted. It is planned to introduce into the advanced classes in a few years a course in Arabic writing so that access to old sources may not be lost. The order has been issued for a new dictionary which shall be the basis of the new language. This is being made very carefully and will probably take ten years. There is a deficiency in Turkish of modern terms and the elastic expression which comes with an old and literary language. French is being used as a model because it has great flexibility of expression. Since French, unlike the Arabic, is not an old literary language, Greek roots for scientific words are being taken and made over into Turkish. The Arabs, as we have seen, with their classical language do not have to do this.

These are spectacular reforms, but there are a multitude of other far-reaching ones. Under the old régime the poor peasant was fearfully exploited by taxes, but now his taxes are lightened and uniformly assessed. The city people who used often to escape are now very heavily taxed. Their bitterness is vocal as in certain other republics.

The financial condition of Turkey is very bad, because it has no industry, and the Greeks and Armenians who had a monopoly on commerce and such industry as there was have been driven out. The government is undertaking vast enterprises which it has to pay for by internal taxes; but it always balances its budget and has no foreign loans, for fear such loans will put it under the control of a creditor power. This fear is constantly with the Turks because of the difficulty under which they live of meeting their payments on the pre-War Ottoman debts. They are determined to take no chances of getting into another fix of the same sort.

Probably the most fundamental reform was the complete

shelving of the Islamic law, which was all there had previously been, and the substitution of systems lifted complete from Europe — civil law from Switzerland, commercial from Germany, and penal from Italy.

Foreigners are under suspicion, as is quite proper after the historical experience of Constantinople. The French and the English are the most unpopular; the Germans would be in the same class if they were not quite different from the pre-War Germans. The peculiar fact is that the Turks have no objection to adopting whatever is felt to be advantageous from the West, because they have nothing of their own to go back to; as long as they can make a religion of nationalism and keep out of the toils of creditors, there is no loss of self-respect in the attempt to become Westernized.

The great instrument in this new process is assumed to be education and there is a very ambitious educational program which is retarded in part by lack of money and of people who are trained to be teachers; besides, since all the commercial places formerly held by Greeks and Armenians have to be filled by Turks, the call of business offers more opportunities than teaching. It is not yet possible for much teaching to be done by women, though there are several normal schools for girls; the old idea still prevails that girls should marry young. This latter fact, however, is in harmony with the government policy to have a rapid increase in population. Turkey is underpopulated because of its continuous wars, but fecundity is high, and the goal is set for an increase in population from 15,000,000 to 40,000,000, without immigration, in twenty-five years. If this occurs it will be the most rapid natural increase that has ever taken place.

The Near East is a hard knot tangled by geography, inter-related history, and contemporary conflict. The awakened Arabs have the numbers to give them potency; the Jews

have the dynamic of four thousand years of history and the experience of the whole world in their own hands; the Turks have shattered their idols and set themselves to the task of aggressive preparation for a world as new to them as was a settled life when they came first as nomads to Turkey seven hundred years ago. The Near East has lost its monopoly as the gateway to Asia, but it is feeling the earthquake that is shaking the continent from rim to rim. Its part in the future will be an important one, and history is starting anew in the land of its birth.

Chapter XVI

CONCLUSION

We have been looking at the age-old civilizations on the great circle of Asia, knowing also that in the center are less familiar peoples who are feeling the new stirrings on the circumference. As once the wealth of the Orient was brought to the West so now the wealth of ideas and ways of life from the Occident are being carried to the East and henceforth both must move on together. The morning of a new world order is dawning in which attitudes and social institutions that have been found wanting must be given up and distant peoples who have been despised and exploited must become our neighbors. The morning is cloudy and there will be thunderstorms, but finally the sun will come up clear and potent from the East. The forces of old habits and broad backgrounds are at work to secure a freedom in their new relationships such as they once had in their isolations. It will not be a day of Utopia, but it will be a day with the excitements of pioneer adventure; when the first dreary hours are over, we may forget the sordid and cramped past and enter into the cosmopolitan era with faith and enthusiasm such as man has never known before. Order will come out of chaos as the outworn theory of sovereignty gives way to reality and as the pressure of the whole exercises itself over the parts.

Realistic and selfish as much of the preparation for this new day has been, we cannot deny that it has been a glorious achievement. Empires and capitalists have served their time with ethics that have no place to-day. Roving Englishmen from Francis Drake to Kitchener may have

been pirates or conquerors, but they brought news of each world to the other and often in their insights portrayed most vividly more than they understood. Traders, missionaries, and scholars with different purposes have followed in their wake and woven a fabric that has bound us all inextricably together.

Early in the forenoon of the new day, but even now pressing hard, a delayed and despised part of mankind will come forward to play its part in the game of social reorganization. This is Africa. China and India bring uncorrupted their long and organized experience with the confidence of well-trained contestants; Western civilization brings the accomplishments of its bounding enthusiasm in the recent discovery of itself; Africa brings the drive of elemental tribal life that has long been forgotten by other men and gives us the opportunity to observe the foreshortening of history and an answer to many preconceptions concerning race capacity.

Africa is more than a third larger than North America and three times as large as Europe and has about the same population as North America. It is rich in natural resources so therefore is a prey to the unrestrained political and economic programs of the white race, but now it too is caught in the wave of resentment against alien exploitation and thus is becoming an integral element in the overnight changes that are covering the face of the earth. Since it is inhabited by Negroes whom prejudice, pseudo-science, and self-interest have called inferior, it has been easy to justify expropriation when new moral standards have made justification necessary.

The story of aggressive exploitation has been short in time but intense in action in Africa. It was not until the middle of the last century that the central part of Africa was opened by discovery, and not until the last quarter of the century that the powers of Europe systematically

partitioned it among themselves. The scandalous conduct of Belgium in the Congo attracted the attention of the world to a moral responsibility for Africa just as the American slave trade had previously awakened indignation against Negro bondage. The unscrupulous activities of all the countries that had a foothold in Africa, even down to most recent days, were as unrestrained as those of the East India Company in India a century and a half earlier.

The traditions of slavery are long in Africa, going back in record to the times of ancient Egypt; modern capitalistic enterprise supported by governments has continued the tradition, but with the more euphemistic name of enforced labor. Since the tropical death rate is high, the population for the whole of Africa has never been large, though concentrated in spots; since nature was lavish even in the crowded areas, the people have never learned the grinding habit of labor as the people of Asia learned it. When the sudden demand for labor came with the bringing of foreign capital, even drastic methods of making the natives work could not supply sufficient labor. To meet the shortage many thousands were brought from India and some from China. This in part solved the problem of the employers but complicated that of imperialism, because it brought through the activities of Gandhi a repercussion in Africa of the situation in India.

On the assumption that the natives would recede as the American Indians had done, the first settlers in South Africa expected that it would be permanently a white man's country. Even to-day in the whitest part of the south, the Negroes outnumber the whites four to one. In the central part, however, imperialism is not interested in proportionate numbers but in exploitation. "European and American capital is pouring into Africa with an intensity probably unequalled in the history of any other backward continent."¹ Consequently the African Negroes have begun to

¹ R. L. Buell, "The Struggle in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, IV, p. 22.

respond to the same forces that are arousing the peoples of Asia; though they lack the historical momentum of Asia they show the same psychological nature that will bring Africa into the picture of To-morrow.

Many forces are concentrating in the awakening of Africa. There are faint and loud notes from Russia that resound in the areas of greatest profits to capital; there are students who have been educated in the higher schools in Africa and abroad, who are reacting as do the students in Asia; there are missionaries who have provided education and sometimes raised their voices against injustice, and are always leading in the direction of self-respect; there are reverberations from the Negroes in America; there was Gandhi a generation ago working to secure justice for Indians who in some degree shared in the disabilities of Africans; there are the Moslems who practice race equality; and finally there are the newspapers which tell of movements elsewhere and of the dilemma of the countries of the white race. There is no cultural unity in Africa like that in India and China, but there are tribal relationships that are, perhaps, more extensive than Caesar found in Europe.

The fact that Africa was untouched by modern life made it an attractive field for Christian missionaries. They arrived long before the aggressive period of imperialism and have been important factors both in the stimulating of the natives and in bringing out knowledge about Africa. The Mohammedans with less conscious organization for their undertaking are at present making converts faster than the Christians. The fact that there is no class or race barrier between Moslems from the north and the Negroes among whom they go gives them a great advantage over white missionaries from foreign lands.

Although it has always been easy to enslave Negroes and in fifty years the area of Africa brought under European power has grown from ten to ninety per cent, yet tribal

organization still determines the control of most of the individuals. The tribe is the nearest equivalent of a nation that can be found in Africa and there is only potential unity as yet between tribes; some writers, however, believe that such a link is being forged at "an alarming rate of speed." The American Indian could not be reduced to individual servitude but everywhere lost his political independence. The African Negro for the time being has lost his political freedom, but his promise of resistance and his response to the world process in which he is sharing hold out the prospect that he will not lose as the American Indian has lost.

Just as in Asia, the War had a profound influence on the attitude of the natives. According to Jan Smuts "To the African the War meant something far more serious than a fresh partition. Instead of the old pre-War collaboration of Europe which existed even in spite of rivalries, the African saw the European front, the front of European culture, broken, and the European powers at war with each other, and the natives of Africa enlisted in a great war between the whites. . . . They shared in and endured all the hardships of the African campaigns, and the rude awakening has opened up an entirely new chapter in the history of Africa. Africa has at last been aroused from her historic slumbers. The people of Africa are infected with that vague unrest which has so universally followed the Great War. For better or for worse, the old Africa is gone and the white races must face the new situation on this continent which they themselves have created. Africa is going to be one of the major problems of the twentieth century and the repercussion of that problem may be very far-reaching yet."¹

As in Asia, different European powers with different policies have divided the land of Africa for their own advantage, and each in its own way is a source of irritation

¹ *Africa and Some World Problems*, pp. 24-25. Oxford University Press, 1930.

and stimulation to the native. The English, with the largest part, concede the most to African cultural habits and maintain the confidence in their own superiority. The French, Belgians, and Portuguese hold themselves less aloof, but adopt an inflexible program for making the natives loyal nationals. The Dutch are the oldest settlers and their policy toward Negroes is harsh. In Abyssinia we have the only independent country in Africa; while it claims Asiatic traditions, its people are largely Negro and its success cannot fail to influence other groping parts of Africa.

Africa is a continent in which the germs of new growth are just beginning to sprout, but that the world is becoming aware of its importance for the future is indicated by the large number of serious books that have been written about it and the extensive researches that are continuously being made. Nowhere else is there such a sociological opportunity for observing social change taking place such as has previously occurred only after long lapses of time. As Julian Huxley says in *African View*, Africa is a continent "equal in importance and variety and interest to its sister continents, but with its destiny still fluid, the lines of its human future not yet laid down. It is the one continent not yet set in its ways" and "is the one major region of the world still free to achieve a new civilization without destroying the old."

In a recent statement in the House of Lords, the Secretary for Native Affairs in Tanganyika Territory, after saying that the native races were rapidly developing a new civilization, continued: "That civilization may be compounded of elements some of which are distasteful to us, and it is in any case in its infancy, but it is essential to recognize it as a living force which nothing can prevent from growing into the great problem of the twentieth century European rule in Africa. The submissive savage, whose only needs are a full stomach and a blanket, is rapidly disappearing as a direct consequence of our presence in

Africa, and even if large numbers of natives might not be correctly described thus at present, that description has already ceased to have any practical relation to the major problems which confront those whose business is the administration of African natives. Well-informed native opinion is widespread.”¹

Nationalism in the sense in which it is appearing in Asia will be modified by the fact that the past of Africa is less articulate, though the tribal organizations have national possibilities. For the whole of Africa there is a budding resentment against alien white control. This is creating intense fear in the whites who have settled there and is making them adopt measures that aggravate what they try to prevent.

To-morrow's dawn is coming up “like thunder” in the awakening of the two largest continents, one very old in human experience and the other very young. The breakdown of the capitalist system in the West is but a flash of lightning in comparison. The serious question arises whether the West can survive. The answer of our whole study is that a culture cannot be destroyed even though it lapse for centuries. But a changed and chastened West need not lapse at all, for it is large and dynamic in its qualities. It has reached its geographical limits and must now settle down to creating a philosophy more profound than the one that has been measured by economic goods. It must acquire a humility that did not find place in the days of its restless adventures. As it passes out of adolescence into early maturity this is all possible. Adventure in economic enterprise was normal when all people were strangers; but now a new adventure can be found in exploring the deeper social and spiritual possessions of strange people and the drive so characteristic of Westerners will become softened but not stopped.

¹ From the *South African Outlook*, Aug. 1, 1931.

Cultures that have disappeared in the past have been small and isolated, scarcely more than a city or a county, brought to ruin by their own extravagances and self-assurance with few to mourn their passing. Western civilization is so interrelated with all the others that mutual continuance is inevitable. Men everywhere are the same in their selfishness and shortsightedness, but all of them carry with them patterns that were formed before their generation came into existence and will continue long after it has gone. Gradually through the milling of populations over larger and larger areas these patterns have grown complicated and large; they cannot be entirely uprooted though occasional branches may be lopped off and strange grafts introduced.

The Westerners are nomads as no other people have been nomads. American cities are but camps and their skyscrapers but tents set up for a moment while the harvest is being gathered before their builders move on to other fields. Their songs and their sentiments have not enriched places, only achievements. It is the immigrant American who set forth to make his economic way that has set the pace of the West with its unscrupulous virility. This quality of energy which has not created a settled culture has resulted in an adaptability that can project itself into the future with less shock than can the older stereotyped cultures, and will continue its impress upon the others. Some of this power will be lost in fertilizing the East, but it possesses enough that is common to all men to be refertilized in turn. In the cosmopolitan era into which we are entering provincialism cannot survive and its death will be the beginning of a larger life.

In every field of social research, the time has come for extensive as well as intensive study, for telescopes as well as microscopes. In other words we must look at society as a whole as well as in detail. The object of this book has been to throw the larger process into bold ov'

line in order to stimulate further study. Men of the older generation see in terms of old categories and throw their observations into familiar pigeonholes. Those who follow by their very criticisms start new categories.

We already accept the necessity of "social planning" but we need to make it on a scale that far transcends the economic planning out of which we now hope for salvation. The larger planning will demand a knowledge of anthropology, history, economics, psychology, and ethics — in short of the whole range of social and political possibilities. We can look forward with faith and not despair, for the human nature with which we have to deal is a constant and marvelously flexible.

Human nature is more extensive and more flexible than the protagonists of particularistic social forms have dreamed. It is one human nature that has produced all the varied cultures we have been studying with the economic, religious, and political forms that seem so exclusive of one another. It has possibilities of adaptation and development beyond the reach of our present imagination. Just as physical science has not plumbed much below the surface of material analysis, so social science has depths before it of vaster magnitude. For the time we are proceeding blindly, with social upheavals instead of reasoned progress.

Two forces are carrying us on our revolutionary way: the gargantuan drive of the Cosmic Process which no one guides and from which no one can escape, and the striving of groups of men. We have created a Frankenstein by our science and our energy. We do not yet know whether we have selected the brain of the normal or the abnormal man to give him direction, but it is not too late to give him the normal one and save ourselves.

There are possibilities of leaders born of knowledge and character, but we shall also have some born of fanaticism and bombast who may be prophetic of life or of death.

We have seen in the preceding pages how three men gathered into themselves formulas and inspirations from uttermost parts and have not only led their own uncounted millions toward new paths but have injected fear and hope into far-away alien peoples.

We stand at the threshold of a difficult new day because we must change our habits and accept new ideas, but it is a day of incomparable interest and possibility. We have an aggregate of knowledge and wisdom such as men never before possessed at the dawning of an era. The table of the Great Society is spread before us loaded with many strange viands, some digestible and some indigestible. We have brought our Western menu and have laid it beside the diverse gifts of the three wise men of the East who, in our time, have partaken richly of the feast, and gone forth to lay before the BREAKING DAY the gold of political and economic reorganization, the frankincense of ethical revaluation, and the myrrh of spiritual regeneration.

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It is the aim of this bibliography to offer material, both for verification of the claims made in the preceding pages, and to provide for further readings in any portion of the subject. It is impossible, short of a whole volume, to provide an exhaustive list of books. Magazine articles, because of their great number, have not been included, although for contemporary developments they are invaluable. Many of the books given under one chapter are applicable to other chapters. In only a few cases have they been repeated. The number of books bearing on this subject published in the last five years is impressive.

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Index

- Abraham, 220
 Africa, 219, 230, 239, 243, 247, 256, 278 ff.
Ahimsa, 239
 Anderson, W. A., 13
 Angkor, 203 ff.
 Anti-Semitism, 9, 68, 268
 Arabic (modernization), 260, 274 ff.
 Arabs, 29, 57, 255 ff.
 Artel, 108 ff.
 Arya Samaj, 218
 Aryan, 212-219
 Asia, 6, 7, 8, 23, 29, 62, 63, 64, 97-102, 135 ff., 210, 216, 217, 243, 278, 282
 Asoka, 212, 214, 277
 Avison, Dr., 154

 Babylon, 1, 3, 204
 Bahai, 246 ff.
 Ballou, Aldin, 20
 Beirut, American University at, 260, 263, 268
 Benares, 232, 251, 264; University of, 232
 Boycott, 20, 29, 174, 240
 Brahmo Samaj, 218
 Broda, Rudolph, 127
 Buddha and Buddhism, 14, 89, 141, 145, 147, 155, 171, 205, 213, 215, 221, 223, 238, 247, 253
 Buell, R. L., 280
 Bushido, 137 ff.
 Calvin, John, 87
 Cambodians, 204 ff.
 Capitalism 87, 93 ff., 221
 Caste, 20, 212, 220
 Chamberlain, William Henry, 20
 Chiang Kai Shek, 188
 China, 14, 15, 20, 22, 29, 30, 42, 47, 51, 52, 55, 63, 69, 71, 73, 83, 87, 93, 104, 117, 130, 134, 139, 147, 163-195, 198, 204, 211, 214, 220, 225, 226, 241, 247, 281
 Christianity, 88, 199, 216, 223, 225
 Civil disobedience, 240
 Civilization, 3 ff.
 Clark, Grover, 11, 13 ff., 85
 Classes, 33 ff., 122
 Close, Upton (Josef Hall), 27
 Communism, 75, 95, 105, 121 ff., 141, 167, 176, 185, 195, 221, 224, 228, 230, 234, 235, 242, 269
 Confucius, 5, 20, 89, 139, 145, 169, 172 ff., 181
 Cosmic Good, 8, 10, 57, 202
 Cosmic Process, 32, 63, 77, 286
 Czechoslovakia, 28, 55, 117, 152, 161, 167

 Darwin, 117
 Dewey, John, 125
 Dravidians, 212 ff., 230
 Druses, 246, 249, 262
 Dyer, General, 229

 Eddy, Sherwood, 43
 Egypt, 1, 3, 203, 204, 248, 257, 259, 260
 Einstein, 36
 Eliot, President, 188

- Embree, Edwin Rogers, 253
 England, 46, 71, 77, 201, 204, 227,
 241, 257, 259
 French, 57, 200 ff., 257, 262, 272
 Gandhi, 16, 20, 21, 57, 70, 104, 144,
 183, 201, 210-244, 253, 280
 Garrison, William Lloyd, 20
 Gates, President, Robert College,
 274
 German, 77, 81, 105, 155, 167
 Graham, Stephen, 106, 115, 125
 Grant, Madison, 67

 Hayes, Carlton J. H., 49
 Hearn, Lafcadio, 136, 148
 Hejaz Railroad, 258
 Hindu, 215 ff.
 Hindus, Maurice, 114
 Holy Man, 224, 226
 Hoover, President, 74
 Horizontal groups, 33 ff.
 Huntington, Ellsworth, 67
 Huxley, Julian, 283

 Ibn Saoud, 256, 259
 Ideographic writing, 180
 India, 1, 3, 15, 22, 36, 47, 56, 63,
 69, 83, 87, 95, 117, 210-244, 281
 Indian National Congress, 231, 239
 Indo-China, 29, 56, 101, 177,
 196 ff., 218
 Inge, Dean, 78
 Ingersoll, Robert, 117
 Iraq, 259 ff.
 Irish, 53, 153, 187
 Irwin, Lord, 223

 Jains, 221, 222, 223
 Japan, 35, 50, 51, 55, 87, 90, 97,
 135-162, 167, 251, 271
 Java, 56, 101, 196 ff., 219, 248
 Jews, 9, 36, 52, 53, 68, 74, 152,
 154, 163, 165, 187, 195, 223, 231,
 246, 255 ff.

 Kagawa, 143 ff., 251
 Kemal, Mustapha, 19, 243
 Kipling, 6
 Kohn, Hans, 11
 Korea, 29, 36, 52, 55, 56, 93, 97,
 139, 149-162
 Krehbiel, Edward, 49
 Kropotkin, 198
 Kuan Yu, 174

 Lao-Tse, 172
 Latin, 83
 Lawrence, T. E., 259
 League of Nations, 60, 91, 139,
 265
 Le Bon, 27, 29
 Lenin, 19, 25, 111 ff., 183, 234,
 241

 Malay Peninsula, 151, 177, 208, 219
 Manchuria, 150, 159, 175, 177, 194
 Manchus, 169, 187
 Manila, 177
 Marx, Karl, 9, 18, 105, 111, 133
 Marxian socialism, 35, 121, 123
 Masaryk, Thomas G., 25
 Maude, Aylmer, 252
 Meiji, Emperor, 142
 Mencius, 172
 Mesopotamia, 219, 245, 254
 Mexico, 157
 Miller, Herbert A., 36
 Mohammedanism, 72, 89, 237
 Moon Festival, 90, 172
 Moslem, 57, 73, 197, 222, 223, 231,
 232, 237, 246 ff., 281
 Moulton, Harold, 163

